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Abstract
This thesis considers procedural discretionary decision-making by administrative tribunals and
access to justice for marginalized and low-income individuals. I begin by reviewing literature
regarding discretionary decision-making, access to justice, procedural justice, and ideal theories
focusing on transparent and respectful engagement and dialogue between decision-makers and
litigants. I then analyze three case studies regarding procedural discretionary decision-making
and accommodations in the hearing process, addressing primarily disability and language
barriers experienced by litigants before the Social Benefits Tribunal, Human Rights Tribunal of
Ontario, and Landlord and Tenant Board. I then compare theories of discretionary decisionmaking with actual decision-making practices employed by tribunal adjudicators. While certain
positive practices may play a role in achieving more meaningful engagement between decisionmakers and parties, my analysis also reveals systemic barriers to access to justice and
limitations of procedural discretionary decision-making by tribunals.
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Introduction
“[G]overnments have a proactive human rights duty to prevent discrimination which includes
ensuring their funding policies, programs and formulas are designed from the outset based on a
substantive equality analysis and are regularly monitored and updated.”1
This is not an aspiration, an advocacy statement, or ideal theory.
This is a recent description of human rights principles by the Ontario Divisional Court.
This statement appears in a judicial review decision regarding the Ontario government’s
compensation of midwives decided on June 26, 2020.2 The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
(HRTO) decided that discrimination based on gender played a role in the Ontario government’s
compensation of midwives, and the government subsequently sought judicial review.3 In
dismissing the government’s arguments, the Divisional Court arguably went further than the
HRTO and discussed the government’s role as policymaker and funder.4 It did so even though
the Ontario government does not directly employ midwives and omitted them from the Pay
Equity Act.5 No matter how responsibility was delegated, the government could not escape its
obligation to treat midwives equally.
This case raises issues regarding government allocation of resources, power imbalances, and
systemic discrimination that are also relevant to the operation of several Ontario tribunals that
have major impacts on low-income persons. These tribunals were ostensibly created to allow

1

Ontario v Association of Ontario Midwives, 2020 ONSC 2839 at para 189 (Div Ct) [AOM]
Even though this may be a progressive statement of the law, the Divisional Court relied on Supreme Court of
Canada and Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decisions that support its position: First Nations Child and Family
Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada), 2016 CHRT 2 [Caring Society]; Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore]
3 AOM, supra note 1 at paras 9-10
4 The HRTO decision focuses on the government’s role as employer, its interactions with the midwives over a long
period of time, and the fact that it did not follow relevant Ontario Human Rights Commission policies regarding
discrimination in employment: Association of Ontario Midwives v Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2018 HRTO
1335 at paras 315-321
5 Pay Equity Act, RSO 1990, c P.7
2
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for efficient and accessible adjudication of important issues, such as income support, housing,
and claims of discrimination. However, taking a more skeptical view, they may also represent
government delegation and abdication of responsibility for significant societal problems that
primarily affect marginalized people. These tribunals have also recently been criticized for their
delays and understaffing as a result of the Ontario government’s failure to appoint
adjudicators. While legal academics have adopted ideal theories about how tribunals should
engage more meaningfully with litigants and promote human rights and access to justice, these
ideals appear further and further from reality as tribunals have fewer resources to accomplish
their mandates.
Although administrative law scholarship often focuses on judicial review, this is an avenue that
is not often accessible to low-income parties. From the perspective of these individuals, how a
tribunal decision-maker exercises discretion may be crucial for their income support, housing,
or discrimination claim. Some tribunals, such as the Social Benefits Tribunal (SBT), decide
appeals from the decisions of front-line bureaucrats.6 In those cases, an appeal to a tribunal is
necessary when parties are dissatisfied with the initial decision they receive. However, some
tribunals, such as the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB), adjudicate a party’s legal matter for the
first time. Institutional and individual procedural decisions made by tribunals may therefore
enable or undermine the full and meaningful participation of marginalized parties in
administrative decision-making.
In my thesis, I analyze procedural discretionary decisions made by tribunal adjudicators that
relate to access to the tribunal process itself. Procedural discretionary decisions are choices
that adjudicators make about the tribunal process based on their interpretation of the enabling
legislation of the tribunal. In particular, I focus on decisions addressing disability and language
barriers, and procedural accommodations that may address them. As I describe in more detail

6

The SBT decides these appeals de novo, without any deference, and may consider new evidence if it is submitted
at the appropriate time: O Reg 222/98, s 64. This means that they place themselves in the position of the front-line
decision-makers and determine whether they reached the correct outcomes.

2

below, disability and language are significant barriers that affect many low-income parties
before tribunals, and may be more likely to be discussed in tribunal decisions.
I will begin my thesis by reviewing the relevant literature regarding procedural discretionary
decisions by administrative tribunals and discussing access to justice, procedural justice, and
ideal theories of discretionary decision-making (chapter one). These theoretical models
emphasize engagement and an environment of trust that promotes dialogue about the
circumstances and needs of parties. They also reflect concepts of meaningful participation and
treatment of parties with respect, dignity and transparency, integral to the meaning of access
to justice that I will later describe.
I will then analyze three case studies regarding procedural decision-making and
accommodations in the hearing process at the LTB, HRTO, and SBT (chapter two). To identify
the approaches that tribunal adjudicators take to recognize barriers and accommodate litigants,
I define “accommodation” broadly. This is consistent with what access to justice requires in the
tribunal context, as detailed in chapter one. This definition of “accommodation” is intentionally
wider than legal requirements imposed by human rights law, the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms,7 or procedural fairness to allow for analysis of situations, such as poverty, that
may not strictly fit within these legal concepts.
After identifying approaches employed by adjudicators to make procedural discretionary
decisions, I measure these approaches against ideal theories of discretionary decision-making
(chapter three). I demonstrate that, in some situations, procedural discretionary decisions and
accommodations to the hearing process may play a role in achieving more meaningful
engagement between decision-makers and litigants. By providing transparent information
about the tribunal process, identifying barriers before the hearing through pre-hearing motions
and case management, addressing barriers that arise during the hearing in flexible ways, and

7

Canadian Charter of Rights Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act,
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]
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proactively inquiring, especially with self-represented parties, about potential accommodations
that may be needed, tribunal adjudicators may promote more inclusive procedures consistent
with theories of discretionary decision-making.
However, implementing these theories in the context of actual tribunal decision-making is not a
simple matter, accounting for the practical realities facing tribunal adjudicators. I also discuss
several factors that limit what decision-makers can achieve by exercising procedural discretion,
including power imbalances,8 the procedural fairness interests of opposing parties, limited
tribunal resources, the tribunal’s statutory mandate, and institutional policies developed to
achieve that mandate. In doing so, I analyze differences in approach between the SBT, HRTO
and LTB and offer explanations for these differences based on the tribunal context and
academic literature. I identify situations where the reasons of tribunal adjudicators may mask
systemic issues implicating access to justice. I also critically consider the limitations of judicial
review in ensuring that tribunals engage meaningfully with parties.
My thesis concludes with some brief thoughts about what kinds of future research would be
useful for testing and deepening my findings and arguments. In providing these observations, I
reflect on the reasons why tribunals may reform their approaches to procedural discretionary
decision-making. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to rapid changes to court and
tribunal procedures, and may provide an opportunity to implement reforms that can promote
access to justice.

8

Power imbalances between parties, and between a party and a decision-maker are both relevant.
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Chapter One: Procedural Discretionary Decisions, Access to Justice, and
Theories of Discretion
Introduction
In this chapter, I will review academic literature regarding administrative decision-making, and
explain why an examination of procedural discretionary decisions with a view to access to
justice will add to our current understanding of administrative law. This analysis is conducted in
three parts.
First, I will discuss how discretionary decision-making fits into the current understanding of
administrative law. Within this discussion, I will explain why a study of procedural discretion
and meaningful participation of litigants in administrative decisions may allow for a more
nuanced analysis of discretion that transcends the “rule of law/arbitrary discretion” binary.
Second, I will explain how procedural discretionary decisions may relate to access to justice, as
understood from different perspectives, including domestic constitutional and human rights
law, international law, and litigants who identify as a member of one or more disadvantaged
groups. Through the analysis of each of these points of view, I identify unifying principles
regarding what access to justice means, and more specific criteria regarding disability and
language barriers.
Third, I will describe how this concept of access to justice is reflected by theoretical models of
discretion that emphasize meaningful engagement with litigants. I will also explain why this
kind of decision-making is also consistent with current Supreme Court of Canada case law
regarding judicial review and Charter and human rights values.

Discretionary Decision-making in Administrative Law
Much of the legal scholarship relating to administrative law focuses on judicial review – more
specifically, how it addresses the tension between the rule of law and the discretion of
administrative decision-makers. I will review this literature and how it has influenced the

5

development of administrative law doctrine by the Supreme Court of Canada. I will also explain
why studying administrative discretion is important for understanding how administrative
tribunals function and the theoretical tensions that animate studies of this area of the law. In
doing so, I will provide examples relevant to tribunals that serve low-income parties to
demonstrate how administrative discretion is exercised from a practical perspective. I also will
address how theories of discretion that emphasize the democratic norms underlying
administrative law and the meaningful participation of litigants may sidestep the seemingly
endless debates regarding the contrast between the rule of law and seemingly unlimited
administrative discretion.
Academic literature in Canadian administrative law often addresses the tension between
meaningful judicial review, as a check on arbitrary decision-making, and the importance of
deferring to expert decision-makers’ exercise of discretion. This rule of law versus discretion
binary is exemplified by the contrasting views of A.V. Dicey and John Willis. Dicey argued that it
was the role of judges to safeguard the rule of law by ensuring that administrative tribunals do
not exceed their delegated authority.9 When courts can act as a meaningful check on
administrative power, parties to administrative disputes can rest assured that they have a
remedy for any arbitrary exercises of discretion. In contrast, Willis asserted that expert
tribunals are best placed to make decisions that implement the intent of the legislature. 10 Willis
took a functional approach, preferring expert government adjudicators and policymakers over
generalist judges.
Mirroring the debate between Dicey and Willis, Canadian courts have struggled to develop an
approach to judicial review that balances these competing concerns. In Dunsmuir, the Supreme
Court of Canada developed a framework for judicial review, holding that reviewing courts
should pay “respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of

9

AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed (London, UK:
Macmillan, 1965) at 392-393
10 John Willis, “Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional” (1935) 1
UTLJ 53 at 75-81
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a decision,” 11 consistent with the views of David Dyzenhaus. However, lingering questions
persisted regarding how and when courts should apply less intense scrutiny to administrative
decisions by way of the reasonableness standard.12
For example, in Wilson, the Supreme Court of Canada split with respect to the result, the
appropriate standard of review, and the approach to judicial review. In this case, there were
conflicting lines of arbitral decisions about the dismissal of federal, non-unionized employees.13
Justice Abella concluded that these employees must be dismissed for cause and explained why
this approach was the only reasonable outcome.14 In addition, she advocated for a single
standard of review – reasonableness – in administrative law proceedings.15 Justices McLachlin,
Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon agreed with the result Justice Abella reached, but held that
it was “unnecessary” to “clarify or simplify our standard of review jurisprudence.”16 Justice
Cromwell also concurred with Justice Abella in the result, but disagreed with her
characterization of the reasonableness standard.17 Finally, in contrast to the rest of the court,
Justices Moldaver, Côté, and Brown selected the correctness standard, and concluded that
dismissals without cause may be justified with notice.18 They held that it was the court’s role,

11

Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 48, citing David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial
Review and Democracy” in Michael Taggart, ed, The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing,
1997) 279 at 286
12 Both Justice Stratas and Paul Daly were critical of the state of law at this time, arguing that a focus on underlying
first principles of administrative law would provide the necessary theoretical foundation: David Stratas, “The
Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency” (2016) 42:1 Queen’s LJ 27 at 3140; Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness Review” (2015) 52 Alta L Rev 799 at 800, 812, 815-818,
826-827
13 Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29 at paras 59-61, 70, 83 [Wilson]
14 Ibid at paras 39-69
15 Justice Abella asserted that a single reasonable standard “accommodates the ability to continue to protect both
deference and the possibility of a single answer where the rule of law demands it, as in the four categories singled
out for correctness review in Dunsmuir”: ibid at para 31, see also paras 15-37
16 Ibid at para 70
17 Ibid at para 73, see also paras 71-72
18 Ibid at paras 80-148
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pursuant to the rule of law, to resolve conflicting interpretations of a home statute adopted by
administrative decision-makers.19
In December 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada attempted to simplify the law of judicial
review in Vavilov.20 The majority reasons endeavoured to pragmatically resolve specific issues
of controversy and emphasize “responsive justification” in determining the reasonableness of
administrative tribunal decisions. 21 Responsive justification means that a decision-maker must
“explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention”, 22 based on “the constellation
of law and facts that are relevant to the decision.”23
Only a few months after Vavilov was released, it is too early to tell whether this revised
framework will have its intended effect. Just to consider one critical commentator, however,
Paul Daly observes that the Court’s revised framework is not built on an analysis of first
principles of administrative law.24 He asserts that the ad hoc approach of “responsive
justification” endorsed by the Supreme Court could lead to challenges later on. One such
challenge may relate to issues of persistent disagreement between tribunal decision-makers,
the issue raised in Wilson. While the court in Vavilov emphasized the importance of the rule of
law, it struggled to provide a practically workable solution to this problem.25

19

Ibid at paras 80-92
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov]
21 Meanwhile, statutory appeals on questions of law should be reviewed on a standard of correctness, which would
likely require even more rigorous review of decisions of some tribunals, such as the SBT or LTB: ibid at paras 36-52
22 Ibid at para 133
23 Ibid at para 105, see also para 106. The court also stated at paragraph 99 that “[t]o make this determination, the
reviewing court asks whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and
intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the
decision.”
24 Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative Law” (2020) 33:2 Can J Admin L &
Prac 111 at 142-144
25 While professing its commitment to the principle of the rule of law, the majority declined to permit reviewing
courts to apply a correctness standard to resolve questions of persistent disagreement within a particular tribunal:
Vavilov, supra note 20 at paras 71-72. The Court’s solution – that tribunals will respond to signalling by courts to
determine a consistent approach – may do little to resolve conflicting lines of cases from tribunals.
20
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While the law/discretion binary may continue to animate debates regarding the standard of
review and how to apply it, other scholars are engaged in studies of how discretion is exercised
at first instance by administrative decision-makers themselves. Judicial review is only relevant
when parties bring their dispute before a court in the first place. In all other cases, the way
tribunal decision-makers exercise their own discretion is almost always, or at least very often,
all that matters. This is particularly apt with respect to low-income litigants, who may not have
the knowledge, resources, or legal representation to apply for judicial review successfully, or at
all.
There are additional reasons why the study of administrative discretion is important.
Commentators in the area of the social sciences are critical of the narrow focus of legal
scholarship on judicial review. Many of these researchers emphasize the importance of how
decision-makers reach outcomes consistent with the goals and practical realities of
administrative bodies, rather than rules, enabling statutes, or legal fictions.26 In addition, some
legal academics, going back at least to John Willis,27 have taken interest in discretionary
decisions with a view to the expertise and process of administrative decision-makers.
Following Denis Galligan, I will assume that discretionary decisions may be usefully defined as
choices by an administrative decision-maker between multiple outcomes based on the
interpretation of governing legislation.28 It follows that procedural discretionary decisions
relate to choices regarding processes with reference to a tribunal’s enabling statute, rather

26

Anna Pratt & Lorne Sossin, “A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion” (2009) 24:3 CJLS 301 at 304-306.
John Willis took an interest in the everyday workings of administrative tribunals, a subject that was analyzed by
socio-legal scholars after he retired: Michael Taggart, “Prolegomenon to an Intellectual History of
Administrative Law in the Twentieth Century: The Case of John Willis and Canadian Administrative Law” (2005)
43:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 223 at 249-251. See also Lorne Sossin, “From Neutrality to Compassion: the Place of Civil
Service Values and Legal Norms in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion” (2005) 55 UTLJ 427 at 429-430
28 Denis Galligan, Discretionary Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 109-111. See also: Jennifer Raso,
“From Enforcement to Integration: Infusing Administrative Decision-Making with Human Rights Values” (2015) 32
Windsor YB Access to Just 71 at 92-93 [Raso, “Human Rights”]
27
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than substantive outcomes.29
There are two levels of discretion that tribunals may exercise.30 First, an administrative body
may make decisions at the systemic or institutional level to develop policies and standards that
may apply to a variety of parties. Second, discretionary decisions may also be made at the level
of individual cases decided within this framework. Both of these kinds of decisions may
implicate procedural discretion. Although every decision may not fit neatly within these two
categories, they still serve a helpful analytical function in analyzing a variety of settings where
administrative decision-making occurs.31 While the nature of the decision-maker’s task and
their organizational structure may lead to some practical differences between decisionmakers,32 these general distinctions provide a useful framework for envisioning the different
roles that administrative decision-makers play.
Institutional decisions set standards, policies and procedures that govern how an administrative
body will decide future cases.33 The legislature may delegate to administrative bodies the
power to make regulations or rules, while others may make some program decisions
informally.34 Many institutional decisions relate to approaches, programs and processes to be
used in the future.35 These decisions may have profound effects on how an administrative body
operates, and have the potential to promote or undermine access to justice on a significant
scale.
For example, Lorne Sossin describes how changes to the social assistance service delivery

29

I acknowledge that the distinction between process and substance is not always clear. Sometimes, procedural
and substantive elements of an administrative decision may be interrelated. For example, David Dyzenhaus and
Evan Fox-Decent discuss the duty to give reasons, explaining that it has implications both for procedural fairness
and for the substantive reasonableness of a decision: David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the
Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v Canada” (2001), 51 UTLJ 193 at 241-242
30 Galligan, supra note 28 at 114-117; Raso, “Human Rights”, supra note 28 at 92-94
31 Galligan, supra note 28 at 116; Raso, “Human Rights”, supra note 28 at 94
32 Galligan, supra note 28 at 113
33 Ibid at 115-116
34 Ibid
35 Ibid at 116-117
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model in Ontario in the late 1990s created barriers to applicants attempting to access
benefits.36 New telephone screening procedures dehumanized applicants and imposed
pressures, analogous to quotas, to screen applicants more efficiently.37 Meanwhile, some
applicants did not have access to telephones, and others were confused by the new process,
intake scripts and voicemail systems.38 Others were more likely to encounter difficulties with
this new screening process if they had certain disabilities, such as a cognitive impairment.39
Furthermore, applicants who qualified for in-person interviews attended a cold, sterile and
degrading office environment.40 Staff sat behind a thick plexi-glass screen, plastic chairs were
bolted to the floor, and waiting rooms were devoid of posters, pamphlets, or other
decoration.41 These institutional changes had profound effects on the ability of applicants to
access benefits and how they were treated in doing so.
Institutional procedural discretion may also be exercised by tribunals to create policies,
procedures and approaches that advance the tribunal’s statutory mandate. For example,
Michelle Alton discusses adjudicative models in the tribunal context with reference to
procedural fairness, describing case screening processes, provision of public legal information
by the tribunal, alternatives to an in-person hearing, and designation of tribunal staff to assist
litigants in completing forms and understanding tribunal procedures.42 While the suitability of
each of these approaches may vary depending on the tribunal context and the needs of users,
tribunals often have significant flexibility to make institutional procedural decisions that may
have a significant impact on how they function.
Nonetheless, even though policies or standards may constrain decision-makers or

36

Lorne Sossin, “Boldly Going Where No Law Has Gone Before: Call Centres, Intake Scripts, Database Fields, and
Discretionary Justice in Social Assistance” (2004) 42:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 363 [Sossin, “Boldly Going”]. See also, Raso,
“Human Rights”, supra note 28 at 94
37 Sossin, “Boldly Going”, supra note 36 at 373-375
38 Ibid
39 Ibid
40 Ibid at 381
41 Ibid
42 Michelle A Alton, “Rethinking Fairness in Tribunal Adjudication to Best Promote Access to Justice” (2019) 32 Can
J Admin L & Prac 151 at 160-162, 169-177
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administrative bodies, they retain varying degrees of discretion to decide individual matters.
These individual decisions may relate to the rights and obligations of parties before them or
specific policy issues falling under the relevant statutory scheme.43 Many individual decisions
deal with specific benefits, entitlements, or enforcement, while others, especially at the policy
level, may set precedents which have implications going forward.44
The scope of a decision-maker’s discretion in some cases may be broader than others, based on
the nature and number of applicable standards that guide and constrain it.45 Many policy
decisions may have less rigorous or fewer applicable standards as compared to a decision about
a specific person’s rights or duties. That said, even where decision-makers are narrowly
constrained, they may still be able to exercise their discretion to adapt to situations and
applicants before them.
For example, Jennifer Raso describes how social assistance caseworkers have flexibility to
decide what versions of certain documents they are willing to accept. 46 Applicants for social
assistance are required to produce a variety of documents to confirm their identity, financial
situation, housing situation, and immigration status. 47 That said, a caseworker may exercise
discretion to allow applicants to produce photocopies, to show them an original that does not
become part of the case file, or to assist disadvantaged applicants in collecting these
documents.48 By doing so, caseworkers can promote access to the welfare determination
process by altering the procedures through which they receive documents. At the same time, of
course, the same scope for discretion means that bureaucratically or unsympathetically-minded
caseworkers can insist on a stricter application of such document requirements.
Individual adjudicators must also work within the constraints of policies, practice directions,

43

Galligan, supra note 28 at 114-115
Ibid at 116-117
45 Ibid at 114-115
46 Raso, “Human Rights”, supra note 28 at 95-96.
47 Ibid
48 Ibid
44
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procedures and institutional approaches of their particular tribunal. Tribunals may have their
own institutional practices for receiving evidence, analogous to the practices governing frontline social assistance caseworkers described by Raso.49 Similarly, a tribunal might have specific
practice directions that govern how and when hearings are scheduled and adjournments may
be sought.50 Although tribunal adjudicators may have discretion to alter or waive certain
elements of these institutional practices in exercising their procedural discretion, these
practices provides a starting point for how they approach their task.
In this regard, Raso analyzes how front-line caseworkers administering the Ontario Works
program adapted to a new Social Assistance Management System (SAMS) put in place to limit
their discretion.51 [add sentence here] SAMS was created to reshape the role of social
assistance caseworkers “away from client-centred social work and towards data entry and
caseload management tasks.”52 To a large extent, SAMS achieved its objective – it decentred
the role of caseworkers, directed them toward particular outcomes, and required them to
spend significant time inputting and tracking data.53 It was simply not possible for a caseworker
to adjust the computer system-generated outcomes in every case.54
Nonetheless, Raso observes that at least some caseworkers navigated the new case
management system to preserve their discretion in some of their cases. Based on interviews
she conducted, Raso concludes that they circumvented SAMS in certain instances by inputting
“placeholder” data, by adjusting dates to maximize benefits or minimize an overpayment, or by
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translating applicant requests into categories of allowable benefits.55 This study demonstrates
how it may be possible for decision-makers to preserve some discretion in some cases in
response to institutional constraints.56 However, in the words of Raso, “even as front-line
workers re-skill and re-centre themselves as professional decision-makers […] SAMS continues
to function as a uniquely powerful institutional force governing their everyday decisions.” 57
While tribunal adjudicators may not be subject to a computer system with such pervasive
effects, they do operate within a matrix of procedures, rules, and institutional approaches that
also significantly structure how they approach their procedural discretion. In some situations,
tribunal adjudicators could also be placed in a position where they have limited opportunities
to exercise their discretion to meet the needs of litigants.
Discretionary decision-making depends on how decision-makers interpret their enabling
statute, from tribunal adjudicators to policymakers.58 Galligan describes how decision-makers
develop policies, procedures and approaches that embody a working conception of their
statutory goals.59 He also recognizes how decision-makers may interpret their home statutes in
more of a practical way, based on their “working conception” of their job as a decision-maker,
informed by their policy preferences, moral views and political opinions.60 In other words, they
may find it essential to “deliberately […] modify, embellish or depart from those objects or
directions” specified in legislation or regulations to fulfill their statutory mandate.61 This
approach would apply regardless of where a decision may fall on a spectrum of administrative
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decisions to quasi-judicial decisions.62 Sossin explains that, “every bureaucratic decision
represents both a political act and a personal judgment, whether it is a junior official
recommending whether a license should be granted, or an administrative board interpreting
the Charter.”63
Consequently, decision-making is also influenced by a tribunal’s institutional realities, including
political pressures, economic pressures, equities, and how to allocate limited resources.64 For
example, the Ontario government of Premier Doug Ford halted evictions altogether in the
context of the recent COVID-19 pandemic.65 After this moratorium on residential evictions is
lifted, the LTB may face an onslaught of eviction applications.66 This increase may also reflect a
recent trend upwards in evictions as landlords ended leases on the basis of renovating units
and moving in themselves to circumvent rent controls.67 A higher caseload would impose new
pressures on the LTB.
A particularly troubling issue facing many Ontario tribunals is a shortage of adjudicators. In
2019, the HRTO began experiencing significant delays caused by an increase in its caseload and
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vacant adjudicator positions.68 Similarly, in early January of the current year, the Ontario
Ombudsman began investigating delays at the LTB, attributed, at least in part, to staffing
shortages.69 Beyond failing to adequately staff tribunals, political appointments of adjudicators
is another way that governments of the day may affect how well and how efficiently tribunals
exercise their discretion. Democracy Watch recently commenced a legal challenge against the
Ontario government on the basis of its practices regarding the appointment and reappointment
of adjudicators.70
Furthermore, as creatures of statute, the mandate, role, and even the existence of tribunals
may be changed by governments through changes to legislation. For example, the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Board is currently winding down its last cases after the Ontario
government decided that this tribunal would be replaced by an administrative process. 71 As
well, Bill 184, Protecting Tenants and Strengthening Community Housing Act, may increase the
workload of the LTB at the expense of vulnerable tenants.72
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The political nature of administrative decisions may be dependent on government actions to
direct what tribunals do.73 However, the government’s role in creating and making changes to
tribunals by amending legislation also implies a level of democratic participation that may
reconcile the law/discretion binary animating much of the scholarship regarding judicial
review.74 Some legal scholars argue that citizen participation and democratization of
administrative bodies can lead to better outcomes for disadvantaged groups and advance
substantive equality, while also providing constraints on seemingly “unlimited” discretionary
power.75
Mary Liston asserts that a right to public participation in public law institutions may be realized
through the requirements of procedural fairness, in addition to a broader conception of both
individual litigant and public interest standing and consultation.76 She describes how these
mechanisms have operated in the context of environmental and Indigenous law, where more
frequent participation of this nature tends to take place.77
Meanwhile, Lorne Sossin characterizes an exercise of discretion as a “social act” whereby a
decision-maker mediates relationships based on an understanding and prioritization of relevant
normative considerations.78 He argues for administrative tribunals to engage the public in a
democratic way.79 He believes some decision-makers currently operate in a much more
impersonal, distant way. For example, in the area of income tax administration, Sossin asserts
that decision-makers may do all they can to avoid interacting with the subjects of their

circumstances, the tenant would receive an eviction order and would have only 10 days to apply to the LTB to
dispute this order and provide an explanation: ACTO, Bill 184, supra note 66.
73 Galligan, supra note 28 at 110-112
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State's Duty of Public Consultation" (2017) 63:2 McGill LJ 375 at 385-387
76 Liston, supra note 75 at 396
77 Ibid at 397
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decisions.80 He contrasts this example with a model of “engagement”, where taxpayers could
interact with government officials about the criteria they use and how they apply them.81
Sossin acknowledges that there are many different settings for administrative decision-making,
and explains that his theory comprises a valid critique of any administrative context. 82 He
considers a variety of decision-makers and asks whether they are truly “doing substantively
different things?”83 Any relevant difference, according to Sossin, “is simply one of context” and
“[t]he similarities between the various kinds of bureaucratic decision-making may be more
striking than the different contexts in which that decision-making takes place.”84
As discussed later in this chapter, Sossin explains that engagement, in the context of his theory,
means that a decision-maker actively listens to and take into account the views of parties,
interacts with parties transparently, and establishes an atmosphere that allows for mutual
trust.85 Sossin describes this type of decision-making as a more “intimate approach”, that
requires a decision-maker to be more open and vulnerable, while engaging in a “joint venture”
of decision-making with parties before them.86
Similarly, Geneviève Cartier argues that discretion cannot exist beyond the reach of the rule of
law, and theories that view discretion as unilateral power must be flawed.87 Instead, she
advocates for a theory of “discretion as dialogue”, that legitimizes the decision-making process
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through participation by and accountability to the parties.88 This collaborative exercise allows
for the consideration of values and norms that account for the public interest.89 As explained in
further detail below, Cartier defines “dialogue” as an interaction where parties listen to each
other, consider each other’s perspectives, and consider norms and values that “transcend their
particular positions”.90
Sossin and Cartier’s theories may demonstrate how exercises of discretion may be meaningful
from the point of view of parties before them, while also sidestepping the law/discretion
binary. Although these theories are not restricted to procedural decision-making, it may make
sense to begin analyzing them from the point of view of procedure to address questions of
access to justice.
As Sossin explains, “[f]or there to be opportunity for engagement, those affected by
discretionary acts must be aware of the decision, its motivations, and its impact on them and
the community at large.”91 Parties must be willing to participate in a process they can access,
while officials must be committed to engaging with them, understanding that meaningful
interaction is vital to the legitimacy of their ultimate decision.
Thus, a first step toward analyzing discretionary decision-making may be to focus on procedural
decisions and to determine whether meaningful engagement takes place. However, for this
analysis to reflect the context of tribunals serving low-income people, it is important to
consider how access to justice should be understood. This question is the focus of the second
part of this chapter.
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Procedural Discretionary Decisions and Access to Justice
To evaluate whether procedural discretionary decisions advance access to justice, it is
important to examine what access to justice means. In this section, I will consider the meaning
of access to justice as defined by legal scholars, as expressed by members of disadvantaged
groups, as articulated by Canadian courts, and as stated in the context of international law. An
analysis of each of these perspectives reveals common principles about access to justice that
may be applied to tribunal procedures. These principles relate to equal, meaningful, and
respectful participation, but also go further to include the responsibility of tribunals to, at
times, be proactive about identifying the needs of litigants before them.
Roderick Macdonald describes how the meaning of “access to justice” has evolved over time.92
This evolution began in the 1960s with the concept that litigants required legal representation
to access courts by way of initiatives such as legal aid certificates, duty counsel programs, and
community legal clinics.93 In contrast, in the 1970s and 1980s, governments also realized the
importance of developing institutional alternatives to the traditional court process. They
created new adjudicative bodies, such as small claims court and administrative tribunals, to
allow for more efficient and less legalistic adjudication.94 They also modified court procedures
to allow for alternate dispute resolution, case management, and specialization, such as the
“commercial list” or “estates list”, to streamline court proceedings.95 Subsequently, in the
1990s, access to justice efforts focused on participation in law-making institutions in
government and other public bodies through public consultations, non-governmental
organizations, and other mechanisms. 96
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Macdonald concludes that we are presently focused on ensuring an “equal right to participate
in every institution where law is debated, created, found, organized, administered, interpreted
and applied.”97 This is a wide-reaching goal that recognizes systemic barriers to access to justice
and the connections between the legal system and other government programs. To achieve it,
members of groups who have been historically excluded should receive equal opportunities to
access legal education as well as positions in other legal institutions, including courts. 98 In
addition, such an approach recognizes the role of health and social services agencies and how
they interact with the legal system.99
In the context of my thesis, I will analyze only a small part of the broader socio-legal system
that Macdonald invokes, relating to tribunals in Ontario where low-income individuals may face
barriers to accessing administrative processes and where tribunal statutory mandates provide
some measure of procedural discretion. To determine what meaningful participation requires
in such a context, I will consider views regarding access to justice expressed by members of
marginalized groups, Supreme Court of Canada case law regarding substantive equality and
human rights, and relevant international law principles such as “full and effective participation
and inclusion in society” and “equal recognition before the law” as stated in the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities100 and other international law instruments.
I begin with consideration of how individuals who identify as members of groups that have
been historically disadvantaged or excluded from legal processes view access to justice. While
views of Canadian courts and international organizations are also important, engagement of
litigants requires examination of the legal system from their point of view.
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First, members of vulnerable communities may approach the legal system remembering past
injustices and marginalization. In doing so, they may question whether access to oppressive
procedures really achieves justice. For example, Sarah Buhler’s interviews with community
members in Saskatoon demonstrated that some individuals may not wish to access legal
proceedings at all, without acknowledgement and reform to address past injustices.101 The
participants in these interviews were low-income and some were Indigenous.102 Many had
experienced racism, poverty, and social exclusion.103 Similarly, a Canadian Bar Association study
interviewing members of marginalized groups concluded that community members did not
believe the legal system would hold people to account for breaching rules or abusing power.104
These studies highlight that even though legal systems promise ideals of fairness and justice,
work is required to rebuild relationships and establish trust with members of marginalized
groups. They also emphasize the vital importance of seeking reforms that promote the respect
for and well-being of parties.105
These findings are consistent with a study conducted by Janet Mosher, who interviewed
racialized youth who had been targeted by their schools, by police, or both in the context of
school disciplinary matters.106 Many of the youth that Mosher interviewed described the racism
they experienced at the hands of the police or their teachers.107
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According to these youth, access to justice did not mean a particular institutional process, but
was instead connected to more fundamental values of respect and equality.108 Many shared the
views noted above regarding the futility of accessing legal systems to redress wrongs against
them.109 They wanted the legal system to acknowledge who they were, without stereotypes,
and to hold authorities to account if they misuse their power.110 Attitudes of respect and
dignity needed to go both ways. In the words of one interviewee: “You could respect the police,
but only if they respect you ... I show my teachers respect but they still have to earn my full
respect by showing respect back.”
The statements of participants in these studies are consistent with scholarship regarding
procedural justice. This scholarship addresses elements of a decision-making process that
people consider when deciding whether the process was conducted fairly and legitimately,
independently of the outcome.111 While the outcome that is reached is also important, litigants
who believe that the process is “procedurally just” will be “more likely to perceive that the
substantive outcome is fair – even when it is adverse to them”.112 Nancy Welsh summarizes the
key factors associated with procedural justice as the expression of voice, “trustworthy
consideration” (defined as “a demonstration that encourages people to believe that their voice
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was heard by the decision-maker”), a “neutral”, “even-handed” forum “that applies the same
objective standards to all”, and “treatment that is dignified.”113
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and Tom Tyler explain that procedural justice scholars have studied
formal adversarial legal settings, as well as more informal processes such as arbitration,
mediation, and alternative dispute resolution. 114 They conclude that, in these more informal
contexts, procedural justice continues to matter:
[i]ndividuals want the benefits of looser process but still expect or want the rule of law
and elements that foster procedural justice too. Understanding that people value
fairness in these processes can provide researchers and theorists a measure of comfort
that procedural justice helps bridge the gap that may exist between ADR and rule of law
– that procedural justice may ameliorate the potential tensions between the two
ideals.115
Welsh analyzes factors relevant to procedural justice in the context of mediation, taking into
account imbalances of power that undermine the participation of people of “lower status”.116
She concludes that participants value being able to exercise their voice, particularly by having
the opportunity to tell their own story.117 However, they may be dissuaded from doing this if
they are “ignored, excluded, or disrespected”,118 or they feel “marginalized or perceive that
others are prejudiced against them”.119 She also observes that “inequality, bias, and prejudice
can get in the way of listening to someone else's perspective, accurately understanding what
she has said, and caring to understand her perspective.”120
Values of respect and equality also animate domestic jurisprudence under domestic law, under
the Charter, the Human Rights Code,121 and international law. Jurisprudence and commentary
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relating to Charter rights, human rights and international law demonstrate how these concepts
can be realized through recognizing and addressing barriers to access. I will primarily analyze
this case law as it relates to specific barriers related to disability and English language
proficiency, which are particularly relevant to proceedings before tribunals adjudicating issues
that disproportionately impact low-income people.
Roderick Macdonald characterizes the barriers to access to justice in four broad categories that
seek to include, rather than exclude, factors that play a role in limiting the ability of parties to
participate in the justice system. He asserts that many people may be excluded from the justice
system for overlapping reasons relating to socio-demographic factors, disability, stigmatization,
or psychological factors, such as a history of trauma.122 His work demonstrates how barriers
should be conceptualized in an open-ended way, focused on systemic problems that transcend
the legal context to implicate health and social services agencies as well.
First, physical and material barriers may be created by the tribunal’s physical location, hours of
operation, facilities and physical spaces, and processes. This occurs when these elements of
how a tribunal functions do not appropriately account for the personal situation of litigants,
such as disabilities, lack of resources, or work schedule.123 Second, objective barriers relate to
“cost, delay and complexity” associated with overly complex legal systems and rules.124 Third,
subjective barriers refer to institutional design choices that favour a certain socio-demographic
profile.125 In other words, individuals who are “white, male, middle-aged, middle-and-upperclass, English- or French-speaking, citizens” will often navigate our adversarial system more
effectively.126 Fourth, sociological and psychological barriers acknowledge the connection
between legal structures and the social marginalization of vulnerable people. 127 While this kind
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of “barrier” is often dismissed since it is not directly related to the legal system, Macdonald
disagrees with this approach. He explains that “[m]ost often problems with access to justice are
problems of perception and formulation”. 128
In addition, the operation of colonial legal institutions and structures, such as the Canadian
residential school system and the operation of the First Nations child welfare system, may also
create or perpetuate trauma experienced by marginalized and vulnerable individuals. 129
Canadian legal structures often ignore the legal traditions, perspectives, and voices of
Indigenous people, while privileging Western institutions and approaches.130 This may be the
case even where there is significant procedural discretion but it is not exercised in ways that are
sensitive to the barriers and perspectives of participants.131 This may explain, at least in part,
why Indigenous applicants have been reluctant to commence applications at the HRTO.132 The
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they were insufficient, complex to access, and introduced late in the inquiry process. In addition, when alternative
processes were used, the evidence gathered was deemed to be less helpful, because it had not been tested
through cross-examination (46-47). Rather than address any specific reliability concerns on a case-by-case basis,
the Inquiry made a broad procedural decision to rely on traditional rules of evidence that discounted testimony
from the most marginalized people.
132 Andrew Pinto, “Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012” (November 2012), online:
<https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/human_rights/>: “The Review received feedback
from several stakeholder groups and individuals that persons of Aboriginal ancestry are not engaging with the
Ontario human rights system, and in turn, that the human rights system is not responding effectively to the needs
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Human Rights Legal Support Centre (HRLSC) continues to recognize that “Indigenous peoples
have not traditionally used the human rights process as the western legal perspective is foreign
to the world-views of many Indigenous peoples.”133 To ensure greater accessibility by
Indigenous parties, institutions may be developed or adapted to employ procedures that are
closer to Indigenous dispute resolution, that allow for the participation of Indigenous
communities, and that have Indigenous decision-makers.134
Macdonald’s approach encourages the analysis of how barriers may implicate intersectional
discrimination. While I will focus on barriers relating primarily to disability and to language,135 it
is also important to recognize that “analysis of discrimination based on a single identity trait
does not adequately account for intersecting aspects of identity, such as race and sex.”136 Legal
theorists and law reform organizations have identified legal problems and offered ideas for
reform based on the connection between law and overlapping identities to better reflect the

of Aboriginal communities and individuals. At the same time, Aboriginal people in Ontario experience
discrimination on a frequent basis […] The Cornish Report identified as areas of concern the disempowering effect
of the human rights system which forces Aboriginal people to participate in a process that is not their own and the
lack of access to the human rights system, given the system's low visibility and the lack of confidence in the system
by Aboriginal people.”
133 Human Rights Legal Support Centre, “Annual Report 2018-19” at 8, online: <https://www.hrlsc.on.ca/en/aboutus/reports-and-statistics/annual-reports> [HRLSC, “Annual Report”]
134 For example, in the context of child protection in British Columbia, traditional Indigenous dispute resolution can
be incorporated into provincial processes to allow for the child’s Indigenous culture, community, and identity to be
properly considered. The governing legislation allows for procedural discretion to adopt “other dispute resolution
mechanism[s]” which provides some flexibility in this regard. However, the juxtaposition of Indigenous dispute
resolution processes and provincial processes demonstrate the significant differences between them: Walkem,
supra note 130 at 113-118, 121-122
135 There are a variety of barriers that face litigants before administrative tribunals. However, to ensure
manageable scope of research for my thesis, I focused mainly on disability and language. These are significant
barriers discussed in the literature that are relevant to at least some participants with legal matters before each of
the SBT, HRTO and LTB. As well, all three tribunals explicitly acknowledge both of these barriers on their websites,
and therefore, parties may be more likely to raise these issues at, or prior to, the hearing. Consequently, my
method of reviewing tribunal decisions may be more likely to yield a greater number of cases, as compared to
other barriers. I discuss my methods further in chapter 2.
136 Suzanne B Goldberg, “Intersectionality in Theory and Practice” in Emily Grabham, Davina Cooper, Jane
Krishnadas & Didi Herman, eds, Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (Abidingdon:
Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 124 at 124-126, citing Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection between
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics”
(1989) U Chi Legal F 139 at 139-167
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lived experience of individuals who experience discrimination. 137 Whenever possible, I will
consider barriers facing marginalized and vulnerable clients before administrative tribunals with
an intersectional lens.
Some tribunals, including those within the Social Justice Tribunals Division of Tribunals
Ontario,138 acknowledge that the Human Rights Code requires that they accommodate litigants
who face barriers related to prohibited grounds of discrimination. The common rules that apply
to the Social Justice Division of Tribunals Ontario state that:
A party, representative, witness or support person is entitled to accommodation
of Human Rights Code-related needs by the [Social Justice] tribunal and should notify
the tribunal as soon as possible if accommodation is required.139
According to human rights law principles, such accommodations must be granted to the point
of undue hardship.140 In evaluating undue hardship, the Code allows for consideration of cost,
outside sources of funding, and health and safety.141 In addition, a tribunal may, under some
circumstances, have a duty to inquire if an adjudicator knows or ought to know that there is a
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Tribunals Ontario was created in 2019, merging three tribunal clusters: Social Justice Tribunals Ontario (SJTO),
Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario, and Safety Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario. The Social
Justice Division of Tribunals Ontario is comprised of the tribunals that formerly belonged to SJTO. It includes five
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replace the CICB with an administrative, rather than tribunal, process. The CICB will process all applications
received by September 30, 2019 before winding down its operations: “CICB Update”, supra note 71. In addition, as
of July 1, 2020, five tribunals including the Conservation Review Board, Environmental Review Board, Board of
Negotiation, Local Planning Appeal Tribunal, and Mining and Lands Tribunal were removed from Tribunals Ontario
to create a smaller cluster called Ontario Land Tribunals: O Reg 282/20, s 1
139 Tribunals Ontario, Social Justice Division, Social Justice Tribunals Ontario Rules of Procedure: Common Rules,
Rule A-5.1, online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/en/rules-of-procedure> [Tribunals Ontario, “Social Justice Tribunals
Common Rules”]
140 Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Policy on Ableism and Discrimination on the Basis of Disability” (2016) at
28-29, online: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-ableism-and-discrimination-based-disability/9-unduehardship#_edn239> [OHRC, “Ableism”]; Human Rights Code, supra note 121, s 17(2)
141 Ontario Human Rights Commission, supra note 140 at 43-45, 51-54; Human Rights Code, supra note 121, s
11(2), 24(2)
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reason to accommodate, based on information and reasoning that does not reflect
stereotypes.142
David Lepofsky and Randal Graham describe how barriers affect persons with disabilities in
particular. They define a “barrier” with reference to the definition in the Accessibility for
Ontarians with Disabilities Act 2005, namely “anything that prevents a person with a disability
from fully participating in all aspects of society because of his or her disability.”143 Lepofsky and
Graham recognize six categories of barriers, explaining that persons with a wide variety of
disabilities may experience these barriers differently.144 They also explain that discriminatory
views may be reinforced by the existence of physical or legal barriers in a “vicious cycle”, since
they contribute to a culture that excludes persons with disabilities.145
The Supreme Court of Canada also addressed barriers that affect persons with disabilities in
Eldridge,146 decided under Charter section 15. This case is about a failure of the British
Columbia government to provide sign language interpretation for deaf patients receiving
medical care in hospitals.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that failure to provide sign language interpretation
violated s. 15 of the Charter. In doing so, the court focused on what deaf patients needed to
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I will discuss the case law in this area, as it relates to the HRTO, SBT, and LTB, in the second and third chapter of
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143 Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 11, s 2, cited in M David Lepofsky & Randal NM
Graham, “Universal Design in Legislative Drafting — How to Ensure Legislation is Barrier-Free for People with
Disabilities” (2010) 27 NJCL 129 at 139
144 Lepofsky and Graham define six types of barriers: physical, attitudinal, communication, informational,
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(1998) 16 Windsor YB Access Just 155 at 160-161
146 Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge]
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access medical care in the same way as the rest of the population in an analysis that reflects
substantive equality:
[i]n order to receive the same quality of care, deaf persons must bear the burden of
paying for the means to communicate with their health care providers, despite the fact
that the system is intended to make ability to pay irrelevant. Where it is necessary for
effective communication, sign language interpretation should not therefore be viewed
as an ‘ancillary’ service. On the contrary, it is the means by which deaf persons may
receive the same quality of medical care as the hearing population. 147
The Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning emphasizes what it means for different groups to
access the same services on equal terms, and how treating them differently is necessary to
achieve this goal. With respect to the facts of this particular case, deaf people required sign
language interpretation to communicate with their doctors in the same way as other patients.
In the disability context, Charter section 15 should be informed by relevant international law,
including the CRPD.148 The principles of the CRPD, as outlined in Article 3, include respect for
dignity, non-discrimination, “full and effective participation and inclusion in society”, and
accessibility.149 Full and effective participation is defined by the United Nations Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as “engaging with all persons, including persons with
disabilities, to provide for a sense of belonging to and being part of society.” 150 To discharge
this obligation, states must provide persons with disabilities with appropriate supports,
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promote an environment of respect rather than stigma, facilitate participation when needed,
and consult with persons with disabilities to understand their needs and lived experience.151
More specifically, Article 13 refers to access to justice.152 The UN Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities has drawn the connection between Article 13 and Article 9, regarding
accessibility: “[t]here can be no effective access to justice if the buildings in which lawenforcement agencies and the judiciary are located are not physically accessible, or if the
services, information and communication they provide are not accessible to persons with
disabilities.”153 The Committee has written about the importance of transparent
accommodations within the legal system.154 It has also highlighted the need for meaningful
participation through recognizing communication barriers and physical barriers, providing
information in a comprehensible way, and addressing financial disadvantage.155
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities refers to other related international
human rights instruments and their committees, such as the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights156 and the Human Rights Committee, and the International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights157 and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.158 However, to date, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not
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155 Ibid at para 52
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March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR]
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authored any joint general comments with these related bodies. I discuss the ICCPR and ICESCR
in more detail below in relation to discrimination on the basis of language, although they are
also relevant to the disability context.
The Law Commission of Ontario’s “Framework for Law as it Affects Persons with Disabilities”159
applies the substantive equality analysis from the Charter jurisprudence and the CRPD to laws,
policies and practices. Its principles recognize the diversity within communities of persons with
disabilities and their intersectional experiences:
all people exist along a continuum of abilities in many areas, that abilities will vary along
the life course, and that each person with a disability is unique in needs, circumstances
and identities, as well as to the multiple and intersecting identities of persons with
disabilities that may act to increase or diminish discrimination and disadvantage.160
One part of the framework specifically addresses “processes under the law”, asking three
questions that are particularly relevant to the procedures of tribunals:
How have the processes under the law been designed to be as simple and transparent
as possible for users?
[…]
How have the processes been designed to include and accommodate the specific needs
of persons with disabilities, including those who are facing additional barriers arising
from low-income, or who have needs related to other aspects of their identities, or who
are transitioning between programs or life-stages?
[…]

against Women, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981, ratified by Canada 10
December 1981), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into
force 2 September 1990, ratified by Canada 13 December 1991) in Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, “General Comment No 7”, supra note 150, at para 3, capturing other intersectional perspectives.
159 Law Commission of Ontario, “A Framework for the Law as it Affects Persons with Disabilities: Final Report”
(2012), Chapter IV: Advancing Equality for Persons with Disabilities Through Law, Policy and Practice at 1-6, 19-20
online: <https://www.lco-cdo.org/en/our-current-projects/the-law-and-persons-with-disabilities/persons-withdisabilities-final-report-september-2012/a-framework-for-the-law-as-it-affects-persons-with-disabilities/>
160 Ibid at 4
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What mechanisms does the law provide to review or evaluate unique needs or requests
for accommodation from affected individuals with disabilities?161
A process that takes into account these questions is more likely to respect the general
principles underlying the Law Commission report, such as respect for dignity, meaningful
participation, responding to diversity, and promoting autonomy and independence of persons
with disabilities.162
As Charter jurisprudence, international law, and analysis of barriers explain what access to
justice means for persons with disabilities, it also addresses language barriers as well. Karen
Cohl and George Thomson, conducting research on behalf of the Law Foundation of Ontario,
analyzed barriers to access to justice that may be attributed to issues regarding linguistic
interpretation. This project focused on members of vulnerable groups facing language barriers,
who often faced intersectional discrimination based on race, disability, literacy, poverty,
immigration status and lack of knowledge of the legal system.163 Consistent with the interviews
with marginalized communities summarized above, Cohl and Thomson’s report concluded that
persons who do not speak the language of a legal proceeding may be less likely to access or
trust in that process.164
Cohl and Thomson also raised issues regarding how interpretation services are provided by
tribunals. It explained that some administrative tribunals may arrange and pay for language and
sign-language interpreters, while others may ask litigants to bring a friend, family member, or a
professional interpreter at their own expense.165 Cohl and Thomson expressed concerns that
proper communication may be compromised if the interpreter is not sufficiently
knowledgeable, is not an objective party, or is interpreting over the telephone without access
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to body language and other silent cues.166 Furthermore, it may be difficult to find a qualified
interpreter for some rare dialects or for sign language.167
Charter section 14 jurisprudence provides some helpful principles that address some of these
barriers. This provision imposes a specific requirement to promote equality in certain legal
proceedings, requiring that “[a] party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand
or speak the language in which the proceedings are conducted or who is deaf has the right to
the assistance of an interpreter.”168
Although there is little case law regarding the application of Charter section 14 in administrative
law proceedings, a tribunal may be required to arrange and pay for an interpreter, especially
when a party cannot afford to do so. Litigants have successfully claimed the right to an
interpreter in the context of labour arbitration and refugee proceedings.169 However, while the
Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed that the right applies in family law proceedings,170 lower
courts in Quebec have questioned whether this right applies to litigation between private
parties.171 The law is also somewhat uncertain with respect to whether the state is required to
pay for an interpreter in the administrative law context. An Alberta trial court ordered that the
state pay for an interpreter in the context of a judicial review about language-based
discrimination.172 In contrast, other trial courts have ordered that the parties cover the cost in
the context of citizenship revocation proceedings, as well as in private law matters.173 That said,
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in each case, the court specified that the state may be required to pay if the party lacked
financial resources.174
The ICCPR and the ICESCR also discuss discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of
language, in a way that supports language interpretation in administrative law proceedings.
Article 26 of the ICCPR specifically states that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law”, referring specifically to
the ground of “language”.175 The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that Article 2 of
the ICCPR imposes a positive obligation on states to ensure the rights in the Convention and
also to provide for an effective remedy where rights are violated. 176 Similarly, Article 2 of the
ICESCR recognizes both formal and substantive equality with reference to language.177 The UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also requires states to adopt positive
measures to prevent both direct and indirect discrimination. 178
In R v Tran,179 the Supreme Court of Canada outlined a framework for applying Charter section
14 to the criminal law context that explains when interpretation is necessary and standards of
quality that it must meet. Although this is a criminal law case, principles regarding the right to
interpretation derived from criminal law may inform what access to justice before

[Welton] in the context of civil litigation, and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Phan, 2003 FC
1194 at paras 39-50 [Phan] in the context of citizenship revocation, citing Wyllie.
174 In Wyllie, supra note 173, the British Columbia Supreme Court explained that: “[t]he question that remains
unanswered is, is there an obligation upon the court or the Crown in civil proceedings to pay an interpreter's fee
upon the court being satisfied that the litigant requiring an interpreter is unable to pay the necessary fee? The
wording of Section 14 is bold and unequivocal and it might well be that upon the basis of impecuniosity that a
court would so order.” In both Welton, supra note 173 and Phan, supra note 173, the court confirmed that the
party was not impecunious, referring to Wyllie.
175 ICCPR, supra note 156, art 26
176 United Nations, Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No 32: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant” (29 March 2004) at paras 6, 10, 13, 15. States may be
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177 ICESCR, supra note 157, art 2
178 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “General Comment No 20: Nondiscrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights)” (2 July 2009) at paras 2, 8-9, 10-11
179 R v Tran, [1994] 2 SCR 951 at para 11, 117 DLR (4th) 7
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administrative tribunals may require. Based on the domestic and international law principles
discussed above, interpretation at the state’s expense may be guaranteed in at least some
proceedings before administrative tribunals. In addition, where Charter section 7 or section 15
interests are implicated, there may be a requirement for interpretation in administrative
proceedings to ensure a fair trial or substantive equality.
The Tran framework mandates that an interpreter should be provided in two distinct
circumstances. In the words of the Court, these circumstances arise when:
(1) it becomes apparent to the judge that an accused is, for language reasons, having
difficulty expressing him- or herself or understanding the proceedings and that the
assistance of an interpreter would be helpful; or
(2) an accused (or counsel for the accused) requests the services of an interpreter and
the judge is of the opinion that the request is justified.180
The court emphasized that it is not necessary for an accused to make a formal request for an
interpreter.181 Rather, courts must be attentive to an accused’s language difficulties as part of
their responsibility to ensure a fair trial process. Furthermore, courts should generally be
receptive to requests for an interpreter that are made in good faith, rather than scrutinizing
them for “an oblique motive”.182
Once interpretation is necessary, it must meet five criteria with respect to its quality. First,
interpretation must be continuous. Breaks and interruptions in interpretation may undermine a
person’s understanding of the trial process.183 Second, interpretation must be precise, to
convey, as closely as possible, what is communicated in a courtroom. Nonetheless, it is a
human exercise conducted in real time, and cannot be expected to be perfect.184 Third,
interpretation should be impartial or objective, without any connection to the accused person
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or the case which might create bias or perception of bias.185 For example, a relative, friend, the
judge, or a person whose interests may be affected by the case should not be responsible for
interpretation. Fourth, interpretation must be competent, such that the quality of
interpretation is “high enough quality to ensure that justice is done and seen to be done”. 186
Finally, interpretation should be contemporaneous, occurring as the legal proceeding
progresses. The Supreme Court stated that it was “generally preferable” if interpretation is
provided consecutively, after people finish speaking, rather than simultaneously. 187 Consecutive
interpretation makes it easier to determine if there are problems with the quality of
interpretation and allows the accused an opportunity to react to what is happening, for
example, to make an objection. 188
Principles relating to language barriers that may be drawn from Charter jurisprudence include
the importance of taking requests for interpretation in good faith, and the need for decisionmakers to proactively identify a need for interpretation as it arises within a proceeding. The five
criteria regarding quality of interpretation are also relevant in analyzing tribunal decisionmaking when questions are raised about whether proper interpretation took place.
Taken together, interviews with marginalized groups, Charter and human rights principles and
case law, and international law demonstrate key principles that inform what access to justice
means. They illustrate that tribunal processes that promote meaningful participation through
inclusive design, appropriate supports, and accommodations allow litigants to overcome
barriers to access. They also demonstrate the importance of processes that treat parties with
dignity and respect, in accordance with the procedural justice literature. Finally, these
processes are not entirely passive – rather, they place responsibility on tribunals to identify
barriers and accommodation needs when parties do not formally request them. This active role
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that tribunals are required to play means that they must meaningfully communicate with
litigants and consider the proceeding from their perspective in the course of making procedural
discretionary decisions.
Nonetheless, there are limits to the access to justice concerns that the doctrine of procedural
fairness, as defined by tribunals and courts, can address. The duty of fairness is informed by five
factors, as described in Baker, and only two of these factors relate directly to the circumstances
of a particular litigant – “the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals
affected” and “the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision”. 189 In the
tribunal context, which is closer to a court process than front-line decision-making, “the nature
of the decision being made and the process for making it” may demand comparatively greater
procedural protections.190 However, on some occasions, these three factors may be
outweighed by the statutory scheme and the agency’s chosen procedures pursuant to its
enabling statute.191
As well, legislatures have the power to limit the application of the common law doctrine of
procedural fairness, as elaborated in Baker, by way of “clear statutory direction.”192 In its
analysis of a legislative scheme limiting the independence of tribunal members, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that:
[c]onfronted with silent or ambiguous legislation, courts generally infer that Parliament
or the legislature intended the tribunal’s process to comport with principles of natural
justice […] However, like all principles of natural justice, the degree of independence
required of tribunal members may be ousted by express statutory language or
necessary implication.193
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This means that the legislature may intentionally limit the scope of procedural discretionary
decisions that tribunal adjudicators are empowered to make.
Moreover, procedural fairness may not encompass all interests protected by the Charter and
the Code. Procedural fairness will only protect interests under section 7 of the Charter when
section 7 is engaged.194 As well, procedural fairness may protect the rights of persons with
Code-protected interests to a lesser extent than the Code upon judicial review. The LTB, HRTO,
and SBT acknowledge they are bound by the Code,195 and have been held to this standard by
the Divisional Court.196 However, the British Columbia Court of Appeal recently held that the
British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal was required to conduct a procedurally fair hearing,
but was not necessarily required to accommodate pursuant to human rights law. The tribunal’s
obligation was:
to ensure the hearing was procedurally fair given [the applicant’s] disabilities but not to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship as if the Tribunal were an employer or
service provider, for example[, …] the obligation to provide a procedurally fair hearing
protects the participation of persons with disabilities in a hearing such as this. An
alleged failure to ‘accommodate’ such a person in a hearing can and should be assessed
as an issue of procedural fairness on judicial review and where appropriate a remedy
can be provided.197
This reasoning has the potential to encourage tribunal adjudicators to interpret the duty of
fairness in more limited ways that place less weight on access to justice considerations
described in this chapter.
Finally, adjudicators must take into account fairness to all parties, despite imbalances of power
between them. If prejudice to the opposing party will result from adapting tribunal procedures,
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this will limit what adjudicators can achieve for marginalized parties. In other words, even when
a tribunal, such as the HRTO, has expansive discretionary procedural powers, adjudicators
cannot go too far to help one party at the expense of another.198
Consequently, where parties have needs and circumstances that implicate access to justice,
tribunal adjudicators may be able to address some but not all of these concerns by exercising
their procedural discretion. As I will explain in further detail below, in my descriptions and
critiques of tribunal case law, I define “accommodation” more broadly than what procedural
fairness, or even human rights law, strictly demands. This allows me to consider the limitations
of procedural discretionary decision-making to promote access to justice.

Theories of Discretion that Advance Access to Justice
In this section, I discuss theoretical models of engagement between tribunal decision-makers
and parties. I will explain what these theories require and how they relate to the definition of
access to justice discussed earlier. I also address how they promote existing norms that underlie
the law of procedural fairness, the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Vavilov, and
tribunal decision-making consistent with Charter and human rights values. In doing so, I will
argue that these theories of engagement are an appropriate benchmark against which one may
assess tribunal procedural decisions to determine whether tribunals are affording parties access
to justice in a meaningful way.
Legal academics have constructed theoretical models regarding discretionary decision-making
that account for the meaningful participation of lay people. These theoretical models reflect
concepts of meaningful participation and treatment of parties with respect, dignity and
transparency integral to access to justice. In slightly different ways, as already briefly noted
earlier, Lorne Sossin, Geneviève Cartier, and Jennifer Raso have written about how decisionmaking can be approached in a more collaborative, respectful and democratic way that is
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consistent with human rights values. However, each of these academics acknowledges practical
obstacles in implementing their ideal theories, related to factors such as the volume of cases
heard by administrative tribunals, power imbalances associated with cases involving
marginalized parties, and the current law of judicial review.
Lorne Sossin advocates for meaningful engagement between applicants and decision-makers,
often from the point of view of marginalized parties. He discusses this theory in the context of a
variety of administrative settings, including income tax,199 and administrative proceedings with
a significant impact on low income people, including housing and income support.200 He argues
that decision-makers should actively listen to and consider the views of parties and their
advocates, interact more transparently, and establish an atmosphere that allows for empathy
and trust.201
For example, Sossin recognizes that front-line public officials in New York City who make
decisions about people who are homeless often have significant discretion. 202 He observes that
“[t]he contact between officials and the homeless is typically devoid of trust, empathy, and
mutuality.”203 He attributes this approach to the dual role of decision-makers as “individuals
confronting a person in need” and also “as agents of the state dealing with a file”.204 Similarly,
in his writing about Canadian administrative law, Sossin also states that administrative decisionmakers generally approach their task with an approach that is “detached” from parties before
them.205
The way forward, according to Sossin, is to establish relationships of “engagement” and
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“mutual respect and trust”.206 Sossin contends that engagement can mean “attraction,
commitment, and entanglement”.207 Engagement promotes meaningful discussion and
understanding, encouraging decision-makers to exercise their discretion to “become the human
face of the administrative state, breaking down the barriers to communication which
bureaucratic interaction has thrown up.”208 In this way, Sossin argues that decisions reached in
a more engaged way may more effectively take into account an individual’s actual needs and
circumstances while also fostering their autonomy and treating them with respect. 209
Sossin recognizes that Max Weber’s “iron cage” of rational-legal administration may prevent
some instances where decision-makers act in ways that are “capricious” and “corrupt”. 210
However, he asserts that empowering citizens by providing for a more open exchange of
knowledge may be possible, at least the level of ideal theory, without undermining the
impartiality and fairness of the proceedings.211 Sossin explains that case law regarding bias
allows for a more personal relationship between a party and a decision-maker, as long as the
decision-maker maintains an open mind. 212 Sossin’s theory is supported by factors discussed in
the procedural justice scholarship regarding fair processes, including an opportunity for parties
to present their stories, and a decision-maker who is respectful, impartial, transparent,
consistent, and trustworthy. 213
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However, it is unclear how this theory would operate in the real world, and Sossin’s approach
may lead to more litigation, even if, ultimately, a court may uphold the decision. Sossin also
addresses fairness, explaining that mutual exchange of knowledge should be required in all
cases, not only when an adverse finding is made against a party.214 However, he acknowledges
that the current doctrine applied by courts is only relevant “when a fundamental right is being
taken away.”215
Sossin also advocates for more transparent reasons from administrative officials. That said,
although parties may appreciate more straightforward, accessible, and honest reasons, it is
unclear whether this is a practical or achievable goal. Sossin refers to the “internal” reasons
provided by the immigration officer in Baker,216 arguing that these would be preferable to
sanitized “external” reasons meant for public consumption. 217 Sossin explains that the
immigration officer’s notes demonstrate his “assumptions, value judgments, first impressions
and broader personal and ideological agendas”, mainly because “[h]e never expected them to
see the light of day.”218 That being the case, it is difficult to contemplate that decision-makers
would be prepared to share their “internal reasons” even on a without prejudice basis, as
Sossin suggests.219 It may be slightly more realistic to require “more modest improvements”
that encourage clearer, more detailed, and more comprehensive reasons,220 but such reasons
appear to fall short of Sossin’s goals of transparency and authenticity.

and reflective listening that allows mediators to check in with parties to ensure they understand what is being said:
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Sossin focuses on two concepts that support engagement: democratic deliberation and dialogic
administration. With respect to democratic deliberation, Sossin characterized decision-makers
as “enlightened listeners” who take into account diverse perspectives and create an inclusive
environment for sharing them.221 Meanwhile, dialogic administration requires that adjudicators
focus on norms and values based on their enabling statute, rather than attempting to remain
“neutral”.222 He contends that this is a “dialogic” process because it has the potential to expose
power imbalances and to demonstrate whether and how public administration actually
achieves its statutory goals.223
Nonetheless, Sossin recognizes that this potential may not be realized in practical decisionmaking. He acknowledges the idealized nature of his theory, particularly in situations where
imbalances of power are significant:
Engagement and interdependency between citizens and bureaucrats would seem to be
best suited to settings where citizens are relatively advantaged (i.e. regulatory settings
where government authorities interact with industry groups on relatively equal footing).
This degree of mutuality is much more difficult to achieve where vulnerable groups are
affected and where individuals may be dependent on a favourable administrative
decision for their welfare (as in public housing or refugee settings). How meaningful is
intimacy when one participant holds disproportionate power over the other? Is wellintentioned informality sufficient to address the potential harm of a relationship
characterized by power and dependency? 224
He states this concern another way when he concedes that, “[w]hen a family's shelter or an
individual's health is at stake and there is nowhere else to turn, I would agree that the good
intentions of an open and honest official may not be enough.” 225
Under these circumstances, Sossin suggests that it may be necessary to provide an
“intermediary”, such as a state-funded lawyer or social worker, to mediate this power
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imbalance.226 He also asserts that that an administrative decision-maker could owe a public law
duty to provide “the fullest possible benefit” to vulnerable parties.227 While this duty may
address some substantive equality concerns, Sossin does not explain how it would work in
practical terms, and how it would relate to specific statutory powers and objectives delegated
to decision-makers to implement.
Geneviève Cartier proposes a similar theory, while also addressing some of its practical
implications and problems. She asserts that exercises of administrative discretion may be
viewed as a dialogue, employing a “bottom-up” theoretical approach that prioritizes the
inclusion of parties in decision-making.228 According to her model, decision-makers and
participants first understand each other’s positions and then engage in dialogue with one
another, taking into account opposing norms and values, regarding how a decision should be
reached.229
At the first step, both the decision-maker and the party must understand and consider the
situation from the other’s point of view. 230 It is vital for the decision-maker to take care to
“demonstrate openness and genuine listening” to understand the experiences and
circumstances of parties before the tribunal.231
At the second step, Cartier emphasizes the importance of engagement between a decisionmaker and a party about relevant factors to a discretionary decision. Cartier describes how a
decision-maker must make choices in this regard, to determine the relevant norms and values
within a margin of appreciation. 232 The decision-maker must consider the perspective and input
of each party in a meaningful and transparent way, through a process of “authentic
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reflection”.233 In other words, the decision reached and its rationale should directly flow from
the dialogue between the party and adjudicator.
Cartier considers practical implications of her theory based by reflecting on her own personal
experience.234 Cartier explains how she made a decision about law students in her position as
dean of a law school.235 She describes how she viewed the situation as an opportunity to test
out her theory of dialogue:
I therefore asked the student directly how she would analyse and sort out the
competing or coexisting considerations that needed to be taken into account if she were
the associate dean asked to make the decision. I could immediately see a shift in
perspective and tone from the student. She was asked for one moment to forget her
particular case and to think about what the norms, the guidelines for taking such
decisions, should be in the event of other requests' being made in the future. 236
After receiving the student’s analysis of the relevant factors, Cartier spent time considering the
student input, gathering other relevant information, and deciding the matter. 237 She provided
the student with the decision and reasons by e-mail.238 Most importantly, she ultimately
evaluates the success of this experiment from the student’s point of view: “very often I
received a reply from the student, who, even faced with an unfavourable decision, accepted it
and even sometimes thanked me for listening.”239
However, Cartier acknowledges that her ideal theory may be difficult for administrative
decision-makers to implement in other contexts. She explains that vulnerable people with
much at stake and no legal training may not be able to engage with decision-makers the way
the law student engaged with her.240 She recognizes that power imbalances in such situations
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may mean that dialogue may be more difficult to achieve or may be less meaningful.241 She
questions how practical her approach may be in contexts where decision-makers hear large
volumes of cases, constrained by institutional policies and guidelines.242 She also wonders
whether administrative decision-makers would actually engage responsively and honestly,
rather than fashioning “acceptable” after-the-fact justifications for their decisions.243 She raises
but does not answer the following query:
Does a case like Baker actually direct decision makers toward a responsive and attentive
approach to exercises of discretion, or does it, as some have somewhat cynically
suggested, simply alert them to take formal but hollow steps – that is, to hide their real
motivations and write down reasons that appear to comply with the substantive
requirements of fairness?244
While the questions Cartier asks are relevant and important, the application of her theory to
the real world is uncertain since she does not provide answers to her own questions.
Finally, Jennifer Raso theorizes that decision-makers should consider human rights values in
exercising their discretion in a way that reflects engagement and dialogue, as advanced by
Sossin and Cartier. She asserts that human rights values should apply to both institutional and
individual decisions to ensure that parties are treated with dignity and respect, and that social
programs meet the community’s needs. 245 In making decisions in individual cases, Raso
recommends that human rights principles such as the dignity of a party may serve as a
framework in reconciling competing norms and guidelines.246 Raso explains that taking into
account human rights values in administrative decision-making is important since this may
allow human rights to inform many situations that are not often or cannot be brought before
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rights enforcement institutions. 247
However, Raso also acknowledges that there are barriers to implementing her approach. Raso
concedes that rights enforcement structures will remain important since the use of human
rights values by decision-makers “will not prevent all decision-makers from using their
discretion to discriminate against marginalized individuals”.248 She also recognizes that that
administrative agencies attempt to make decisions in a consistent way, and to do so, employ an
“overwhelming number of rules and policies […] to constrain front-line workers”.249
Despite their idealized nature, theories of engagement may be particularly apt in light of the
majority reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada in Vavilov. As noted earlier, the Court
focuses on a concept of “responsive justification”, relying on procedural concepts and case law
in redesigning the framework for substantive judicial review.250 According to the majority,
decision-makers should provide responsive reasons when important interests, such as a party’s
“life, liberty, dignity or livelihood”, are at issue.251 In the court’s words, when “a decision has
particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain
why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention.” 252
Meaningful engagement with litigants would arguably be necessary for decision-makers to
provide these reasons that demonstrate a logical chain of reasoning based on the evidence and
arguments before them.253 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov may raise
more questions than it answers. Although, instinctively, it may appear helpful to require
reasons that are attentive to the interests and perspectives of parties, it remains unclear
whether and how this would improve the accessibility and fairness of the decision-making
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process.
A comparison of ideal theories of engagement and real-world procedural decision-making may
allow for a better understanding of this question. Procedural justice literature demonstrates
that fair processes may be more important where there are imbalances of power.254
Nonetheless, administrative law literature does not frequently engage with the ways
marginalized parties experience more informal tribunal procedures and associated implications
for the legitimacy of administrative tribunals. Ideal theories of engagement focus on the
humanity of the administrative process, treating parties with respect and dignity, and creating
an environment of trust that allows for dialogue about a party’s circumstances and needs.
While it is unclear whether these theories can be practically implemented in the real world,
Sossin, Cartier and Raso raise significant concerns in this regard. Examining actual procedural
decisions from administrative tribunals and evaluating them against these ideal theories may
demonstrate to what extent engagement and dialogue may be achieved and whether it truly
advances access to justice.
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Chapter Two: Procedural Decisions at the Social Benefits Tribunal,
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, and Landlord and Tenant Board
A review of cases decided in the past five years by the Social Benefits Tribunal (SBT), Human
Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO), and Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) demonstrates some
striking patterns of adjudication of procedural requests for accommodation during the hearing
process.255 The SBT’s lay adjudicators often took a practical, case-by-case approach, informed
by a context where most or all appellants have some form of disability. Meanwhile, the HRTO’s
approach is informed by a human rights analysis and active adjudication practices, applied by
legally trained adjudicators who may occasionally take an overly technical approach to balance
fairness to applicants and respondents. Finally, the vast caseload and interests of landlords to
process their eviction applications quickly has led to institutional practices at the LTB that
undermine the ability of individual LTB members to meaningfully evaluate accommodation
needs of tenants before them.
In this chapter, I will briefly review my methods for reviewing this case law, so as to arrive at
the general conclusions stated in the opening paragraph. Then, I go into considerable detail by
providing context from, and engaging in analysis of, publicly available tribunal documents,
academic and policy analyses, and statements from individuals who have navigated these
systems or who work in them to support vulnerable groups. This overview and analysis includes
a review of the statutory mandate of each tribunal and relevant court decisions.

Methods
My review of SBT, HRTO, and LTB decisions focuses on the adjudication of requests for
procedural accommodation. A primarily doctrinal method is a logical step to map the
topography of tribunal procedural decisions in this area, as little academic literature exists
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documenting this case law.256 In this section, I describe the perspective I bring to my analysis of
tribunal case law, how I define “accommodation”, how I conducted my case law searches, and
the limitations of my doctrinal method.
An analysis of decisions of the Ontario SBT, HRTO and LTB from 2014-2019 enabled me to
review a significant number of tribunal decisions as well as relevant judicial reviews.257 The
majority of the cases I read highlighted one or more barriers associated with disability and
language proficiency, as these barriers were the primary focus of my case law search. In
addition, some cases exemplified other types of barriers, relating to family status, domestic
violence and limited financial resources.
Given the number of decisions released by these tribunals in this time period, it was not
possible to read each one, or to search keywords that would capture every way an adjudicator
could describe a particular issue. As well, there may be some exchanges that occur at hearings
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or barriers experienced by parties that do not appear in written decisions at all.258 Therefore,
while I reviewed a sufficient number of cases to observe some general trends, these trends may
not account for the approaches of every adjudicator at each tribunal during the relevant
timeframe.
I place my analysis of tribunal decisions in context and am transparent about my own
perspective, to address some of the shortcomings of this primarily doctrinal method. 259 This
context includes policy papers, tribunal documents, and studies conducted by researchers and
advocates that are relevant to these particular tribunals. In addition, my research is
intentionally and transparently focused on access to justice, informed by barriers faced by
marginalized groups.
Accordingly, in my descriptions and critiques of tribunal case law, I define “accommodation”
broadly, consistent with the definition of access to justice described above.260 I consider any
factor that can undermine a party’s ability to participate fully and meaningfully as a “barrier”.261
Similarly, any request to overcome a barrier proposed by the applicant or implemented by the
tribunal comprises an “accommodation”. This definition of “accommodation” is intentionally
wider than legal requirements imposed by the Code, the Charter or the doctrine of procedural
fairness. This allows me to analyze situations that may not be sufficiently addressed by these
legal concepts, but may nonetheless be relevant to access to justice and legal theories of
dialogue and engagement. For example, this definition would encompass barriers such as
poverty that may not strictly fit into grounds of discrimination described in the Code.
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That said, it is notable that procedural discretionary decisions and hearing accommodations
cannot address all access to justice issues and barriers faced by parties. As described above, the
legal doctrine of procedural fairness is limited by the tribunal’s statutory scheme, its chosen
procedures, and fairness to opposing parties. In addition, the procedural justice literature
demonstrates that parties evaluate the fairness of procedures based on factors that go beyond
procedural accommodations. These factors, such as diverse appointments of decision-makers
or the training of decision-makers to engage in reflective listening or to consider unconscious
bias,262 are significant, but cannot be adequately captured by the written decisions and
operational policies that I reviewed. That said, as described further below, some of the cases I
reviewed demonstrated the possibility for more meaningful procedural decisions that reflect
some of the values inherent in the procedural justice literature, despite certain limitations that
decision-makers face.
Social Benefits Tribunal
The SBT hears cases relating to Ontario’s two income support programs: Ontario Works and
Ontario Disability Support Program benefits. The SBT’s approach to discretionary decisionmaking reflects a practical, individualized approach employed by lay adjudicators in a context
where many appellants have a disability and may also face other barriers to a fair hearing.
Since a large majority of the accommodation cases I identified are appeals of ODSP decisions, it
is important to put these decisions into that context. More Ontarians are receiving ODSP than
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ever before.263 However, their lived experience reflects a program characterized by insufficient
benefits, demeaning conditions, coercion and stigma.264
The standard of living for recipients of ODSP has become increasingly limited because benefit
rates have not kept up with the costs of goods and services.265 In 2020, a single person receives
$1169 each month, while a couple with two children receives $2,126.266 The Income Security
Advocacy Centre has recently stated that, because of their limited means, benefit recipients
may live in “substandard, dangerous housing”, rely on food banks and other charities, and go
without essentials they need.267 Similarly, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives reported
in 2016 that single ODSP recipients were 33% below the poverty line, while recipients with two
children were 11% below the poverty line.268
Furthermore, ODSP recipients also report that their treatment by front-line ODSP staff does not
always respect their dignity. The ODSP Action Coalition collected statements in 2011 from
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benefit recipients who said that they were treated like “a non-person”, “an ungrateful child”
and “a criminal”.269 Similarly, the Income Security Advocacy Centre reported in 2017 that
“[f]ront-line workers are the first to say that their time and energy are guided by the punitive
rules that they are expected to enforce.”270 These rules relate to initial and ongoing eligibility
for benefits and can be complex, confusing and lacking in transparency.
Therefore, it is important to consider the statutory mandate and procedures of the Social
Benefits Tribunal in the context of a program that often feels inadequate and disrespectful to
its recipients, who may struggle to meet their expenses with the benefits they receive. The
vulnerability of these recipients and their response to the imbalances of power in this system as
a whole are relevant to their experience of the SBT’s procedures.
Statutory Mandate
The statutory mandate of the SBT balances fair procedure and efficiency in the hearing process.
The SBT is constituted by the Ontario Works Act, 1997, and is empowered to hold hearings in
person or in writing.271 Oral hearings may be held “at the places in Ontario and in the manner
and at the times the Tribunal considers most convenient for the proper discharge and speedy
dispatch of its business.”272
The SBT’s Rules of Procedure outline the powers of adjudicators, which allow them broad scope
to alter hearing procedures.273 For example, an adjudicator can alter time limits within the
Rules, hear multiple appeals brought by the same appellant consecutively, convene a prehearing conference, make changes to the order that issues are considered or that parties
present their case, narrow the issues and limit evidence on particular issues, make interim
orders, or “take any other action appropriate in the circumstances.” 274 Other rules allow
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ODSP Action Coalition, supra note 265 at 11-12
Income Security Advocacy Centre, “Income Security: A Roadmap for Change” (October 2017) at 95, see also 90102, online: <http://incomesecurity.org/resources/publications/>
271 Ontario Works Act, 1997, SO 1997, c 25, Sch A, ss 65(1)-(2) [Ontario Works Act]
272 Ibid
273 Social Benefits Tribunal, “Rules of Procedure for Appeals to the Social Benefits Tribunal”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/sbt/SBT%20Rules%20Parts%201%20&%202%20EN.html#rule1>
274 Ibid, Part II, Rule 1.5
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hearings to be conducted “in person, in writing, by telephone or by other electronic means as
the SBT considers appropriate”, 275 and provide procedures for requesting adjournments.276
The SBT states on its website that they will provide accommodations based on Human Rights
Code grounds.277 It explains that appellants may make requests in writing or by calling an
Appeals Resolution Officer assigned to the appeal. The SBT’s frequently asked questions
webpage also explains that appellants may bring a support person and request cost of
transportation to the hearing if they cannot afford it.278
The Divisional Court has recognized that the SBT must interpret its mandate in accordance with
reasonable accommodation consistent with Human Rights Code and Charter values, given that
its enabling statute is intended to support persons with disabilities. 279 It has also acknowledged
that the SBT must take into account any information they have about a party’s disability, even if
that party does not appear at the hearing.
For example, the SBT has granted adjournments to give the appellants a chance to explain why
they were not able to attend on the assigned hearing date, since their failure to appear may
relate to their disability.280 The SBT will evaluate any explanations provided with an open mind,
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Ibid, Part II, Rule 7.7
Ibid, Part II, Rule 13
277 Social Benefits Tribunal, “Accessibility and Accommodation”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/sbt/accessibility-and-accommodations/> [SBT, “Accessibility and Accommodation”].
This website links to the Tribunals Ontario, Social Justice Division, “Accessibility and Accommodation Policy”,
online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/sjto/Accessibility%20and%20Accommodation%20Policy.html>
[Tribunals Ontario, “Accessibility and Accommodation Policy”]
278 Social Benefits Tribunal, “Videos and FAQs”, online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/sbt/faqs/> [SBT, “Videos and
FAQs”]
279 Pavon v Ontario (Director, Ontario Disability Support Program), 2013 ONSC 4309 at para 45 (Div Ct). Similarly,
the Social Justice Tribunals Ontario cluster has a common set of rules that apply to the SBT, HRTO and LTB. Rule A5 requires that all three tribunals must accommodate the Human Rights Code needs of parties, witnesses and
support persons: Social Justice Tribunals Ontario Rules of Procedure: Common Rules, Rule A-5, online: Tribunals
Ontario, Social Justice Division <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/en/rules-of-procedure/> [SJTO, “Common Rules”]
280 1707-06287 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 51 at para 5, citing Miller, supra note 142. Further examples are reproduced
below at note 286.
276
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even if medical evidence may not be completely relevant or a disability may not be the only
reason for the accommodation. 281
Types of Accommodations Provided
The SBT provides a variety of accommodations, informed by the medical restrictions and
requests of appellants before it. The SBT begins its inquiries regarding potential
accommodations at the stage of the initial appeal form, but is also willing to grant
accommodations that are requested later on in the process.282
The SBT’s appeal form proactively asks appellants about procedural accommodations to the
hearing process. It includes a question asking whether the appellant requires an interpreter
and, if so, requests the language and dialect.283 The form also specifically inquires whether sign
language interpretation is needed.284 Finally, the form provides a box for the appellant to
explain any “[p]hysical or other accommodation to participate in the hearing.” 285 However, the
form does not include much information about what barriers to the hearing process may be
addressed, what accommodations are typically provided, or what kind of information may be
needed to support them.
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1703-02211 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 5598 at paras 7-10
It may be impossible to conclude with certainty, based on the decisions I reviewed, whether decision-makers
always take consistent approaches. On many issues, the number of cases I found was small. In addition, it is
impossible to discern situations where decision-makers could have raised issues on their own motion and did not
do so. However, to the extent that I can draw conclusions, the majority of the decisions I read were generally
consistent with each other.
283 Social Benefits Tribunal, “Forms and Filing”, Appeal (Form 1) at 2, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/sbt/forms-filing/#form1> [SBT, “Appeal Form”]
284 Ibid
285 Ibid. For the most part, based on my research, this process appears to work successfully. However, in one case,
when the appellant requested a two-hour hearing block on his Appeal Form, his hearing was scheduled for 90
minutes. After discussing this issue before the hearing started, the appellant and adjudicator agreed that 90
minutes would be sufficient: 1803-01447 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 2645 at paras 4-5
282
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This lack of information is disappointing, since the SBT is willing to grant a wide range of
accommodations. They include:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Adjournments for a variety of reasons, including in response to a failure of the appellant
to appear,286 for the appellant to get legal advice or representation,287 because the
appellant is not well enough to participate, 288 or to determine accommodations;289
Allowing an appellant’s matter to proceed first on the hearing day;290
Allowing an appellant to testify in writing;291
Providing the appellant with breaks292 and opportunities to change position; 293
Allowing additional time to file the appeal,294 and provide submissions and evidence;295
Holding the hearing in the morning296 or the afternoon;297
Providing the appellant with questions in writing; 298
Formatting documents accessibly for appellants with visual disabilities;299
Accommodations to address an appellant’s ability to learn and process information; 300
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For example: 1707-06145 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 967 at paras 2-8; 1708-06625 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 1203 at paras 3-8;
1704-03035 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 630 at paras 3-9; 1611-08205 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6284 at paras 3-7
287 1607-04556 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 2120 at para 3; 1608-05938 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4070 at paras 2-4; 1712-10427
(Re), 2018 ONSBT 3553 at para 8
288 1702-01113 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 1205 at paras 4-7
289 For example: 1704-02853 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4674 at para 10; 1706-05104 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4282 at paras 2-3
290 1802-01128 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4020 at para 2; 1608-05922 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4706 at para 1
291 In 1412-13744 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 4635 at paras 29, 39-41, the SBT directed the appellant to provide medical
evidence to support a request to answer written questions in the form of an affidavit. Upon receiving this
evidence, the SBT was willing to allow this accommodation to the hearing process.
292 1601-00146 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 5339 at para 1; 1408-08806 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 598 at para 6; 1810-06627 (Re),
2019 ONSBT 3263 at paras 8-10
293 1405-06041 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 6344 at para 15; 1507-07094 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 3673 at para 3
294 1506-06006 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 5089 at para 2; 1312-12902RR (Re), 2017 ONSBT 1687 at paras 17-22; 140606261 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 6395 at paras 3-6; 1402-02492 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 5576 at paras 3-6; 1506-05797 (Re),
2016 ONSBT 366 at paras 5-6; 1506-06244 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 3170 at paras 6-7; 1606-04478 (Re), 2017 ONSBT
3872 at paras 5-8 (delay of 7.5 months); 1610-07319 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6075 at paras 3-6 (delay of 5 months);
1802-01019 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4903 at para 7
295 1402-01765 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 3366 at paras 9-12 [1402-01765 (Re) 2017] and 1402-01765 (Re), 2018 ONSBT
489 at para 20 [1402-01765 (Re) 2018] regarding the same appeal; 1705-03640 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 3945 at paras 910
296 1810-06627 (Re), supra note 292 at paras 8-10
297 1705-04114 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6059 at paras 1-2; 1402-01842 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 2250 at para 1
298 1601-00474 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 4777 at para 3
299 1802-00966 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4293 at paras 2-6; 1704-02957 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6205 at para 7
300 1706-05023 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 202 at para 2
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•

•
•
•
•
•

Accommodations to the physical hearing room, such as dimming the lights, 301 providing
a room with natural light rather than fluorescent lighting,302 or keeping the door
open;303
Providing the appellant with a different chair,304 allowing the appellant to sit in a
different place,305 or allowing the appellant to give evidence lying down; 306
Changing the location of the hearing;307
Changing the method of hearing to a hearing in writing, 308 teleconference,309 in
person,310 or a hybrid of these approaches;311
Allowing the appellant to be accompanied by a service dog; 312
Allowing the appellant to be accompanied by a support person; 313
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Ibid at para 2
1403-02784 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 4792 at para 3
303 1802-01128 (Re), supra note 290 at para 2; 1803-01379 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 5393 at para 2
304 1607-05236 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 768 at para 19 [1607-05236 (Re) 2018] and 1607-05236 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 3745
at para 2 regarding the same appeal; 1408-08806 (Re), supra note 292 at para 6
305 1511-10141 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 5079 at para 7 (seating arrangement to address a hearing impairment)
306 1608-05629 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 3867 at para 3
307 1404-04409 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 3806 at para 15 (meetings conducted by telephone or close to the appellant to
accommodate his anxiety regarding public transportation); 1705-04551 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2225 at paras 6-7 (to
conduct the hearing in the city where the appellant lives, as he does not have access to transportation); 170705605 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6143 at para 4 (hearing held close to where the appellant lives and postponed to avoid
winter driving); 1703-01860 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 1647 at para 4 [1703-01860 (Re) #1] (SBT was open to changing the
venue to one that accommodated the appellant’s scent sensitivity)
308 1703-01860 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2355 at paras 15-19 [1703-01860 (Re) #2] (to accommodate scent sensitivity
when the appellant could not suggest alternate venues); 1601-00294R (Re), 2018 ONSBT 1719 at para 8 (in writing
to accommodate disabilities and financial circumstances of the appellant); 1602-01243 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 5481 at
para 15; 1909-06766 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 3802 at para 2; 1807-05066 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 2264 at para 3
309 1702-01317 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4428 at para 3 (oral hearing requested by appellant); 1608-05793 (Re), 2017
ONSBT 3517 at para 2 (appeals converted to oral hearings from telephone hearings based on an accommodation
request before the hearing); 1703-02315 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6392 at para 4 (telephone hearing requested to
accommodate agoraphobia); 1506-06006 (Re), supra note 294 at para 1 (changed to telephone hearing on the day
of the hearing to accommodate disabilities); 1712-10308 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 5057 at para 3 (to accommodate
electro-sensitivity); 1612-09123 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4315 at para 22 (to accommodate anxiety about leaving home);
1410-12252 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 5821 at para 13 (to accommodate anxiety); 1511-10029 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 3119 at
para 1 (unspecified medical reasons)
310 1603-01657R (Re), 2018 ONSBT 852 at paras 9-12; 1712-10427 (Re), supra note 287 at para 30
311 1705-03640 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4734 at paras 2-6 (openness to a hybrid hearing where some evidence is received
by affidavit); 1703-01860 (Re) #1, supra note 307 at para 4 (openness to hearing beginning by telephone and
becoming a written proceeding based on appellant’s limitations)
312 1408-09364 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 5088 at para 1; 1512-11672R (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4458 at para 3
313 1703-02128 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2874 at para 8; 1803-01379 (Re), supra note 303 at para 2; 1707-05734 (Re),
2018 ONSBT 1701 at para 2; 1501-00396 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 5988 at para 13; 1607-05333 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 1836 at
paras 2-3; 1810-06627 (Re), supra note 292 at paras 8-10
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•

Interpretation, including sign language interpretation, arranged by the tribunal at its
own expense.314

Case Management and Accommodation Requests Prior to the Hearing Date
The SBT has case management procedures in place that provide a forum to discuss
accommodations prior to the hearing date. According to the SBT’s Practice Direction on PreHearing Conferences, the Tribunal itself may also decide to schedule a pre-hearing conference
even if the parties do not request one.315 The SBT usually holds pre-hearing conferences by
telephone or videoconference where procedural matters are at issue, but where significant
prejudice may otherwise result, it may be held in person as well.316
Some decisions regarding accommodations were issued after a pre-hearing conference – for
example, to set timelines to receive evidence regarding the merits of the case that
accommodate an appellant’s disabilities,317 to set timelines to receive evidence in support of an
accommodation request,318 to allow an appellant to bring a late appeal,319 to select a venue
that accommodates the appellant, 320 or to determine a method of hearing that accommodates
the appellant.321
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SBT, “Accessibility and Accommodation”, supra note 277. Social Benefits Tribunal, “Language Services,” online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/sbt/language-services/> [SBT, “Language Services”]. As well, in 1709-07502 (Re), 2018
ONSBT 1716 at para 6, the Tribunal confirms its policy that it will arrange and pay for third party interpreters
required by appellants.
315 Social Benefits Tribunal, “Practice Direction on Pre-Hearing Conferences” (effective January 1, 2016), online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/sbt/Pre-Hearing%20Conferences.html>
316 Ibid: Procedural questions that may be resolved by pre-hearing conference outlined in the Practice Direction
include deadlines to complete steps in the hearing process, the length of the hearing, or the order of proceedings.
However, the Practice Direction provides adjudicators with flexibility, stating that “any other matter that may
assist in the just and expeditious disposition of the appeal” may be decided as well.
317 1402-01765 (Re) 2017, supra note 295 at paras 9-12
318 1611-08690 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2576 at paras 2-5
319 1312-12902RR (Re), supra note 294 at paras 17-22
320 1703-02128 (Re), supra note 313 at paras 3-11; 1705-03640 (Re), supra note 311 at paras 3-4. See also: and
1703-01860 (Re) #2, supra note 308 at paras 15-19
321 1705-03640 (Re), supra note 311 at paras 2-6
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These case management conferences were often held at the request of the SBT to narrow
issues in complex cases,322 to provide directions after an adjournment was granted, 323 or to
determine procedural matters such as where a hearing should be held. 324 However, one prehearing conference was held at the request of the respondent to address an issue of
jurisdiction.325
Accommodation Requests at the Hearing
Although some appellants may request accommodations early on, the case law reflects
flexibility when an accommodation request is made at the hearing itself. They may grant the
request or adjourn the hearing to provide time for appellants to consider what
accommodations they need and provide appropriate medical support for them.
SBT members may grant accommodations at the hearing without prior notice from the
appellant; for example, they may convert an in-person hearing to a telephone hearing,326 dim
the lighting, simplify the language of questions, and assist the appellant with medical
evidence.327 Similarly, if the appellant has an episodic condition where it is impossible to predict
her level of functioning, the Tribunal may grant an adjournment. The SBT understands that, in
some cases, “it is the nature of [the appellant’s] condition that she cannot predict when she is
going to have a bad day.”328
When appellants do not understand that they can request accommodations in advance, the SBT
member explains this process and may adjourn to provide the appellant with the opportunity to
make a request.329 In particular, the SBT recognizes that appellants with limited English
proficiency may require an adjournment to both arrange for an interpreter and allow the

322

1402-01765 (Re) 2017, supra note 295 at paras 9-12
1611-08690 (Re), supra note 318 at paras 2-5
324 1703-02128 (Re), supra note 313 at paras 3-11
3251312-12902RR (Re), supra note 294 at paras 17-22
326 1506-06006 (Re), supra note 294 at para 1; 1511-10029 (Re), supra note 309 at para 1
327 1706-05023 (Re), supra note 300 at para 2
328 1702-01113 (Re), supra note 288 at para 7
329 1704-02853 (Re), supra note 289 at para 10
323
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appellant time to get legal advice.330 The SBT may adopt stricter timelines than they did in
response to a previous adjournment with respect to the same matter if an appellant has
difficulties putting together an accommodation request or supporting it with the relevant
evidence – however, the SBT will not necessarily deny a second adjournment request
outright.331
The SBT will also be willing to adjourn the hearing if accommodations themselves cause
unexpected difficulties. For example, technical problems may occur during a telephone
hearing.332 Similarly, a scheduled interpreter may fail to attend or arrive late,333 speak the
incorrect language or dialect,334 or may not interpret accurately.335 The SBT has also adjourned
a hearing because an appellant has expressed concerns with telephone interpretation. 336
These cases demonstrate that SBT members generally exercise their discretion flexibly, taking
accommodation needs of appellants seriously even if they are first raised at the outset of the
hearing or during the hearing itself.
Inquiries about Accommodations and Evaluation of Practices Employed by Regional Offices
SBT members sometimes identify accommodation issues on their own motion at the hearing,
even when appellants do not raise the issue on their own. For example, a member asked an
appellant who had a stroke whether this led to any limitations that should be
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For example: 1612-09469 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 3737 at paras 2-3; 1807-04766 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 994 at paras 1-5;
1711-09229 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2764 at paras 1-2; 1703-02308 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2357 at paras 2-3
331 1611-08690 (Re), supra note 318 at paras 2-5; 1703-02013 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 5013 at paras 6-10
332 1712-10308 (Re), supra note 309 at paras 4-5 (appellant and representative had problems using speakerphone
during a telephone hearing); 1409-09769 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 1182 at paras 4-5 (SBT member had difficulties
accessing the teleconference line).
333 For example: 1705-05222 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6326 at paras 2-3; 1705-04067 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6233 at para 2;
1611-07950 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 2947 at para 2; 1606-04106 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 2959 at paras 2-3; 1804-02374
(Re), 2018 ONSBT 5047 at paras 4-7
334 For example: 1705-04550 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 6301 at paras 3-5; 1610-07745 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 2481 at paras 3-5;
1609-06560 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 1333 at paras 4-9; 1802-01285 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4679 at paras 3-4
335 1610-07270 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4565 at paras 3-4; 1810-06568 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 2043 at paras 3-8; 1803-01927
(Re), 2018 ONSBT 5352 at paras 3-7; 1711-09798 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4981 at paras 5-7
336 1705-03762 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 5851 at para 5; 1507-07094R (Re), 2017 ONSBT 2588 at paras 5-6; 1604-02711
(Re), 2017 ONSBT 1477 at paras 2-9
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accommodated.337 In addition, when an appellant experienced memory problems during his
testimony, the adjudicator asked him about it, learned that his medication was affecting his
memory, and raised the possibility of an adjournment.338
Similarly, if an appellant seems to have a language barrier, the SBT will raise this as a matter of
human rights and section 14 of the Charter.339 The SBT arranges for interpretation provided by
an objective, impartial interpreter at the tribunal’s expense, upon receiving an appellant’s
request prior to the hearing or if it becomes obvious at the hearing that an appellant requires
one.340 That said, the SBT provides appellants with the option to bring someone they know if
they prefer, as long as that person interprets accurately and fairly.341 For example, a family
friend was permitted to interpret as an accommodation for the appellant’s anxiety.342 Once
interpretation has been arranged, SBT members regularly inquire about potential problems
with interpretation343 and may order an adjournment if there are doubts regarding the quality
of interpretation.344
The SBT has also concluded that some policies of local disability benefits offices fail to
accommodate appellants to the required extent. The SBT has held that pre-formulated letters
are not always enough to accommodate a party. For example, when an appellant missed
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1304-04164 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 2490 at para 3
1709-07977 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 9 at paras 3-4
339 1702-01099 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4332 at paras 2-4. See also: 1609-06411 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 1331 at paras 1-2
340SBT, “Language Services”, supra note 314; SBT, “Accessibility and Accommodation”, supra note 277. See, for
example, 1810-06568 (Re), supra note 335 at paras 3-8, where the SBT adjourned a hearing because of inaccurate
interpretation, even where the appellant’s bilingual spouse was present; 1609-06745 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 1733 at
paras 3-5, where an interpreter did not arrive at the hearing and the SBT refused to allow a friend to interpret;
1602-01419 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 5834 at para 1, where the SBT provided an interpreter and the appellant’s son did
not interpret; 1806-04272 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 389 at para 1, where the SBT did not allow the appellant’s son to
interpret and adjourned to arrange for an interpreter.
341 1402-02043R (Re), 2015 ONSBT 2325 at para 12; 1307-06812 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 2388 at paras 3-4
342 1502-01815 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 881 at para 3
343 For example: 1712-10011 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 3123 at paras 3-6; 1712-10271 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 3394 at para 1;
1711-09155 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 3966 at para 3. However, in 1811-07754 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 2526 at para 14, the SBT
did not inquire further when the appellant stated that he had difficulty understanding questions from his
representative even though an interpreter was present. It is possible that the SBT did not intervene because the
appellant was represented and because he had some proficiency in English.
344 1705-03849 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2146 at para 1
338
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multiple deadlines for providing documentation for a medical review, the Director was required
to take into account the appellant’s mental health disabilities and whether she had a family
doctor.345 Failing to take into account the appellant’s own personal circumstances meant that
she was not appropriately accommodated. 346 Similarly, in accepting a late appeal from an
appellant with paranoid schizophrenia, the SBT commented that it was “aware that the
Appellant may have been difficult to deal with at the time but the local office failed
to accommodate the Appellant and subsequently caused him undue stress.”347
Disrespectful and unfair interactions with local offices may cause appellants to be less
forthcoming about accommodation requests and to find hearings to be more stressful. In one
case, where it was difficult to find a venue that accommodated an appellant’s multiple chemical
sensitivities and physical limitations, she expressed an unwillingness to engage in further
negotiations around the accommodation of these conditions. 348 While it may not always be
reasonable for an appellant to refuse to engage in their own accommodation process, this case
highlights the importance of respectful and efficient arrangement of accommodations at all
levels.
Discretionary Decision-Making Practices
When SBT members decide accommodation requests, they take a practical approach that
weighs the interests of the parties, the importance of moving the appeal process ahead, and
any medical evidence they already have before them. In doing so, a few cases demonstrate that
at least some SBT members attempt to view the appellant as a whole person, and to take into
account their personal circumstances that may not directly relate to their disabilities.
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1808-05527 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 1447 at paras 11-14
Ibid
347 1312-12902RR (Re), supra note 294 at paras 17-22
348 1703-02128 (Re), supra note 313 at para 7
346
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Weighing the Interests and Prejudice to the Parties
The SBT analyzes prejudice to the appellant and the respondent, the Director of the Ontario
Disability Support Program, taking into account relevant circumstances affecting the appellant,
including an appellant’s medical conditions. For example, the SBT allowed an appellant to file
an appeal late, taking into account that her depression significantly worsened when her mother
died, and that she had to move.349 While accommodating the appellant’s depression was an
important reason for allowing the extension of time, her depression was considered in the
context of her other circumstances. In addition, the Tribunal acknowledged that “denying the
extension would prejudice the Appellant significantly more than any possible prejudice that
could be experienced by the Director”.350 However, in some cases, as noted below, the SBT
denied accommodations after balancing the interests of the parties, on the basis of delay,
failure of the appellant to participate, or other factors that demonstrated to the decision-maker
that the hearing process had been frustrated.
For the most part, the Director did not oppose accommodations requested by appellants, which
may provide decision-makers with more scope to allow them, since prejudice to the opposing
party is not a significant factor. In some cases that I reviewed, the Director consented to
accommodations such as extension of time to appeal, adjournments, a change of venue for the
hearing, and the arrangement of language interpretation. 351 In one case, counsel for the
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1506-06244 (Re), supra note 294 at paras 6-7
Ibid at para 7. See also: 1606-04478 (Re), supra note 294 at paras 5-8 (delay of 7.5 months); 1610-07319 (Re),
supra note 294 at paras 3-6 (delay of 5 months)
351 With respect to extension of time to appeal: 1603-01820 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 3547 at para 4; 1606-03867 (Re),
2017 ONSBT 2431 at para 6. With respect to adjournment to arrange for accommodations, see: 1705-04114 (Re),
supra note 297 at paras 1-2; 1703-02211 (Re), supra note 281 at para 9. With respect to an adjournment when the
appellant did not attend: 1504-03288RR (Re), 2018 ONSBT 1113 at para 6; 1711-09393 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 3031 at
para 5. With respect to an adjournment because of an error on the notice of hearing: 1602-01423 (Re), 2017
ONSBT 2107 at para 5. With respect to an adjournment and a change of venue, see: 1707-05605 (Re), supra note
307 at paras 3-5. With respect to an adjournment to arrange language interpretation, see: 1705-04550 (Re), supra
note 334 at para 3; 1610-07745 (Re), supra note 334 at paras 3-5; 1604-02711 (Re), supra note 336 at paras 2-9;
1609-06560 (Re), supra note 334 at paras 4-9; 1806-03654 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 7 at paras 2-4; 1712-10011 (Re),
supra note 343 at paras 3-6; 1705-04425 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 85 at para 2; 1601-00474 (Re), supra note 298 at para
3; 1609-06745 (Re), supra note 340 at para 5. In 1810-06627 (Re), supra note 292 at paras 8-10, respondent’s
counsel agreed to a number of accommodations, including an in-person hearing, after having requested a written
350
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Director consented to an adjournment for the appellant to obtain legal representation, but
expressed concerns that “an adjournment would lead to a similar situation in the future.” 352 In
another appeal, the Director’s counsel took no position on an adjournment request at all. 353
However, in a few cases, the respondent opposed requests that could engage access to justice
concerns. For example, the Director objected to two extensions of time, 354 as well as two
adjournments when the appellant did not attend the hearing.355 In addition, a Case Processing
Officer (CPO) appearing for the Director questioned the adjournment requested by the
appellant on the basis of a language barrier, after the Director filed written submissions in
English shortly before the hearing.356
When the SBT evaluates prejudice to the appellant or the respondent that may be caused by a
delay, it will take into account whether the appellant is still receiving income support. For
example, where an appellant is over the age of 65 and no longer receiving income support, the
prejudice to the Director is a lesser concern.357 The SBT may also consider that an appellant
may have to pay back interim support received pending the appeal if the appeal is
unsuccessful.358
Additional Evidence is not Always Required
In evaluating the interests of the parties, the SBT may not always require additional evidence.
Evidence about an appellant’s disabilities and circumstances is often already available and may

hearing. See also: 1408-08806 (Re), supra note 292 at para 6 where the respondent’s representative agreed to sit
in a different location to give the appellant more room for her electronic devices and orient herself so they were
facing one another and 1802-00966 (Re), supra note 299 where the Case Presenting Officer agreed to make best
efforts to convert the Director’s submissions to a format that was accessible to the appellant, taking into account
his visual disability.
352 1711-09242 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2638 at para 5, see also paras 3-4, 6-7
353 1702-01317 (Re), supra note 309 at para 5
354 1312-12902RR (Re), supra note 294 at paras 17-22; 1609-07071 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 639 at paras 30-47
355 1412-13744 (Re), supra note 291 at paras 24-25; 1801-00291 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 3683 at paras 3-8
356 The SBT allowed the adjournment, noting the CPO’s disrespectful conduct: 1804-02168 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 35 at
paras 11-15
357 1702-01668 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 2204 at para 10
358 1607-05236 (Re) 2018, supra note 304 at para 22
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provide enough information to support the accommodations requested. For example, in one
case, an appellant’s grandfather came to the hearing to explain why the appellant could not
attend. Based on the medical evidence already in the file, the SBT granted an adjournment. 359
Even if nobody attends to explain the appellant’s absence, the SBT will consider whether the
appellant may not have attended because of a medical condition, such as a mental health
condition, chronic pain or intellectual disability.360 For example, the SBT took into account
difficulties in communication which could explain a failure to attend, such as a language barrier
and hearing impairment.361
Similarly, the SBT may allow an adjournment based on an appellant’s personal circumstances.
When an appellant did not appear at her hearing, the SBT member noted that her file
documented homelessness and a tendency to lose touch with caseworkers and healthcare
workers.362 In the interest of fairness, the SBT gave the appellant an opportunity to explain why
she was not able to attend.363
When the Tribunal does require medical evidence, it may take the time at a hearing to explain
to the appellant, as well as any support person present, what information is needed from the
doctor.364 When the appellant is not able to obtain this information, the SBT is also mindful of
the reasons why and is open to providing more time. For example, when an appellant was
supposed to undergo a psychological assessment to determine how to accommodate her
cognitive issues in the hearing process, the psychologist passed away.365 The appellant tried her
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1711-09393 (Re), supra note 351 at paras 3-10
1706-04867 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 890 at paras 4-7 (depression and anxiety); 1702-01676 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4501 at
paras 2-8 (intellectual disability and substance abuse); 1707-06223 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 983 at paras 3-8 (chronic pain
and depression, see also 1707-06211 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 832 at paras 1-8); 1704-03022 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 5519 at
paras 3-8 (social anxiety with phobia and social isolation); 1804-02369 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 5248 at paras 3-8
(borderline personality traits and obsessive compulsive disorder with paranoia); 1708-06430 (Re), 2017 ONSBT
6274 at paras 3-8 (agoraphobia)
3611703-01949 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 5342 at paras 3-8
362 1610-07579 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4587 at para 5
363 Ibid at paras 6-9
364 1412-13963 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 364 at paras 4-6
365 1611-08690 (Re), 2018 ONSBT 4783 at para 2
360
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best, providing some information from the family doctor and asking for more time. 366 The SBT
provided an adjournment to allow this assessment to take place with another psychologist. 367
Similarly, the SBT does not request significant evidence or explanation for interpreter requests,
and may allow interpreters to remain on stand-by even if the appellant may not always need
them.368 The SBT website explains that interpreters may be requested on the appeal form, or
after submitting that form but before the hearing.369
Assistance from Counsel May Allow Additional Accommodations to be Adjudicated
While many appellants request accommodations on their own, assistance from their
representative may be helpful.370 For example, where counsel for the appellant was concerned
that an appellant was not following the proceedings because of a cognitive impairment, the SBT
took this concern seriously. 371 It granted an adjournment to receive medical information and
assess any additional accommodations. In addition, the SBT granted an adjournment when a
representative raised an issue about the quality of the interpretation at the hearing. 372
Accommodations are Refused Where Continuing with the Hearing Process becomes Impossible
In some cases, despite the requests by appellants and their counsel, the SBT may conclude that
further accommodation should not be provided. Under these circumstances, the SBT will
consider whether the appellant cannot or refuses to participate in the hearing process at all,
significant delay has been incurred, or the appellant is asking for something that is not
reasonable or possible for the SBT to provide.
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Ibid at para 3
Ibid at para 4
368 For example: 1511-10038 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 3085 at para 2; 1511-10029 (Re), supra note 309 at para 1; 150100005 (Re), 2015 ONSBT 5647 at para 19; 1712-10282 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 717 at para 3
369 SBT, “Language Services”, supra note 314. However, the website also explains that correspondence directed to
the SBT must be in English or French, which may impose barriers in requesting interpretation and in requesting
other accommodations prior to the hearing.
370 However, if a represented appellant does not request accommodations within a reasonable time, the SBT may
also be less patient than in the case of an unrepresented appellant: 1501-00228 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 1019 at paras 35
371 1706-05104 (Re), supra note 289 at paras 2-3
372 1806-03654 (Re), supra note 351 at paras 2-4
367

68

For example, in one case, an appellant was not able to participate in the hearing process for
over two and a half years, and requested that the SBT provide her with a representative.373 In
another case, the appellant still had not obtained medical information from a family doctor
after two years had passed.374 In other cases, the appellant engaged in disrespectful behaviour
and refused to follow the SBT rules,375 wanted to call witnesses whose evidence was in the file
and who were no longer working at the ODSP office,376 or requested a hearing in a municipality
where there was no accessible location available. 377 While some of these cases may engage
situations that demonstrate undue hardship under the Code, others may relate more to a
frustration of the hearing process from the perspective of the SBT.
In Summary: Practical Decisions Informed by the Needs of Persons with Disabilities
The SBT’s discretionary decision-making regarding accommodations in the hearing process is
characterized by a practical, individualized approach, tailored to the particular disabilities,
circumstances, and needs of appellants. The SBT is willing to provide a variety of
accommodations at various points in the appeal process, and to look to the evidence on file to
support them where possible. The SBT will take reasonable requests at face value and will
arrange for interpretation or alter the hearing process to accommodate disabilities as needed,
especially where there is little prejudice to the Director. Fairness to the opposing party may not
be a significant concern in many cases, since the Director does not often oppose
accommodation requests. However, in a few cases, the SBT acknowledges that the interest in
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1212-15758 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 820 at paras 17-20. While the SBT will not provide an appellant with a lawyer, it
may adjourn the hearing to allow the appellant to get legal advice or representation from a community legal clinic:
1712-10427 (Re), supra note 287 at para 8; 1705-05222 (Re), supra note 333 at paras 2-3; and 1612-09469
(Re), supra note 330 at paras 2-3. In one case, the SBT ordered an adjournment upon finding that the appellant’s
sister, who was not a lawyer or paralegal, was not a competent representative: 1803-01682 (Re), 2018 ONSBT
5588 at paras 7-8.
374 1508-07792 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 3516 at paras 15-19 (and related case 1508-07792 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 3488 at
paras 15-19). See also: request for third adjournment denied in 1404-03788 (Re), 2016 ONSBT 971 at paras 3-9
375 1607-05236 (Re) 2018, supra note 304 at paras 22-24
376 1402-01765 (Re) 2018, supra note 295 at paras 12-21
377 1701-00513 (Re), 2017 ONSBT 4883 at paras 1-2 (see also, the decision on the merits: 1701-00513 (Re), 2017
ONSBT 5350 at para 2). While this case may raise other questions about how hard the SBT looked for an accessible
location or accessibility more generally in certain areas of the province, it serves as a helpful example of how SBT
members evaluate cases of undue hardship.

69

ensuring that the appeal proceed may outweigh an appellant’s accommodation request where
that request is unreasonable or impracticable, or where significant delay has already been
incurred.
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
The HRTO hears applications regarding discrimination and harassment under the Human Rights
Code. The HRTO’s approach to discretionary procedural decisions regarding accommodations
reflects its human rights mandate and its legally trained adjudicators. While the HRTO is
mindful of the importance of accommodations and provides applicants with some information
and time to make and support accommodation requests, it may occasionally take an overly
technical view of what accommodations are reasonable, failing to account for access to justice
concerns beyond the Code.
While discrimination claims at the HRTO arise in a variety of social areas,378 the majority of
claims arise in the workplace. Tribunals Ontario reports that, between 2016-2018, 69-70% of
applications related to employment, 26-27% related to goods, services and facilities, and 8%
related to housing.379 Discrimination must also be connected to one or more Code grounds.380
The most common ground reported in applications filed between 2016-2018 was disability,
cited in 55-56% of applications.381 Other more frequently cited grounds include race, ethnic
origin, sex, family status, sexual harassment, and reprisal.382
Applicants often hold less power in their relationships with employers and landlords (who are
often the respondents in these cases), and may also be less likely to understand HRTO

378

Code, supra note 121, s 1-9
Linda P Lamoureux & Holly Moran, Tribunals Ontario, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report 2018-19”, (28 June
2019) at 47, online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/en/reports-plans-standards/> [Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals
Ontario Annual Report”]
380 Code, supra note 121, s 1-9
381 Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report”, supra note 379 at 48. The Human Rights Legal Support
Centre’s 2018-2019 Annual Report also cites disability as the most common ground of discrimination in its cases,
comprising 34% of its total caseload: HRLSC, “Annual Report”, supra note 133 at 14
382 Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report”, supra note 379 at 48
379
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processes or to be able to afford a representative.383 Furthermore, although some applications
may arise out of ongoing interactions, Michelle Flaherty and Leslie Reaume have observed that
parties “rarely draw on or seek to maintain longer-term relationships with one another.” 384
Cases can often take months or years to resolve,385 and even when applicants do win their
HRTO cases, the quantum of damages they receive may be inadequate to redress the wrongs
they have experienced.386
Statutory Mandate and Active Adjudication
The HRTO has more expansive procedural discretion than the SBT or the LTB. It is required to
employ adjudicators with legal expertise as well as the ability to implement alternative
procedures. The Human Rights Code explains that the Code and HRTO’s Rules “shall be liberally
construed to permit the Tribunal to adopt practices and procedures, including alternatives to
traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, will
facilitate fair, just and expeditious resolutions of the merits of the matters before it.”387
Adjudicators must have experience with human rights law, and an “aptitude for applying
[these] alternative adjudicative practices and procedures”.388
Active adjudication is a “hybrid” approach employed by the HRTO to achieve this mandate,
falling between traditional, adversarial courtroom procedures and non-adversarial, inquisitorial
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Some applicants receive free summary advice from or representation by community legal clinics or HRLSC. Over
14,000 people contacted HRLSC in 2018-2019 to seek legal advice about a potential case of discrimination. HRLSC
provided in-depth legal services to 2725 people that year: HRLSC, “Annual Report”, supra note 133 at 15-16
384 Michelle Flaherty & Leslie Reaume, “Mediation-Arbitration in Ontario: Labour Relations, Human Rights, and
Beyond?” (2017) 30 CJALP 351 at 364-365, 374-375 at 364
385 Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report”, supra note 379 at 49
386 Ryder and Ranalli criticize damage awards by the HRTO from 2000-2015 as being too low, taking into account
the quasi-constitutional status of the Code, and not having kept up with inflation: Audra Ranalli & Bruce Ryder,
"Undercompensating for Discrimination: An Empirical Study of General Damages Awards Issued by the Human
Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2000-15" (2017) 13 JL & Equality 91 at 137-139
387 Human Rights Code, supra note 121, s 41. See also s 43 which gives the HRTO broad discretion to make its own
Rules and conduct hearings.
388 Ibid, s 32(3)
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procedures.389 During active adjudication, decision-makers guide the hearing process, in
contrast to passively allowing the parties to present their cases. 390 Parties usually consent to
active adjudication techniques, although adjudicators may proceed despite objections. 391 This
“hybrid” approach may also include techniques that lead to the settlement of a case, such as
mediation-adjudication.392
Active adjudication may modify the way the tribunal receives evidence, such as allowing
witnesses to provide written statements rather than undergo direct examination, to testify in a
non-traditional order, or to give their evidence over the telephone.393 For example, in one case,
an applicant was accommodated by allowing her to testify first, allowing documents into
evidence to reduce the extent of her testimony, and to record the hearing so she could listen to
it later, given her limited language proficiency and disability.394 The adjudicator may intervene
to ensure that parties are treated fairly and respectfully in sensitive cases, such as those
relating to sexual harassment.395
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Samantha Green & Lorne Sossin, “Administrative Justice and Innovation: Beyond the Adversarial/ Inquisitorial
Dichotomy” in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Bagley, eds, The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes:
Global Perspectives (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013) 71 at 71
390 Michelle Flaherty, "Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in
Administrative Law" (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 119 at 130 [Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants”]
391 David A Wright, "Implementing the New Ontario Human Rights Code: A Tribunal Perspective" (2014) 18:1 CLELJ
101 at 114
392 The broad mandate of the HRTO to employ non-traditional procedures also supports its practice of mediationadjudication. During mediation-adjudication, the adjudicator mediates the case on the understanding that if the
parties do not reach a settlement, the hearing will proceed with the same adjudicator in the ordinary course. This
practice, adapted from mediation-arbitration in the labour relations context, faces additional challenges at the
HRTO where parties are self-represented, may be seeking vindication in a hearing or legal decision, do not choose
their adjudicator, and may not wish to maintain an ongoing relationship. However, some adjudicators have
successfully navigated these challenges by earning the trust of the parties, explaining to parties how confidential
information will not be used if the matter proceeds to a final decision, and by taking a reflective approach, taking
care not to take “advantage of vulnerable parties who are fed up with the cost and time associated with
participating in a human rights application”: Flaherty & Reaume, supra note 384 at 364-365, 374-375
393 Wright, supra note 391 at 114
394 Taucar v University of Western Ontario, 2015 HRTO 380 at paras 10-12 [Taucar #1]; Pellerin v Conseil scolaire de
district catholique Centre-Sud, 2011 HRTO 1777 at paras 13-14 [Pellerin]
395Michelle Flaherty, “Best Practices in Active Adjudication” (2015) 28 Can J Admin L & Prac 291 at 295-296
[Flaherty, “Best Practices”]
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A decision-maker may also direct parties to certain issues or dispense with procedural
elements, such as opening statements, to focus in on what is important in an accessible, nonlegalistic way.396 In the Tribunal’s words:
In some cases the Tribunal may exercise its powers to narrow the issues, limit the scope
of evidence or decide to hear issues in a particular order following a motion for a
summary hearing or other request. Nonetheless, it is the exercise of [the] Tribunal's
powers to control its process that is at the heart of the matter […] the Tribunal [must]
ask what is the question that needs to be determined, what evidence is needed to
determine that question, and what is the most fair, just and expeditious manner to
proceed in the circumstances. 397
For example, an adjudicator may decide certain issues on a preliminary basis398 or consider
summary dismissal at any point in the hearing.399 Summary dismissal is typically considered
near the beginning of hearing a human rights matter, and is meant to determine whether a
hearing has a reasonable prospect of success.400
In Aiken, a case about summary dismissal, the court quoted the Supreme Court of Canada’s
statements regarding access to justice and proportionate procedures in Hryniak,401 and applied
them to the human rights context. The Divisional Court stated that proportionality may inform
how the HRTO adapts its procedures in the context of active adjudication:
What is true for the traditional civil trial system is even more applicable to the
administrative tribunal system, which was designed to be a more expeditious and costeffective process for the resolution of disputes. Even more compelling is the application
of these principles to the human rights adjudication process in Ontario, a system that
had been mired in backlogs and delays, which the new regime was designed to
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Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants”, supra note 390 at 130-131
JS v Dufferin-Peel Catholic District School Board, 2018 HRTO 644 at para 20 [JS]
398 CAW - Canada Group of Employees v Presteve Foods Ltd, 2012 HRTO 1365 at paras 54-55
399 Cybulsky v Hamilton Health Sciences, 2019 HRTO 102 at para 9
400 Aiken v Ottawa Police Services Board, 2015 ONSC 3793 at paras 35-36 (Div Ct), upholding the summary hearing
procedure [Aiken]; Pellerin supra note 394 at paras 15-20
401 Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at paras 1-6. In Hryniak, a case about summary judgment motions in the context
of civil litigation, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]ithout an effective and accessible means of enforcing rights,
the rule of law is threatened” and that courts must rethink conventional trial processes and adopt “proportional
procedures tailored to the needs of the particular case” (paras 1-2).
397
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ameliorate. The recognition and enforcement of human rights principles go to the core
of our values as a society. This is truly a situation in which justice delayed is justice
denied […] Principles of natural justice and procedural fairness do not always require a
full trial-like hearing.402
The Divisional Court has also acknowledged that the HRTO is empowered to modify its
procedures based on proportionality in other ways, for example, by limiting the number of
hearing days for a particular matter.403
While proportionality may be an effective way for a tribunal to resolve cases efficiently with a
view to the limited resources of litigants and the tribunal itself, it could limit a party’s
participation and be abused by respondents. To properly apply Hryniak to the context of
administrative tribunals, it is important to consider whether parties “have a meaningful
opportunity to participate”, as well as whether adjudicators can “be confident” in reaching a
decision based on the relevant evidence.404 It may sometimes be difficult to reconcile
proportionality with meaningful participation, if an abridged process limits the opportunity for
parties to tell their story. That said, at least in some situations, the HRTO may recognize that a
summary hearing process might in itself create barriers. For example, an adjudicator concluded
that a summary hearing was inappropriate where the self-represented applicant relied heavily
on an interpreter and her anxiety and prior head injury made it difficult for her to testify. 405 In
this case, the adjudicator specifically referred to the applicant’s ability to tell her story.
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Aiken, supra note 400 at paras 33-34. At paragraph 32, the Divisional Court quotes the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Hryniak.
403 Bart v McMaster University, 2016 ONSC 5747 at paras 105-120 (Div Ct)
404 Alton, supra note 42 at 167
405 Fan v Royal Ottawa Health Care Group, 2015 HRTO 1018 at paras 19-20 [Fan]. At paragraph 20, the adjudicator
stated that, “[i]n this case, I did not consider that process fair, just or expeditious because of the applicant's
reliance on an interpreter, the fact that she was unrepresented, the heightened anxiety she displayed about the
hearing process and the difficulties she was having organizing her thoughts and presenting her story, much of
which she said was attributable to having a head injury.”
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Similarly, the HRTO discourages respondents from bringing requests for a summary hearing at
multiple stages to repeatedly test the applicant’s case.406
A Human Rights Approach to Exercising Procedural Discretion
The HRTO has adopted some approaches to deciding accommodation requests and receiving
evidence to support them with principles of accommodation in mind. For example, if a party
requests an extension of time, the Tribunal will usually grant it, “until [these requests] begin to
substantially interfere with the Tribunal process, are unfair to the other parties or amount to an
abuse of process.”407 Similarly, the HRTO will routinely grant the requests of parties to have
access to a recording of the hearing.408 In some instances, the HRTO may also accommodate
unexpected barriers that may arise based on a party’s lack of financial resources, for example,
by allowing an applicant to attend at the HRTO to call in to a hearing because he did not have
access to a telephone. 409
If a party raises accommodation needs, adjudicators will explain the HRTO’s accommodation
process and provide them with time to make a request.410 They will advise parties of the
different options that they may have, such as explaining how a hearing by teleconference or
video-conference will work.411 The HRTO will also consider accommodation requests made at
the hearing, even if they were not made through the proper process or using the proper
form.412
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JS, supra note 397 at para 19: “Thus, it is important to remember that the approach taken in Pellerin does not
form the basis of a process that encourages or permits respondents to bring requests for summary hearings at any
point in a proceeding, in order to test whether an application has a reasonable prospect of success.”
407 Nahirny v Liquor Control Board of Ontario, 2016 HRTO 648 at para 13 [Nahirny]
408 Taylor Estate v Royal Canin Canada Co, 2017 HRTO 1600 at paras 20-22
409 Wang v Toronto (City), 2019 HRTO 516 at para 4
410 Rose v Toronto Police Services Board, 2015 HRTO 1716 at para 3 [Rose]; Stor v Randstad Holding NV, 2015 HRTO
963 at para 7 [Stor]
411 Fagan v Toronto Transit Commission, 2017 HRTO 1226 at para 8 [Fagan]
412 DiFlorio v Nails For You, 2017 HRTO 576 at para 4 [DiFlorio]
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The HRTO grants a wide range of accommodations, including:
•
•
•
•
•

•

Allowing an applicant to file a late application; 413
Recording the hearing;414
Providing real time captioning;415
Changing the method of hearing by holding it in person,416 in writing,417 by telephone,418
or by videoconference;419
Adjourning the hearing for reasons such as a medical condition, 420 to allow the applicant
more time to get representation as a disability accommodation, 421 to address a
misunderstanding on the part of an applicant with a language barrier,422 or to adjudicate
an accommodation request;423
Altering the process regarding the adjudication of preliminary issues, such as hearing
them in writing424 or adjudicating them at least three weeks before each hearing day;425
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Kelly v CultureLink Settlement Services, 2010 HRTO 977 at paras 70-72; T (OP) v Presteve Foods Ltd, 2015 HRTO
675 at para 90 [Presteve]. See also: James v York University, 2015 ONSC 2234 at paras 45-55 (Div Ct), leave to
appeal to SCC refused, [2016] SCCA No 1
414 Leach v Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2018 HRTO 1113 at paras 12-13;
Sismon v Ottawa (City), 2019 HRTO 432 at paras 50-10; Atadero v Shoppers Drug Mart Inc, 2017 HRTO 780 at para
88; Fagan v Toronto Transit Commission, 2017 HRTO 1323 at paras 8-9; Dolny v College of Massage Therapists of
Ontario, 2016 HRTO 943 at para 5; Davidson v Cummer Avenue United Church, 2017 HRTO 1000 at para 6
[Davidson]. These cases refer to the HRTO’s practice direction that explains that parties may be permitted to
record the hearing to address Code-related needs: Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, “Practice Direction on
Recording Hearings”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/hrto/Practice%20Directions/Recording%20Hearings.html>
415 Armstrong v Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2016 HRTO 1468 at paras 9-12 [Armstrong] (this case
explains that this accommodation has been provided in other cases as well)
416 Leach v Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), 2017 HRTO 1412 at para 7 [Leach 2017]; Bilon v
Niagara (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2019 HRTO 1628 at para 13
417 Searle v Peterborough Regional Health Centre, 2019 HRTO 1243 at para 4; Ihasz v Ontario (Minister of Revenue),
2015 HRTO 352 at para 20; Coughlin v Brampton (City), 2018 HRTO 1352 at paras 11-14 [Coughlin]
418 Knight v Surrey Place Centre, 2019 HRTO 482 at para 156; Jenner v Waterloo (Regional Municipality), 2018 HRTO
788 at para 3
419 AB v Joe Singer Shoes Ltd, 2016 HRTO 1105 at paras 4, 16-17 [AB v Singer]. See also AB v Joe Singer Shoes, 2016
HRTO 1083 at paras 17-20, which discusses the submissions of the applicant but not the respondent because of an
administrative error.
420 Sprague v Yufest, 2017 HRTO 1147 at paras 27-28 (regarding the respondent’s medical condition); Tahir v
Toronto (City), 2018 HRTO 1841 at para 10-12 [Tahir] (to get medical treatment and representation); McPherson v
DeSilva, 2016 HRTO 171 at paras 7-9 [McPherson]; McAllister v Victorian Order of Nurses, 2017 HRTO 1505 at paras
5-8 [McAllister]
421 Rooks v Park 'N Fly, 2016 HRTO 1604 at paras 5-9 [Rooks]; Tahir, supra note 420 at paras 10-12
422 Ahmed v Extendicare West End Villa, 2016 HRTO 802 at para 3 [Ahmed]
423 Weasner v St. John Ambulance Council of Ontario, 2017 HRTO 1150 at para 7 [Weasner]
424 Dolinar v University of Waterloo, 2017 HRTO 1671 at para 4
425 Marsden v Halton Condominium Corp No 41, 2015 HRTO 907 at para 1.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Altering the start time of the hearing;426
Changing the venue of the hearing;427
Limiting the hearing time for each hearing day;428
Allowing a party to have a support person;429
Allowing for breaks during the hearing;430 and
Language interpretation, including sign language interpretation, arranged by the HRTO
at its own expense.431

Case Management and Accommodation Requests Prior to the Hearing
The HRTO informs applicants that they may request accommodations early on, and may decide
requests for accommodations during procedural motions prior to the hearing on the merits.
The HRTO raises the possibility of accommodating applicants on the application form itself. The
form explains, under the signature line, that applicants should contact the Registrar by
telephone, fax, or e-mail to request accommodations if they require them.432 Unfortunately, no
further information is provided about the SJTO Accessibility and Accommodations Policy 433 or
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Matthews v Manufacturers Life Insurance Co, 2016 HRTO 1112 at para 17
Ruffolo v Manulife Financial, 2017 HRTO 282 at para 14 [Ruffolo]; Schiller v Ontario (Ministry of Natural
Resources and Forestry), 2019 HRTO 563 at para 4 [Schiller]; UM v York Region District School Board, 2017 HRTO
1718 at para 2 [UM]; Gonder v Durham Regional Police Services Board, 2019 HRTO 1371 at para 5 [Gonder]; Taucar
v University of Western Ontario, 2015 HRTO 515 at para 30 [Taucar #2]. See also Pollock v Wilson, 2017 HRTO 712
at para 29 [Pollock], where the HRTO suggested a change of venue closer to both parties, after granting an
adjournment because of the appellant’s medical condition.
428 Keane v CompuCom Canada Co, 2018 HRTO 32 at para 6 (half days); UM, supra note 427 at para 2
429AB v Singer, supra note 419 at para 19; DiFlorio supra note 412 at para 4
430 AB v Singer, supra note 419 at para 19; Davidson, supra note 414 at para 24
431 Ruffolo, supra note 427 at paras 14-18 (tribunal explains the process); Fan, supra note 405 at para 20; Human
Rights Tribunal of Ontario, “Practice Direction on Requests for Language Interpretation”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/hrto/Practice%20Directions/Language%20Interpretation.html> [HRTO,
“Practice Direction on Language Interpretation”]; Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, “Language Services”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/hrto/language-services/> [HRTO, “Language Services”]
432 Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, “Form 1: Application”, online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/hrto/formsfiling/> [HRTO, “Application Form”]
433 Tribunals Ontario, “Accessibility and Accommodation Policy”, supra note 277.
427
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the other information about accommodations and interpretation, including sign language
interpretation, available on the HRTO website. 434
Accommodation requests may also be decided on a preliminary motion, a process which the
HRTO is working to improve, and which is consistent with active adjudication practices.435 In
2018, the HRTO began assigning an adjudicator to case manage each application until it is heard
to improve efficiency in resolving preliminary matters.436 When either party brings a request for
an interim decision, accommodation issues may also be advanced, analyzed, and decided on a
preliminary basis.437 For example, an applicant who experienced major depression and PTSD as
a result of the respondent’s conduct provided medical evidence to support a request to testify
by videoconference from another room. This request was allowed by interim decision,438 and
demonstrates an openness to altering the way the HRTO receives evidence. A preliminary
motion is also an opportunity for the HRTO to discuss an accommodation request with an
applicant, explain what documents may be needed to support it, or suggest alternative
accommodations that may be reasonable. 439
The HRTO may, in some cases, adapt how preliminary issues are heard in ways that are
consistent with active adjudication. For example, adjudicators have altered preliminary hearing
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Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, “Accessibility and Accommodations”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/hrto/accessibility-and-accommodations/> [HRTO, “Accessibility and
Accommodations”]
435 Active adjudication practices include preliminary rulings and case-management of applications prior to a
hearing on the merits: John v 1608271 Ontario Inc (cob Service Ontario 077), 2017 HRTO 1588 at paras 54-55
436 Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report”, supra note 379 at 46
437 Leach 2017, supra note 416 at para 7 (request that summary hearing be held in person granted); Mastromatteo
v. Kenora (City), 2018 HRTO 42 at para 5 [Mastromatteo] (request to move the venue of the hearing denied);
Royeton v. Toronto District School Board, 2017 HRTO 371 at paras 20-28 (rejecting the applicant’s proposed
accommodation pending the receipt of further medical information) [Royeton]; Ruffolo, supra note 427 at paras
14-18 (changing the venue of the hearing, requiring all communication to be sent by mail and e-mail, and
explaining to the applicant how to request an interpreter); Schiller, supra note 427 at paras 4-6 (request to change
the hearing venue allowed); Yahya v Sigco Industries Inc, 2015 HRTO 1555 at paras 5-17 [Yahya] (rejecting a
requested change of venue, but suggesting a third venue that is reasonable for the parties to consider)
438 AB v Singer, supra note 419 paras 4, 16-17. See also: Taucar #1, supra note 394 at paras 10-12 where the
Tribunal granted an accommodation request to minimize the amount of time the applicant was required to testify
and to attend the hearing. The adjudicator was willing to accept documentary evidence and to record the hearing
to accommodate the applicant’s disability and limited English proficiency.
439 For example: Kusinski v Marvin Basar Pharmacy Ltd, 2017 HRTO 1277 [Kusinski]
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procedures to accommodate self-represented applicants. In Dolinar, preliminary issues were
addressed in writing,440 while in Marsden, the applicant was given three weeks to prepare for
each hearing day after all preliminary issues were resolved.441
Statistics gathered by Tribunals Ontario demonstrate a slight increase in HRTO interim
procedural decisions in 2018. 442 This is encouraging, since better quality adjudication before the
hearing may promote the resolution of accommodation issues earlier and more efficiently. It
may also lessen pressures on adjudicators which are apparent in some interim decisions. For
example, in one interim decision released in 2015, an adjudicator decided a variety of
accommodation requests in writing.443 The accommodation requests were made only a couple
of weeks before the hearing, and the Vice-Chair was unable to schedule a teleconference based
on her hearing schedule.
A Duty to Inquire: Accommodations Not Directly Raised by a Party
The Divisional Court has held that the HRTO may be required to consider accommodations that
are not explicitly raised by a party, especially one who is self-represented. This is consistent
with the Tribunal’s human rights approach to procedural discretionary decisions, since it takes
into account the duty to inquire. It is also consistent with active adjudication, which encourages
adjudicators to play a role in “shaping the hearing and helping parties navigate the rules and
processes”, to “determine what is fair, appropriate, and proportionate in each case.” 444
The HRTO may have a duty to raise and consider accommodations where it is reasonably
apparent that they may be needed, especially where a party is self-represented. In Audmax, an
unrepresented party’s main witness was not available. The Divisional Court concluded that
rejecting the written evidence without considering alternatives, such as an adjournment,
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Dolinar, supra note 424 at para 4
Marsden, supra note 425 at para 1
442 Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report”, supra note 379 at 47
443 AB v Western University, 2015 HRTO 354 at para 3 [AB v Western]
444 Flaherty, supra note 395 at 293, 299
441
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breached procedural fairness.445 This is consistent with the duty to inquire, which would require
the HRTO to be on notice for potential accommodation issues, and to raise them in a sensitive
way that does not reflect stereotypes.
Consistent with this ruling, the HRTO is prepared to suggest accommodation and particular
approaches that may assist parties and witnesses in fully participating in the hearing.
Sometimes, the HRTO will suggest accommodations on its own motion, 446 or alternative
accommodations if the HRTO cannot allow the accommodation request a party has made.447
Supporting Applicants to Gather Medical Evidence to Determine Reasonable Accommodations
When an accommodation is requested for a disability, the HRTO often requires medical
evidence to “assess options for accommodation that also take into account balancing the
interests of other parties who may be directly affected by changes to the hearing process.”448
Medical evidence allows the HRTO to determine whether the accommodation specifically
relates to a disability, rather than being a “preference” of a party.449 However, the HRTO does
not always require additional medical evidence to what the applicant has already provided, 450
and a short doctor’s note may be sufficient. 451
The HRTO does not require accommodation requests and associated medical evidence to be
served on the opposing party, unless a party is seeking an accommodation, such as an
adjournment, that has “a material impact on the opposing party.”452 This addresses a concern
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Audmax, supra note 142 at paras 36-42. The Divisional Court’s analysis relies solely on procedural fairness
without reference to the Code or any Code grounds. However, the Divisional Court’s approach to procedural
fairness demonstrates an approach that is somewhat analogous to the duty to inquire under the Code.
446 Armstrong, supra note 415 at paras 9-12
447 Kusinski, supra note 439 at paras 3-12 where the HRTO denied an accommodation request for teleconference
hearing and gave the applicant 21 days to request a hearing by videoconference with supporting documentation
448 AB v Singer, supra note 419 at para 17
449 Ibid
450 Davidson, supra note 414 at para 6 (to allow personal recording device into the hearing)
451 Coughlin, supra note 417 at paras 11-14
452 Taucar #2, supra note 427 at para 30. See also: Marsden v Ontario (Minister of Community Safety and
Correctional Services), 2011 HRTO 30 at para 43
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that parties may not want sensitive medical evidence to be disclosed when it is not related to
the substance of the application. 453
Where medical evidence is not available, or does not connect the accommodation to the
disability, the Tribunal may provide the applicant with questions to give a doctor and time to
obtain the answers.454 For example, in Royeton, the applicant requested to be cross-examined
by video-conference with permission to refer to her notes, or through a written statement.455
However, her medical note was not specific about how these accommodations related to her
disability.456 The Vice-Chair gave the applicant 30 days to provide more medical information
about giving “evidence verbally throughout the various stages of the hearing, including crossexamination, with or without some form of accommodation of her needs and the timeframe of
when she is likely to reach this point in her recovery.”457 The adjudicator’s suggestion of various
options in this case demonstrates active adjudication in a way that attempts to balance the
needs of the applicant with the respondent’s right to cross-examine her.
Discussing the evidence required to support an accommodation request and providing time to
obtain it allows the HRTO to tailor accommodations to the specific medical limitations of
applicants in accordance with human rights principles. Although 30 days may not always be
enough time to gather that information, other cases show that applicants may receive more
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However, a recent constitutional challenge has led Tribunals Ontario to adopt a new Access and Privacy Policy
in 2019. Based on this new policy, if a party does not request a confidentiality order, all information in the case file
may be presumptively public: Tribunals Ontario, “Access and Privacy Policy”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/sjto/A2I-Policy-en.html> [Tribunals Ontario, Privacy Policy]
454 Noor v University of Ottawa, 2018 HRTO 1295 at para 7 [Noor]; Wolfe v Toronto Transit Commission, 2018 HRTO
1791 at para 9 [Wolfe]; Garisto v Aphria Inc, 2019 HRTO 1477 at paras 21-22 [Garisto]. However, sometimes the
Tribunal will simply state that there is no evidence at all to support an accommodation request: Shackra v Basic
Packaging Industries Inc, 2019 HRTO 576 at paras 3-5.
455 Royeton, supra note 437
456 Ibid at paras 24, 26-28
457 Ibid at para 33
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time.458 However, if months go by and new medical evidence is not received, the HRTO may
eventually deny an accommodation request. 459
The Limits of Active Adjudication and Procedural Fairness Interests of Respondents
The case law summarized above provides examples of how the HRTO has adapted case
management processes, proactively identified accommodation issues, and altered how it
receives evidence in ways that are consistent with active adjudication. However, “greater
involvement of the adjudicator in the hearing process” must ensure the process is “fair and just
for both parties.”460
Notwithstanding the HRTO’s broad procedural discretion, there are limits to the interventions
available to an adjudicator to assist a self-represented party, since they cannot prejudice the
opposing party.461 The boundaries of an adjudicator’s role to promote access to justice for one
party relate to what is fair and what is seen to be fair by the other party.462 In other words, an
adjudicator cannot intervene in a way that may be perceived as taking one party’s side, even if
that party requires some form of accommodation. 463
Some respondents consented to accommodations requested by applicants, even in some cases
where the relevant accommodations could cause delay.464 In two cases, respondents took no
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ATA v Houselink Community Homes, 2016 HRTO 1357 at para 28 [ATA] (three months)
Garisto, supra note 454 at paras 16-20 (the applicant asked for additional time to get medical evidence but the
HRTO did not grant it because it asked for this medical evidence 8 months previously); Armour v Threshold Homes
and Supports Inc, 2019 HRTO 1183 (about four months); Vaney v Toronto Police Services Board, 2017 HRTO 89 at
paras 21-22, 35-41 (longer than a year, where the respondents requested that the application be dismissed for
abuse of process)
460 Kassir v Del Property Management Ltd, 2017 HRTO 149 at para 22
461 Kristjanson & Naipaul, supra note 198 at 220-224
462 Ibid at 206-207
463 Ibid at 222-223. Flaherty, supra note 395 addresses some questions that adjudicators may ask in determining
whether a departure from more traditional procedures is appropriate at 301-302: “(a) would the ruling or process
unfairly or unreasonably interfere with either party's opportunity to prepare and present its case?; (b) would it
unreasonably interfere with the opportunity to test the other party's evidence?; and (c) in all of the circumstances,
does the ruling lead to a process that is proportionate?”
464 Dolny, supra note 414 at para 3 (with respect to audio recording the hearing, and taking no position on the
adjournment requested by the applicant); Davidson, supra note 414 at para 7 (with respect to recording the
hearing); Armstrong, supra note 415 at paras 9-10 (with respect to asking questions more slowly and giving the
459
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position on adjournments requested by the applicant.465 In many decisions, the respondent’s
position is not mentioned in the decision.466
However, in a number of cases, the HRTO granted accommodation requests despite the
objections of respondents. The concern of respondents was often delay caused by an
adjournment, by additional time taken by the applicant to complete certain procedural steps,
or by the applicant failing to appear at the hearing.467 That said, in other cases, it was more
difficult to discern the potential prejudice motivating the respondent’s objections. For example,
a respondent objected to an applicant’s testimony by videoconference in another room,468 and
in another case, the respondent objected to a recording of the hearing.469
I also identified several cases where the HRTO agreed with the respondent that further delays
or accommodation was not warranted. I elaborate further on these cases below in discussing
accommodation requests that the HRTO rejected, noting cases where respondents advanced
prejudice or argued abuse of process.

applicant more time to respond to them, as well as using microphones at the hearing); McAllister, supra note 420
at para 4 (with respect to an adjournment request); Ruffolo, supra note 427 at para 14 (with respect to changing
the hearing location); Schiller, supra note 427 at para 2 (with respect to changing the hearing location and
rescheduling the hearing); Keane, supra note 428 at para 2 (with respect to an adjournment)
465 Rooks, supra note 421 at para 8; Cronier v Securitas Canada Ltd, 2015 HRTO 57 at para 2, 5
466 In one case, HRTO explicitly noted that it did not request the respondent’s views on the accommodation
request before denying the accommodation request: Nahirny v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario, 2016 HRTO 543 at
para 7
467 For example: Presteve, supra note 413 at para 66 (relating to delay in filing the application); Kelly, supra note
413 at para 5 (relating to delay in filing the application); Tahir, supra note 420 (opposing a second adjournment);
Pollock, supra note 427 at para 23 (opposing a third adjournment); Fagan, supra note 414 at paras 2-5
(adjournment of second day of hearing); Coughlin, supra note 417 at para 13 (opposing a written hearing);
McPherson, supra note 420 at para 4 (adjournment); Bassis v Commissionnaires Great Lakes, 2017 HRTO 479 at
para 3 (adjournment); Weasner, supra note 423 at para 6; Worrell v DiPietro's Meat and Groceries, 2018 HRTO 739
at para 3 [Worrell]
468 AB v Joe Singer, supra note 438 at paras 5-9. In this case, the respondent disputed the connection between the
applicant’s disability and the accommodations she requested, stating that “it is crucial for them to put documents
to the applicant in an orderly and timely manner” and that parties should testify in person when credibility is at
issue. The HRTO ordered the parties to exchange documents in advance to address some of these concerns.
469 Sismon, supra note 414 at para 7. The respondent’s objection was based on the fact that the applicant did not
make the request in advance of the hearing.
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The HRTO Denies Unreasonable Accommodation Requests
In denying a request for a procedural accommodation to the hearing process, the HRTO
considers how and when those accommodations were raised and the reasonableness of the
accommodations requested. Significant delay or lack of diligence on the part of the applicant
requesting the accommodation may also provide a reason for the HRTO to deny it. As well,
accommodations may be less likely to be reasonable if they impact the fairness of the
proceedings or do not engage a Code ground.
Significant Delay and Lack of Diligence
The Tribunal also considers the amount of delay a party has incurred, or the delay an
accommodation request may create, to determine whether an accommodation request should
be granted.
If the HRTO denies an accommodation on the basis of the delay, the relevant time period is
significant, usually spanning months or years.470 In particular, when a party causes delay of this
magnitude by failing to follow the HRTO’s procedural directions, it may prejudice the opposing
party’s ability to present its case and place undue strain on the HRTO’s own resources. 471 The
Divisional Court has held that it is reasonable for the HRTO to dismiss an application without
further accommodation after a party has breached its procedural orders. 472
The HRTO acknowledges that both the applicant and the respondent have procedural fairness
interests in having applications decided efficiently. As such, medical evidence is particularly

470

Biondic v Intact Financial Corp, 2017 HRTO 80 at para 99 [Biondic] (11 years). In this case, the respondents
agreed to multiple adjournments of mediation and an extension of time for the applicant to provide disclosure.
However, given the case history, the respondents finally took the position that the application should be dismissed
for an abuse of process (at paras 16-18).
471 Park v University of Ontario Institute of Technology, 2019 HRTO 1083 at paras 16-18, 48-50 [Park] (where the
respondents took the position that the application should be dismissed as an abuse of process); SG v Waterloo
Cooperative Preschool Inc, 2018 HRTO 1716 at paras 14, 22 [SG] (where respondents also advanced abuse of
process). See also Nahirny, supra note 407 at para 10 (where no respondent position is noted).
472 Samra v Brennestuhl, 2017 ONSC 1498 at paras 1-3 (Div Ct), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2017] SCCA No
513. See also, regarding abuse of process: Taucar v Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2017 ONSC 2604 at paras
109-118 (Div Ct), leave to appeal to the SCC refused, [2017] SCCA No 401
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important to support long or indefinite adjournment.473 Similarly, the Tribunal will be unwilling
to delay for an indefinite period of time to search for accommodations. For example, after a
delay of five years, the HRTO dismissed an application because there were no accommodations
the Tribunal could provide that would enable the applicant to participate. 474
In evaluating delay that has been or will be incurred, the HRTO considers whether parties were
diligent or whether they faced obstacles outside of their control. For example, when a party
requests accommodation in advance, the Tribunal is less likely to allow additional
accommodation on the eve of hearing that could have been requested earlier.475 In contrast,
when applicants act diligently in response to an unexpected event,476 the HRTO is more likely to
grant an adjournment as compared to when they simply assume that the Tribunal will adapt to
their school or work schedules.477 Similarly, even if a party’s representative has contributed to
the delay, the HRTO may allow an adjournment if there was no way for the applicant to have
acted reasonably, for example, because of a language barrier.478
Fairness of the Proceedings
Furthermore, the HRTO may deny accommodations because they are not warranted based on
the underlying rationale for its procedures. Where there were factual matters in dispute, the
HRTO refused to hear the application in writing. Instead, the Tribunal asked the applicant to
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Noor, supra note 454 at paras 4, 8 (respondent opposed the applicant’s adjournment request)
ATA, supra note 458 at paras 7, 56-60 (respondents argued that the application should be dismissed). See also:
Murugesan v CIBC Mortgages Inc, 2015 HRTO 1343 at para 9 where the HRTO rejected a request to amend an
application given that it may take years for the applicant to appreciate certain information.
475 Gonder, supra note 427 at paras 4-13 (respondent objected to a last-minute request advanced by the applicant
to provide additional written submissions)
476 Worrell, supra note 467 at paras 4, 6-7
477 Sokolowska v Nexonia Inc, 2015 HRTO 164 at paras 10-11 (school schedule); Borja v Bazos, 2016 HRTO 1030 at
paras 8-10 (work schedule)
478 Galoglu v A Wesley Paving Ltd, 2015 HRTO 1723 at paras 9, 13-14, 21-22 (the HRTO allowed the adjournment
even though respondent’s counsel requested the case be dismissed). On judicial review, the Federal Court has also
considered the reasonableness of accommodations provided by the Human Rights Commission in its investigation
of a complaint: Georgoulas v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FC 652 at paras 160-163
474
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identify when she would be ready to participate in an in-person hearing.479 The HRTO also has a
very high threshold for excluding respondents from the hearing room, given that their presence
is an “essential requirement” for an HRTO hearing.480
While these cases reflect relatively common views held by many adjudicative bodies, the action
of tribunals, including the HRTO, 481 to hear some matters remotely during the current
pandemic may demonstrate that this question is not a straightforward one. Sossin and
Yetnikoff, writing on this subject years before COVID-19, asserted that the use of
videoconference technology has the potential both to improve and to undermine access to
justice.482 According to them, videoconference hearings may require less travel by applicants
and allow for high quality, recorded video. 483 Conversely, they may also undermine the ability
of applicants to participate in complex matters and to have their credibility assessed because of
poor quality, delayed sound and images, and the inability to exchange documents physically. 484
Consequently, the HRTO’s analysis of these requests on a case-by-case basis is sound. However,
such an analysis should be informed by improvements in technology and innovations by other
tribunals or courts. This will promote the use of remote hearings where it is fair and accessible,
accounting for technological advancements.
Accommodations Must be Reasonable and Connected to a Code Ground
As well as measuring accommodations against the requirements of procedural fairness, the
HRTO will analyze them for conditions necessary for accommodation under the Code. This
framework accounts for whether an accommodation is “reasonable” and whether it is

479

Kwan v Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2016 HRTO 486 at paras 5-9. The
HRTO’s decision is likely motivated by the respondent’s position that they would be prejudiced without an
opportunity to cross-examine the applicant.
480 McWilliam v Toronto Police Services Board, 2016 HRTO 1413 at para 16
481 Tribunals Ontario, Social Justice Division, “COVID-19 Updates on Tribunals Ontario Operations” (updated 9 July
2020), online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/en/covid-19/> [Tribunals Ontario, COVID-19]
482 Lorne Sossin & Zimra Yetnikoff, “I Can See Clearly Now: Videoconference Hearings and the Legal Limit on How
Tribunals Allocate Resources” (2007), 25 Windsor YB Access to Just 247
483 Ibid at 257-259
484 Ibid at 253-257, 259-262
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connected to a Code ground. The underlying rationale of at least some of these cases may be
that the applicant’s reason for requesting accommodation is outweighed by other concerns,
such as the HRTO’s limited resources or the importance of moving the application forward in a
timely way in accordance with the interests of respondents.
For example, the HRTO has decided that changing the hearing location a week prior to the
hearing date is not reasonable, as compared to other reasonable accommodations, such as
“having a support person attend the hearing with the applicant, allowing the applicant to have
access to her therapist during the hearing breaks, and providing additional or longer hearing
breaks.”485
In a few cases, the HRTO denied requests to move the location of hearing,486 and to hold a
hearing in person,487 because they were not supported by a Code-related ground.488 More
troubling, however, was that an applicant’s lack of resources to get to the hearing location was
deemed by the HRTO not to be a sufficient reason to change the venue of a hearing.489 This
may demonstrate that access to justice concerns may be overlooked if the Tribunal
mechanically requires a Code ground to receive procedural accommodations at a hearing.490
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AB v Western, supra note 443 at paras 17-19
Mastromatteo, supra note 437 at para 5; Yahya, supra note 437 at paras 4-5, 12. In Yahya, the request to
change the hearing location was initiated by the respondent. However, the applicant consented and asserted a
hearing closer to where he lives would be more “financially and physically accessible” (at para 5). See also: CV v
Mount Sinai Hospital, 2015 HRTO 1331 at paras 6-8, 11 [CV], the Tribunal refused to change the hearing location
even though the applicant would have to travel to Toronto from Ottawa with her two children, including a
newborn baby.
487 Bryczkowski v Sim & McBurney - Sim Lowman Ashton & McKay LLP, 2016 HRTO 339 at para 10 [Bryczkowski]. In
this case, an applicant’s lack of comfort with technology did not warrant an in-person hearing. The respondent
argued in favour of the teleconference hearing, and the applicant subsequently agreed to proceed.
488 This rationale sometimes appears in other types of HRTO decisions as well. For example, in Hum v Alma Mater
Society of Queen's University Inc, 2015 HRTO 1061 at para 6 where the HRTO denied a reconsideration request on
the basis that the accommodations already provided were sufficient to address the relevant Code ground.
489 John v Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 HRTO 1451 at para 20 [John]: “As
regards the request to change venue, the applicant asserted that he lacked the resources to attend the hearing.
The Tribunal will consider requests to change venue when it is necessary to accommodate a Code related need. An
alleged lack of resources is not a basis for such a request.”
490 “[R]eceipt of public assistance” is a Code ground with respect to discrimination in housing, and poverty may
sometimes be captured through the intersection of other Code grounds. However, poverty is not a stand-alone
486
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In Summary: A Human Rights Framework Applied in a Precise, Doctrinal Way
The HRTO applies a framework that brings human rights principles to the forefront of its
analysis. Although it may not perfectly balance these principles with the interests of other
parties and procedural fairness concerns, HRTO adjudicators are willing to raise
accommodation issues on their own motion, consistent with a duty to inquire. They are also
willing to discuss evidence to support accommodation requests and give applicants time to
provide it. However, the HRTO may occasionally apply standards of fairness or legal
requirements relating to specific Code grounds in a way which may not adequately address
access to justice concerns brought forward by applicants that do not neatly fit within these
legal concepts. These exercises of discretion may demonstrate that progressive legal
frameworks may be helpful, but also have their limitations, as they may not account for all
access to justice barriers that applicants may face.
Landlord and Tenant Board
Although the LTB offers a variety of accommodations to tenants, its mandate and institutional
structure undermine the scope of individual adjudicators to address accommodation requests
in a person-centred, evidence-based, and flexible way. The LTB differs from that of the SBT and
the HRTO in a few significant ways. First, the LTB hears many more cases. Tribunals Ontario
reports that the LTB received over 82,000 applications in 2018-2019,491 as compared to about
4500 applications at the HRTO492 and about 8700 at the SBT.493 Second, almost 79,000 of these
applications were brought by landlords,494 although tenants can also bring applications as

Code ground that applies to the tribunal context: Code, supra note 121, s 2; Ontario Human Rights Commission, “In
the Zone: Housing, Human Rights and Municipal Planning” (2012), Appendix A: Poverty, social condition, and the
Human Rights Code, online: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/zone-housing-human-rights-and-municipal-planning>
[OHRC, “In the Zone”]; Kearney v Bramalea Ltd (No 2)(1998), 34 CHRR D/1 at para 104 (Ont Bd Inq), rev’d on other
grounds: Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Shelter Corp (2001), 39 CHRRD/111, 103 ACWS (3d) 324 (Div Ct)
[Kearney]
491 Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report”, supra note 379 at 50
492 Ibid at 46
493 Ibid at 56
494 Ibid at 51
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well.495 This means that a typical application before the LTB is much less likely to reference or
provide any information about the basis for any accommodations a tenant may be seeking.
Both landlords and tenants have much at stake in the outcome of LTB proceedings. Sixty-two
percent of landlord applications in 2018-2019 were for eviction for non-payment of rent, while
19% were for eviction for other reasons, including persistent late payment of rent, committing
an illegal act, or damaging the rental unit.496 Landlords have a significant financial interest in
resolving these applications as soon as possible.
However, tenants before the LTB have their housing at stake, are often marginalized, and may
face barriers in navigating the LTB process. During the 2016 Tenant Duty Counsel Program
Review, researcher Emily Paradis interviewed 212 tenants who accessed tenant duty counsel
services at eight locations across the province. 497 While 44% of tenants were racialized, black
and Indigenous tenants were particularly overrepresented.498 Many tenants also reported a
disability: “[m]ore than one-third said that they or someone in their household have a disability;
29 percent of tenants reported mental health or cognitive disabilities, including frequent
responses of anxiety, depression, attention deficit, post-traumatic stress, and addiction.” 499
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Tenants can bring their own applications against landlords for a variety of reasons, including maintenance,
illegal rent, bad faith termination of their tenancies, or other tenant rights. Tenant rights applications may allege
that the landlord changed the locks, illegally entered the unit, or withholds a vital services, such as heat, electricity,
gas, or hot or cold water: Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 17, s 29(1) [RTA]; Landlord and Tenant Board,
“Tenant Rights: Interpretation Guideline 6”, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/06%20-%20Tenants%20Rights.html>
496 Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual Report”, supra note 379 at 51; RTA, supra note 495, ss 58, 6068
497 Emily Paradis, “Access to Justice: The Case for Ontario Tenants, Final Report of the Tenant Duty Counsel
Review” (October 2016) Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario, online: <https://www.acto.ca/production/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/TDCP_Report_2016.pdf> [Paradis, “Tenant Duty Counsel Review”]. Paradis also
interviewed Tenant Duty Counsel, legal clinic staff, community service providers, municipal programs, tenant
organizations, and members and mediators of the LTB as noted at 27.
498 Ibid at 32-33
499 Ibid at 33
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Furthermore, about half of tenants had experienced discrimination in prior searches for
housing and almost two thirds had a history of homelessness.500
Upon receiving a notice of eviction, tenants are drawn into a process that may not appear to be
accessible to them and that may undermine their agency. The Tenant Duty Counsel Review
commented on the “major imbalances in power, resources, legitimacy, social capital, and risks
between landlords and tenants.” 501 Community service providers explained that tenants view
the LTB process as “frightening, intimidating and disempowering.” 502 Tenants may be
intimidated by notices of eviction and may not attend the LTB at all. 503 Sometimes, landlords
may take advantage of tenants’ limited understanding of their rights, lack of trust in the LTB
process, or fear of being homeless again, pressuring them to leave their housing without any
process at all.504
To mediate between the conflicting interests of landlords and tenants, LTB’s statutory mandate
accounts for both procedural fairness and efficiency. The Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (RTA)
provides that “[t]he Board shall adopt the most expeditious method of determining the
questions arising in a proceeding that affords to all persons directly affected by the proceeding
an adequate opportunity to know the issues and be heard on the matter.” 505 To achieve this
mandate, decisions must be made at the institutional level to determine general procedures
that balance the interests of landlords and tenants that are at stake.
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Ibid at 34. This review defines homeless broadly: “For 36 percent, this was visible homelessness, such as staying
in a shelter, outside, or in a place not fit for human habitation, while 62 percent had experienced hidden
homelessness, such as having to stay with friends or family because they had no place of their own, or not being
able to remain in their home because it was not safe.”
501 Ibid at 49
502 Ibid
503 Ibid at 57-59
504 Ibid at 57-58
505 RTA, supra note 495, s 183.
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LTB Hearing Procedures: Institutional Procedural Decisions and “Superblocks”
The LTB must decide a high volume of applications across the province in an efficient manner.
To do this, LTB offices often schedule eviction applications for unpaid rent in large blocks or
“superblocks” with many applications scheduled on one docket. 506 However, according to the
Tenant Duty Counsel Review, this method of scheduling hearings may interfere with the
procedural rights of tenants.507
The Review quoted a Tenant Duty Counsel who said, “It seems like the LTB is procedurally
stacking the cards against tenants’ interests. We are seeing huge dockets – 62 hearings. There is
no way a member can hold 62 fair hearings, and no way TDC can advise even a third of
tenants.”508 Some community participants inferred that the large dockets were created on the
assumption that some tenants would not show up to their hearings at all, “essentially
institutionalizing the exclusion of ‘no-shows’ from access to justice.”509
Nonetheless, taking into account only the tenants who do show up, adjudicators are often
overwhelmed by the volume of cases to be resolved within these blocks. 510 Sometimes matters
cannot be heard by the end of the block. Consequently, tenants may become frustrated when
their case is adjourned after taking time off work and waiting hours at the LTB. 511
In deciding accommodation requests within this institutional structure, individual LTB members
must balance the interest in resolving cases quickly with the duty to accommodate. 512 In other
words, “the Board must consider the public interest in resolving cases in an efficient fashion, as
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The Tenant Duty Counsel Program provides free legal advice, resources and referrals to tenants on the day of
their hearing, prioritizing tenants who are facing eviction: Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario, “Tenant Duty
Counsel”, online: <https://www.acto.ca/our-work/tenant-duty-counsel/>
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well as the right to a fair hearing.”513 As the cases reviewed below will demonstrate, when
minor modifications of the hearing process are supported by evidence, LTB members are more
likely to grant accommodations. However, the institutional structures within which individual
LTB members must make procedural decisions may mean that it is more difficult to
meaningfully exercise discretion with respect to accommodations.
Guideline 17 and Accommodations Offered by the LTB
The LTB’s procedural guideline on human rights states that the Board must accommodate
parties before it pursuant to the Human Rights Code. Even though the LTB has already
attempted to design accessible processes, when those processes do not meet Code-related
needs of parties, the LTB must accommodate. 514 This guideline provides examples of how the
Board’s usual procedures may be modified to accommodate certain personal circumstances,
such as scheduling the hearing around religious holidays, allowing a party with diabetes to eat
or drink during the hearing, or allowing a person with a disability to bring a support person.515
The guideline specifically explains that accommodations must respect the party’s dignity. 516
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The vast majority of the cases identified in my research related to accommodation needs of
tenants.517 In these cases, the accommodations the LTB granted to tenants included:
•
•
•
•
•

Adjournments, for reasons related to a medical condition, 518 to give the tenant more
time to get legal representation,519 or to arrange for a telephone hearing instead;520
Giving the tenant time to get advice from duty counsel;521
A hearing in writing522 or by telephone;523
Adjusting the start time of the hearing;524
Providing additional hearing time;525

517

Although I identified a few cases where landlords requested accommodation, these cases were rare. In one
case, a landlord received an adjournment to obtain medical evidence to support accommodations for hearing loss
and to bring any assistive devices or a support person he needed. However, when the landlord did not bring
medical evidence, an assistive device, or a support person to the next hearing date, the hearing proceeded without
any accommodations: File No TST-69380-15, 2016 LNONLTB 1970 at paras 5-6, 2016 CanLII 88322. In another case,
also relating to hearing loss, the LTB member allowed the landlord’s agent to assist him at the hearing: File No
NOT-29533-17-AO, 2017 LNONLTB 2117 at para 7, 2017 CanLII 93883. It is notable that the LTB’s failure to provide
interpreters may affect landlords differently. Given the financial pressures they face, they may not want to adjourn
a hearing to arrange for an interpreter: File No SWL-00134-17, 2017 LNONLTB 194 at paras 4-5, 2017 CanLII 28797.
In addition, where the landlord’s chosen interpreter was not impartial, the LTB questioned the credibility of the
landlord and his agent: File No CET-76526-18, 2018 LNONLTB 3112 at paras 26, 34, 2018 CanLII 88592. I did not
find any cases where credibility findings were drawn in this way against tenants and it is possible that landlords
may be held to a higher standard in this respect.
518 For example, the LTB adjourned because of the tenant’s unnamed medical condition in File No TEL-70970-16,
2016 LNONLTB 2024 at paras 4-7, 2016 CanLII 89023. Similarly, in File No CEL-80413-18-IN, 2018 LNONLTB 4598 at
paras 14-15, 2018 CanLII 143785, the LTB granted an adjournment for the tenant’s generalized anxiety disorder. In
File No TSL-88141-17, 2018 LNONLTB 2654 at paras 5-7, 2018 CanLII 42655, the LTB granted a first adjournment for
the tenant’s anxiety disorder, but refused a second adjournment for lack of evidence.
519 For example, in File No TSL-71184-16-IN2, 2016 LNONLTB 2236 at paras 4-6, 9, 2016 CanLII 71317, the tenant
needed to get a new lawyer and was provided with an adjournment to retain one. The tenant had a demonstrated
mental health condition, based on a psychological report, and had not prolonged the proceedings. See also: File No
TEL-51969-14-SA, 2015 LNONLTB 362 at para 3, 2015 CanLII 111068; File No SWT-94108-16, 2016 LNONLTB 2091
at para 3, 2016 CanLII 100344
520 File No SOL-53942-14, 2015 LNONLTB 16 at para 2, 2015 CanLII 2900
521 File No SWT-84446-16, 2016 LNONLTB 810 at paras 10-11, 2016 CanLII 44317; File No EAL-62570-17, 2018
LNONLTB 2956 at para 5, 2018 CanLII 86111
522 File No TSL-63981-15, 2016 LNONLTB 557 at para 4, 2016 CanLII 39872; File No TET-75706-16-IN, 2017 LNONLTB
2627 at paras 5-6, 2017 CanLII 145866; File No TST-47443-13-RV, 2016 LNONLTB 603 at para 4, 2016 CanLII 39772;
File No TST-44900-13, 2018 LNONLTB 2673 at paras 8-10, 2018 CanLII 42669
523 File No TSL-67570-15-RV-IN2, 2016 LNONLTB 1221 at para 4, 2016 CanLII 71323; File No TST-62872-15-IN, 2015
LNONLTB 872 at paras 5, 13, 2015 CanLII 69373; File No EAL-61451-16, 2017 LNONLTB 2602 at para 4, 2017 CanLII
142939
524 In File No TSL-60910-15, 2016 LNONLTB 1853 at para 5, 2016 CanLII 88388, the start time of the hearing was
later than usual. Similarly, in File No TSL-91342-17, 2018 LNONLTB 4072 at paras 4-5, 2018 CanLII 120936, the
hearing was held in the afternoon.
525 File No SOL-68892-16, 2016 LNONLTB 923 at paras 12-15, 2016 CanLII 47983
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Limiting the hearing time and holding hearings over multiple days; 526
Allowing for regular breaks during the hearing;527
Permitting a tenant to testify in another room by telephone; 528
Ensuring that people at the hearing speak slowly and clearly; 529
Allowing additional time to prepare submissions;530
Allowing a service dog at the hearing;531
Allowing a support person to attend the hearing;532
Allowing a notetaker to transcribe the proceedings; 533
Providing parties with a recording of the hearing;534
Holding a private hearing;535
Sending Board communications by email for access by assistive reader and/or large font
print;536
Providing an interpreter to address a language barrier;537 and
Providing a quiet room to accommodate the tenant’s children.538

Guideline 17 instructs that parties should request accommodations early, in writing. 539 The LTB
has a form that parties may use to make an accommodation request. 540 However, they may
also contact the LTB by telephone or speak to LTB staff in person to ask for accommodation. 541
Even though requests are often answered and arranged in advance, this does not always
happen. In one case, a tenant with depression and anxiety asked, one month in advance, for a
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529 File No SWL-17187-18, 2018 LNONLTB 4357 at para 7, 2018 CanLII 141504
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535 File No SWL-32001-19, 2019 LNONLTB 457 at para 5, 2019 CanLII 89687; File No TST-92725-18, 2018 LNONLTB
4204 at para 4, 2018 CanLII 123275
536 File No TST-07548-19-RV, 2019 LNONLTB 651 at para 6, 2019 CanLII 134546
537 File No TEL-88814-18-RV, 2019 LNONLTB 7 at paras 7-11, 2019 CanLII 35238
538 File No TET-81423-17, 2017 LNONLTB 1607 at para 18, 2017 CanLII 70469
539 LTB, “Guideline 17”, supra note 514, s 1
540 Landlord and Tenant Board, “Forms”, Forms for Tenants, Request for French-Language Services or Request for
Accommodation, online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/ltb/forms/>
541 File No TSL-22820-11-RV, 2015 LNONLTB 175 at para 22, 2015 CanLII 15595
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social worker to come to the hearing with him. 542 The LTB never followed up with him to
explain that it does not provide social workers and to discuss other accommodations. At the
hearing, the LTB member learned that the tenant’s own support worker was on vacation and
unavailable to attend.543 The member reasoned that accommodation must be “reasonable”,
with reference to Supreme Court of Canada case law. The member decided that a reasonable
accommodation in this situation was to give the tenant an hour to contact a support person
and to allow for frequent breaks in the hearing.544 The tenant refused both of these options and
the hearing went ahead without any accommodation at all.545
This case demonstrates two failures in the LTB’s accommodation processes. First, if tenants
request accommodations in advance, staff should follow up with them if those
accommodations are not possible. Second, the LTB member took a very narrow, legal view of
accommodation in exercising discretion in this situation, which appeared to ignore the tenant’s
circumstances – namely, that his existing support person was not available at an hour’s notice
and it was unreasonable to think support was so fungible that someone else could step in
within an hour. Disregard for the tenant’s own situation meant that the alternative
accommodation was not meaningful and the tenant was not really accommodated at all.
That said, at times the LTB will allow accommodations at the hearing itself if parties “do not
have an adequate opportunity to participate in the proceeding”. 546 For example, a tenant who
arrived at the LTB in error for a telephone hearing was provided a mediation room with a
telephone to attend.547
Requesting an accommodation may be more difficult at the hearing. However, since Guideline
17 specifies that some accommodation requests “may require the party to provide sufficient
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evidence to establish that they are covered under section 1 of the Code and need
accommodation.”548 In the case of a disability, medical evidence must not only establish the
barrier to participation, but must also connect it to the accommodation requested. 549 If a party
is making an accommodation request in the moment at the hearing, after becoming aware of a
barrier to participation, it is possible that supporting medical evidence may not be available for
the LTB member to review.
Medical Evidence and Accommodation Requests
When supportive medical evidence is not available, the LTB is more likely to deny
accommodation requests.550 Sometimes, tenants may have included evidence of medical
conditions as part of a tenant application, which the LTB can also consider in the context of an
accommodation request. For example, in one case, an LTB member referred to medical
evidence of the tenant’s mental health and physical health conditions on file, and allowed an
accommodation pursuant to Guideline 17. 551 However, in the context of eviction applications
brought by landlords (and recalling that the vast majority of applications are brought by them,
not tenants), it is much less likely for there to be evidence in the LTB file which may be relevant
to an accommodation request.
Similarly, even where there is some evidence of a tenant’s medical condition, it may not be
clear what the tenant’s limitations are and how they are connected to the tenant’s
accommodation request. In cases where medical evidence is insufficient, LTB decision-makers
have denied accommodation requests rather than seek to clarify the tenant’s situation.
For example, the LTB denied an accommodation request when the tenant did not appear at the
hearing but previously submitted a doctor’s letter describing a period of total disability,
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including the hearing date.552 Rather than asking the tenant to provide more information or
inquiring whether this was an adjournment request, the Board proceeded with the matter in
the tenant’s absence.553 The LTB member’s rationale for going ahead with the hearing was the
lack of specific details in the medical letter and the lack of a formal accommodation request
before the LTB. This would appear to demonstrate a failure to properly appreciate the tenant’s
circumstances, even though the tenant had not raised the issue in the most preferred way.
The LTB Holds Tenant Accommodation Requests to a High Standard
Furthermore, the information the LTB requires to adjudicate accommodation requests relating
to disability or language interpretation may, on some occasions, be flawed and may set a
standard that is too high.
For example, an LTB member rejected an undated medical letter regarding a possible
concussion. The member reasoned that the letter “does not provide any identification of her
medical condition or specifics of what her restrictions on participation in the hearing might
be.”554 While “specifics of what her restrictions on participation in the hearing” are relevant,
the tenant’s diagnosis is not necessary. Requesting irrelevant information that a tenant may
wish to keep confidential may raise barriers to access to justice, rather than address them.
Similarly, tenant requests for language interpretation may be held to an inappropriate
standard. The LTB’s website explains that the Board will provide services in French or sign
language interpretation upon request.555 However, interpretation for languages other than
French or English is not presumptively provided, and the Board’s website instructs parties to
bring someone they know or hire their own interpreter.556 This is different than the SBT and the
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555 Landlord and Tenant Board, “Language Services”, online: <http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/ltb/language-services/>
[LTB, “Language Services”]
556 Ibid

97

HRTO’s policies described above to provide interpretation, at the tribunal’s expense, upon
request. In contrast, LTB’s policy may undermine the fairness of the proceedings or mean that
interpretation may be inaccessible to some tenants.
Furthermore, at a hearing, the LTB has questioned whether interpretation is required rather
than taking requests by tenants at face value, absent any indication that the request was not
made in good faith.557 That said, parties may be able to get an adjournment if their chosen
interpreter does not arrive,558 or if the interpreter does arrive but does not meet the
appropriate standard.559 In the latter case, the Board agreed to arrange for the interpreter
itself.560
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
In denying accommodations, the LTB provides some insight regarding how its members view
the reasonable accommodation and the threshold of undue hardship. Members exercise their
discretion taking into account the interest of the landlord in resolving the case quickly, but may
not understand the meaning of accommodation to the point of undue hardship or that this duty
rests on the LTB.
The LTB considers the procedural fairness interest of the landlord in refusing accommodations.
For example, tenants are less likely to get an adjournment if they have received prior
adjournments and are breaching an interim order of the LTB, which often requires them to pay
their rent into the Board.561 In these cases, the LTB will conclude that the delay and prejudice to
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the landlord outweigh the duty to accommodate, 562 that the tenant should have tried harder to
get a representative more quickly,563 that the tenant should have appeared at the hearing,564 or
that the tenant is unfairly prolonging the proceedings.565 The LTB may also consider the amount
of any arrears of rent owing to determine the extent of prejudice to the landlord. 566
In addition, some LTB members suggest that the landlord,567 or the landlord and the LTB,568
have a duty to accommodate a tenant to the point of undue hardship. This reasoning
demonstrates that some LTB members may not understand what undue hardship means, or
that the duty to accommodate rests on the LTB. First, at least some LTB members appear to
misunderstand that the duty to accommodate is the responsibility of the Board, not the
landlord. Second, some LTB members may not know the meaning of undue hardship in the
context of human rights law. “Undue” hardship does not mean that any financial hardship is
sufficient.
In contrast, the Divisional Court has correctly stated that the LTB’s role is “ensuring that the
tenant's interests are properly put before the Board so a just determination of the underlying
issues may be rendered on the merits […] [T]he accommodation must accord the tenant full

19, 2016 CanLII 37511. The Divisional Court has held that a party’s procedural fairness interest may be less if they
are breaching an interim order of the LTB: Regan v Latimer, 2016 ONSC 4132 at para 24 (Div Ct), motion to set
aside refused, 2016 ONSC 4351 (Div Ct); Shields v Lancelotte, 2016 ONSC 4433 at paras 24-25 (Div Ct)
562 File No CEL-62600-16-RV, supra note 561 at paras 26-27; File No HOL-00395-16, supra note 561 at paras 12-19
563 File No TSL-81945-17, 2017 LNONLTB 285 at paras 5-7, 2017 CanLII 28770
564 File No SWL-18807-18, 2018 LNONLTB 4361 at paras 21-24, 2018 CanLII 141494; File No TSL-07606-19, 2019
LNONLTB 723 at paras 4-9, 2019 CanLII 134502, upheld on internal review on this point, File No TSL-07606-19,
2019 LNONLTB 675 at paras 8-10, 2019 CanLII 134575
565 File No TSL-67570-15-RV2, supra note 561 at para 17
566 File No TSL-81945-17, supra note 563 at para 5
567 File No TSL-67570-15, 2017 LNONLTB 55 at para 18, 2016 CanLII 39862, upheld on this point on internal review,
File No TSL-67570-15-RV2, 2017 LNONLTB 55 at para 17, 2017 CanLII 9472: “I am satisfied that the Landlord will
suffer undue hardship if the Tenant's request for an adjournment is granted. This matter has been adjourned twice
previously. The Tenant has not paid rent since September 2014. When the Tenant was ordered to pay her rent into
the Board, she failed to do so. Any further delay in the proceedings causes the Landlord financial hardship which
increases with each passing month.”
568 File No SOL-57813-15, 2015 LNONLTB 1111 at para 126, 2015 CanLII 85078: “The Board acknowledges that the
duty to accommodate this Tenant's health needs did create an extra burden on both the Board and the Landlord.
However, the duty to accommodate is to the point of 'undue hardship' and the Landlord did not demonstrate that
the Landlord's accommodation reached the level of undue hardship.”
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and fair participation in the process to the point of undue hardship.”569 In failing to appreciate
this, LTB members deviate from established human rights principles, Divisional Court case law,
and their own Guideline 17.
Practical Obstacles to Fulfilling the Duty to Inquire
While Guideline 17 acknowledges that parties must participate in their own accommodation
process, it also anticipates that parties may not always recognize when they need
accommodations. The Guideline references a duty analogous to a duty to inquire on the part of
members conducting a hearing:
Members must be attentive to indications which suggest a party may require
accommodation in order to participate in the hearing, even if the party does not request
any accommodation from the Board. Pursuant to section 201 of the RTA, the Member
may on their own initiative ask questions and request submissions from both sides to
determine if the party requires accommodation. 570
Furthermore, in deciding accommodation requests, LTB members also recognize that, “a Board
Member may raise the issue of accommodation on their own motion at a hearing because
something they see or hear raises some concern that accommodation may be necessary in
order for there to be a fair hearing.”571 The Divisional Court also acknowledged that members
may be required to recognize a situation where an accommodation may be needed, pursuant
to procedural fairness and Guideline 17. 572
However, when an issue of accommodation arises in the middle of a hearing, it may be difficult
for an LTB Member to respond, given the need to make decisions quickly and to maintain
efficiency in a fast-paced environment. For example, an LTB member failed to investigate the
reasons for a request for an adjournment when the tenant did not volunteer these details on
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his own and appeared to be participating in the hearing.573 Similarly, when a tenant cited fever
and back pain as a basis for her adjournment, the LTB member denied the request because
“[t]he tenant appeared capable of participating in the hearing”.574 Since it may be difficult to
objectively observe either of these conditions, it is concerning that the Member did not, at
minimum, ask how these conditions were affecting the tenant’s ability to participate.
Similarly, LTB members may attempt to solve problems with interpretation quickly during
hearings in ways that may fall short of appropriate accommodation. In one case, the tenant’s
friend was supposed to interpret, but he did not attend.575 The LTB member proceeded with
the hearing, asking the tenant to speak up if he did not understand. 576 This solution is not much
of an accommodation at all, and may be less meaningful if a tenant, intimidated by the hearing
process, is reluctant to interrupt frequently. In a second case, the Member attempted to
interpret on her own using computer translation. 577 The quality of this interpretation is
concerning (to say the least) and may not meet the requirements of procedural fairness.
Furthermore, the Divisional Court recently upheld a decision to hear a landlord’s preliminary
motion to dismiss the tenants’ applications in writing as an accommodation for a language
barrier on the part of the tenants.578 However, the Divisional Court’s analysis fails to discuss
whether this solution accommodated the needs of the tenants, or whether the tenants were
asked what their needs were at all.
The Tenant Duty Counsel Review highlights how tenants felt after their needs and
circumstances were not meaningfully considered at hearings. One tenant expressed her
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frustration with a “lack of understanding of my low-income situation and mental health
problem. I felt a lack of humanity.” 579
Reviews Sought by Tenants after a Hearing
Some tenants may not understand they can request accommodations at a hearing or may be
reluctant to do so. They may later request review based on this lack of accommodation.
However, these requests are not likely to be successful and may demonstrate the lack of
knowledge on the part of the tenant of the LTB’s accommodation processes at the relevant
time.
Tenant Duty Counsel play an important role in supporting tenants with disabilities and human
rights issues in explaining their cases.580 However, tenants sometimes do not know they can
consult Tenant Duty Counsel, or they may be reluctant to disclose disabilities unless they are
asked.581 That said, Tenant Duty Counsel do not have the capacity to provide additional services
to each tenant with accommodation needs. 582 This demonstrates that, for one reason or
another, some tenants may not be aware they can ask for accommodations in the context of
the hearing process.
Where a tenant does not make an explicit accommodation request at the hearing, they are
unlikely to be successful on a subsequent review premised on lack of accommodation. 583 For
example, a tenant unsuccessfully sought review of an LTB decision, denying his request to
adjourn mid-proceedings to get legal representation. The tenant argued that his difficulty in
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2015 LNONLTB 1191 at paras 24-28, 2015 CanLII 91976, citing the decision of the Divisional Court in Matechuk v
Raamco International Properties, 2015 ONSC 1196 at para 7 (Div Ct); File No SWL-15072-18-RV, 2018 LNONLTB
2984 at paras 29-34, 2018 CanLII 86109; File No HOL-03632-18-RV, 2018 LNONLTB 4257 at paras 8-10, 2018 CanLII
140407
580

102

staying on topic and remembering the directions of the Member should have alerted the
Member to his disability.584 However, the tenant had not submitted any medical evidence at
the time of the hearing to demonstrate that disability and the need for accommodation. 585 The
tenant later submitted medical evidence of his schizophrenia from his family doctor and
psychiatrist when he requested a subsequent review.586 Nonetheless, the LTB denied the
review on the basis that it was a delay tactic.587 The LTB’s reasoning does not appear to take
into account the fact that many tenants may not be able to predict their accommodation needs
in advance, especially if they have never appeared before the LTB.
This perfunctory approach is inconsistent with Divisional Court jurisprudence. The Divisional
Court has stated that the relevant factor is whether the tenant was reasonably unable to
participate.588 While the LTB may consider the fact that a party did not raise an accommodation
at the time, this may not be as significant if evidence is provided later on and the party explains
why a request was not made earlier.589
In Summary: The Challenges of Balancing Efficiency and Fairness in a Fast-Paced System
The LTB’s approach to accommodation requests is informed by its high volume of cases and its
statutory mandate to ensure efficient resolution of those cases. However, at times, the LTB’s
institutional approaches may limit the ability of individual Members to properly appreciate the
circumstances of tenants and to proactively and sensitively identify and address
accommodation needs. Furthermore, LTB members may conflate the procedural fairness
interest of landlords with the LTB’s own duty to accommodate tenants, which undermines the
legitimacy of their exercises of procedural discretion.
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Conclusion
The trends in procedural decision-making across these three tribunals are informed by the
statutory mandate of each tribunal, institutional practices created to effect that mandate,
conflicting interests of parties with varying degrees of power, and available evidence that may
support accommodations.
As I will discuss in Chapter 3, these trends provide insights regarding what access to justice may
require to provide meaningful access to tribunal procedures, as measured against theories of
discretionary decision-making. In addition, some of the legal, institutional, and practical
obstacles evident from this doctrinal analysis also shed light on the limitations of dialogue
theory.
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Chapter Three: Procedural Discretion in Theory and in Practice
Introduction
The final chapter of this thesis compares the theoretical understanding of exercises of
procedural discretion, introduced in Chapter 1, to the body of case law from the SBT, HRTO and
LTB, discussed in Chapter 2. It highlights practices that encourage and foster access to justice,
through dialogue and engagement. It also discusses practices that fall short, demonstrating real
world limitations and imbalances of power that are more difficult, or perhaps impossible, to
address based on the theoretical frameworks advanced by Lorne Sossin, Geneviève Cartier, and
Jennifer Raso.
Exercises of procedural discretion by the SBT, HRTO and LTB demonstrate positive practices
that encourage meaningful dialogue and engagement, and negative practices that frustrate
meaningful communication and understanding. Positive practices are consistent with an
approach that accommodation and meaningful participation comprise a necessary part of the
statutory mandate of these tribunals. Following this approach, at least some tribunal decisionmakers have taken the time to discuss and understand the needs of parties, demonstrated
flexibility in meeting those needs, and provided transparent information about requests for
accommodation. In the first part of this chapter, I will review these positive practices, outlining
how they promote human rights values, dialogue and engagement.
In contrast, the failures of tribunals to achieve these ideals demonstrate a significant need for
reform, as well as the limitations of applying ideal theories to the real world. Sometimes,
despite the good intentions of a tribunal decision-maker, power imbalances between opposing
parties and between a party and the decision-maker may mean accommodation requests are
never made or have no reasonable prospect of succeeding. In addition, narrow statutory
mandates that balance efficiency with fairness may limit the information that is available to
tribunal decision-makers and the range of procedural options that are practical for them to
implement. As such, individual decision-makers may be limited both by the institutional
framework in which they work and by their own conception of what their statutory mandate
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requires. As well, matters of resources and staffing may influence procedures that are adopted
at the level of institutional and individual decisions.
Finally, I will address judicial review as an accountability measure to address some of these
negative practices. Courts have provided helpful principles that may guide each of these
tribunals in specific situations. Nonetheless, judicial review may not be an effective mechanism
to address systemic inequities or whether meaningful engagement has occurred. In fact, the
new Vavilov framework for judicial review may reflect foundational administrative law doctrine
that may obscure procedural decision-making and undermine its potential to be transparent
and authentic.

Positive Practices: Theories of Engagement, Dialogue, and Human Rights Values in Action
Positive practices displayed in some SBT, HRTO and LTB procedural decisions convey an overall
approach that accommodation and access to tribunal decision-making is a part of the tribunal’s
statutory mandate. This approach is essential to tribunal engagement and intimacy, as
advanced by Cartier and Sossin, because these theories require commitment to mutual
understanding and open communication.
According to Cartier, administrative discretion should be subject to implied limits imposed by
the statutory purpose and the perspective of the party whose rights are at stake.590 She
illustrates this approach, which underlies her theory of discretion as dialogue, by analyzing the
judgment of Justice Rand in Roncarelli.591 In the words of Justice Rand, “there is no such thing
as absolute and untrammelled ‘discretion’” and “there is always a perspective within which a
statute is intended to operate.” 592 Cartier does not directly address legislative schemes of
tribunals that often serve low-income people. However, her reasoning may be logically
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extended to require decision-makers to consider how procedural decisions may further or
frustrate the social welfare purpose of these statutory schemes in determining the content of
the duty of fairness.
Taking this analysis further, Sossin considers statutory purposes relevant to decisions regarding
vulnerable people. By delineating statutory powers, legislatures communicate to decisionmakers how their mandate relates to the interests of vulnerable parties and why that mandate
has been given to them.593 Administrative decision-makers are meant “to develop institutional
and social strategies for suffusing rights with meaning” -- in other words, to realize the high
level policy goals expressed by the legislature through both institutional and individual
exercises of discretion.594 It may therefore be possible to hold decision-makers accountable if
their disrespect or lack of consideration for vulnerable people obviously undermines statutory
objectives.595
Some procedural decision-making at SBT, HRTO and LTB appears, at least on its face, to
facilitate or provide accommodations that are appropriate to the tribunal context and the
specific circumstances of parties. I group these positive strategies into four different categories:
transparent information about procedural accommodations; responsive pre-hearing practices
including preliminary motions and case management; flexibility in adapting tribunal processes
to the situations and needs of parties at the hearing itself; and a duty to inquire about
accommodations not raised by parties themselves.
Transparent Information about Accommodation Practices
Institutional practices provide parties with information about procedural decision-making and
may facilitate parties in making accommodation requests. Both Sossin and Cartier view the
exchange of information and perspectives as a crucial starting point to meaningful
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engagement.596 Sossin also asserts that power imbalances may be addressed, at least in part, by
providing parties with information about tribunals and tribunal decision-makers.597 Knowing
how decisions are made and how decision-makers understand their role may assist in
“[l]evelling the playing field of knowledge”, allowing more effective mutual understanding by
parties and by decision-makers about each other’s perspectives.598
Consistent with this approach, all three tribunals provide information about how to request
accommodations and what accommodations may be available that is reasonably easy to locate
on their websites.599 Most of the information about accommodations conveyed by all three
tribunals is generally positive.600 These web pages explain, for the most part in plain language,
how to contact the tribunal about accommodations 601 and sometimes offer concrete examples
of accommodations to which parties may be able to relate.602 Some of this information may be
more effectively communicated, consolidated and displayed in a more accessible and
prominent way.603 Nonetheless, providing such a resource at all is a helpful first step.
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More proactively, the SBT and HRTO raise the issue of accommodations in the initial forms to
start a proceeding. The SBT asks appellants about accommodations and interpretation requests
on the appeal form and provides space to explain what is required.604 This approach conveys
that accommodation requests are part of the SBT’s regular practice and provides an early
opportunity for appellants to make an accommodation request. It then places the onus on the
tribunal to address it. Meanwhile, the HRTO explains at the end of its application form that
applicants may contact the Registrar by telephone, fax or e-mail to request any necessary
accommodations.605 Both tribunals might improve these processes by providing some of the
information about procedural accommodations conveyed on their websites within these initial
forms. That said, the proactive nature of these practices demonstrates an attempt at
informational transparency consistent with legal theories of participation and engagement.
Pre-hearing Practices: Preliminary Motions and Case Management
In addition to providing parties with information and opportunities to begin a discussion about
potential accommodations, some tribunal practices recognize that meaningful, authentic
communication may take time and tribunal resources to exchange information and promote
trust. To truly appreciate one another’s perspectives in a transparent and authentic way, 606
decision-makers may need to discuss and exchange information with a party, sometimes on
multiple occasions. While this goes beyond what accommodation may require under the Code,
HRTO and SBT decision-makers displayed some of these practices in conducting case
management and making preliminary decisions.
A preliminary motion is an opportunity for the decision-maker to discuss what evidence may be
required to support an accommodation request and to give parties time to gather that
evidence.607 It also allows an adjudicator to discuss alternative accommodations that the party
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may wish to request, in the event that accommodations are denied, or prior to the submission
of request in the first place.608
Procedural motions held prior to a hearing on the merits may be an efficient method of
resolving accommodation requests without adjournments, delay, and potential prejudice to the
opposing party. These decisions may set the venue for an in-person hearing or resolve whether
a matter will be heard by telephone, by videoconference, or in person. 609 If these requests were
made at a hearing, an adjournment would likely be necessary to grant them. In contrast, when
these accommodations are determined ahead of time, they do not need to be balanced against
potential delay and resulting prejudice to the opposing party.
As well, the HRTO’s new practice of assigning one adjudicator to case manage an application
has the potential to encourage trust to develop between a party and an adjudicator who may
interact on multiple occasions.610 A party may be reluctant to request accommodations at the
first case management conference. However, they might be more likely to do so later on if the
decision-maker is even-handed, receptive to ideas, and respectful.611 In addition, a party may
be more comfortable making a request if one decision-maker, who is familiar with their case,
will make all case management decisions. This institutional practice could overcome attitudinal
barriers to disclosing accommodation needs, such as mental health disabilities or hardships

608

Kusinski, supra note 439; Yahya, supra note 437 at paras 5-17
Regarding setting a venue: 1703-02128 (Re), supra note 313 at paras 3-11 and related case 1703-01860 (Re) #2,
supra note 308 at paras 15-19; Mastromatteo, supra note 437 at para 5; Ruffolo, supra note 427 at paras 14-18;
Schiller, supra note 427417 at paras 4-6. Regarding setting a venue and method of hearing: 1705-03640 (Re), supra
note 311 at paras 2-6. Regarding method of hearing: Leach 2017, supra note 416 at para 7
610 Regarding the HRTO’s case management practices, see Lamoureux & Moran, “Tribunals Ontario Annual
Report”, supra note 379 at 46
611 This point may be supported by the procedural justice literature’s discussion of trustworthy consideration,
described above. Furthermore, Welsh asserts, in the context of mediation, that “pre-mediation and early
caucusing” may, in some cases, “encouraging the productive expression of voice and providing evidence of
trustworthy and respectful consideration by the mediator”: Welsh, supra note 111 at 755, see also 752-754, 756
609

110

relating to poverty.612 Such an approach is consistent with Sossin’s view that “less formal
confrontations” may assist in establishing trust with vulnerable parties. 613
Nonetheless, these institutional practices do not work well in every individual case. The SBT has
recognized that some parties may not be able to easily or quickly obtain supportive medical
evidence if they do not have a family doctor.614 Furthermore, in the case of more complex
accommodation requests, the pre-hearing process may become so prolonged that it becomes a
burden on the party – in quantitative terms of passage of time, and also in qualitative terms of
navigating a complex procedure and interacting frequently with administrative decisionmakers.615 I will address these limitations later on. However, on the whole, these practices
appear to promote transparency on the part of the SBT and HRTO which may lead to early
adjudication of accommodation requests.
Flexibility in Adapting Tribunal Processes to the Situations and Needs of Parties
While it may be preferable to resolve some accommodation issues prior to the hearing on the
merits, some tribunal practices at the hearing stage also demonstrate flexibility consistent with
theories of engagement and dialogue. On some occasions, the SBT and HRTO adjudicators
provide information about accommodations at the hearing for parties to consider.616 Similar to
the discussions held at pre-hearing conferences, transparency may promote a meaningful
conversation about what accommodations will serve a particular party’s needs. As well, at least
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some adjudicators respond and adapt to circumstances as they develop in the hearing process
and take a more active role in ensuring fair procedures.
The HRTO’s active adjudication techniques provide adjudicators with powers to adapt the
hearing process in response to accommodation needs at the hearing itself, to narrow the
issues, to change the order of witnesses, to admit documentary evidence that reduces the
scope of witness testimony, or to adapt to the sensitive nature of certain cases, such as sexual
harassment applications.617 These techniques focus on the particular circumstances of the
applicant, and dispense with mechanical application of legalistic processes. They have been
used by the HRTO to fashion proportionate procedures that also reflect accommodation needs
and circumstances of applicants. 618
As noted above, the HRTO employs active adjudication to raise accommodation needs that
parties do not identify, case manage applications, adapt processes for hearing preliminary
issues, and alter processes for receiving the applicant’s evidence. 619 These practices are
consistent with Sossin’s theory of intimacy and engagement, which emphasizes a more
personal and flexible process, rather than a standardized, legalistic process.620 In other words,
the HRTO’s expansive procedural discretion provides it with greater scope, as compared to
tribunals with more traditional mandates, to meet applicants where they are, in a way that
promotes inclusion.
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SBT members have a lesser scope to adapt elements of the hearing process, as compared to
HRTO adjudicators. However, SBT members are willing to modify the hearing process on the
day of the hearing in certain ways: to convert the proceeding to a telephone hearing;621 to
make physical changes to the hearing room;622 to simplify language;623 to respond to technical
problems;624 or to address flaws in interpretation.625 When appellants may not be aware they
can request accommodations or interpretation services, SBT members may raise
accommodation issues on their own motion, explain these processes, and adjourn the
hearing.626 Therefore, at least some individual decision-makers are willing to do what they can,
within the limitations of their procedural discretion, to address specific needs of appellants.
Even though the LTB’s institutional processes may undermine the ability of individual
adjudicators to allow procedural accommodations – a topic that will be addressed at length
later in this chapter – the case law does demonstrate some examples where accommodations
were granted. Where the accommodation is simple or the supporting evidence is already
available, it is easier for LTB adjudicators to allow them despite institutional constraints. For
example, a tenant was provided with a telephone upon appearing in person for a telephone
hearing.627 Similarly, an adjudicator allowed disability-related accommodation where medical
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evidence was already on file.628 This case included both a landlord and a tenant application. 629
This may have been significant, since tenant applications are more likely to include detailed
information about a tenant that supports an accommodation request.630 Thus, there are
indications that, despite some significant limitations, some LTB adjudicators may try to grant
accommodation requests where time and resource pressures allow.
Duty to Inquire about Accommodations not Raised by Parties
At the hearing, adjudicators, as well as parties, may raise potential procedural
accommodations. In one case, an SBT member asked a party whether her disability could be
accommodated in the hearing process,631 and in two other cases, SBT members asked whether
parties required an interpreter arranged and funded by the tribunal.632 SBT members may also
adjourn if they believe, based on the information they already possess, that a party did not
appear at a scheduled hearing because of a disability.633 Similarly, the HRTO has also raised the
possibility of accommodations with parties in two cases that I identified.634 It is impossible for
me to conclude how pervasive these approaches are from the case law I have examined.
Nonetheless, these limited examples demonstrate that at least a few adjudicators view their
role as including some limited duty to inquire about procedural accommodations.
This approach is consistent with Divisional Court case law regarding procedural fairness. The
Divisional Court held that the HRTO was required to raise and consider procedural options on
its own motion when a witness for the respondent employer was not available to testify in
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person.635 The court explained that, in this situation, the adjudicator must be mindful of “other
options that might be available to ensure that the unrepresented parties had a fair opportunity
to present their defence.”636 The self-represented applicant testified before the Divisional Court
that she would have sought an adjournment had she known that this request might have been
granted.637 The Divisional Court also held that the adjudicator should have considered changing
the order of witnesses or receiving this particular witness’s evidence by video-conference or by
telephone.638
While this case does not turn explicitly turn on human rights or access to justice principles,
these underlying values may implicitly inform what procedural fairness requires.639 When selfrepresented parties are unaware that hearing procedures may be adapted so that they may
meaningfully participate, the Divisional Court’s decision requires HRTO adjudicators to raise
these options with the parties and to consider them. This parallels the duty to inquire under the
Code, which requires a respondent, often an employer, to raise the issue of accommodation in
a respectful way, on their own initiative.640 However, this reasoning is not limited to specific
human rights grounds and may apply to a variety of barriers to access to justice that selfrepresented litigants may face. In addition, the Divisional Court does not explicitly refer to the
more expansive procedural discretion of the HRTO in determining the content of procedural
fairness. This leaves open the possibility that this reasoning may apply to other tribunals that
serve vulnerable parties who are often self-represented.
The Limits of Procedural Discretionary Decision-making
In concluding this section, it is important to reflect on procedural accommodation processes
and measure them against actual outcomes. All three tribunals provided a variety of
accommodations to parties before them. However, it is highly unlikely that the cases I have
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reviewed reflect all the accommodation needs of all parties before each tribunal. Some
adjudicators may not record accommodations provided for privacy or other reasons, some may
state accommodations provided using wording outside of my search parameters, and some
tribunal decisions may not be publicly available at all.
In addition, it is also possible that parties may not understand they can ask for accommodations
or feel comfortable requesting them. Even at the HRTO and SBT, where the issue of
accommodation is raised as early as the initial forms, accommodations are still frequently
requested at the hearing itself. Parties may be concerned about disclosing detailed medical
information about their disability to respondent employers or landlords, or even members of
the public who request their tribunal file.641 Meanwhile, at the SBT, some income support
recipients may be reluctant to request accommodations if they previously had negative
interactions with front-line staff that left them feeling less than a person.642
This problem may be particularly apparent in the LTB context, where there is often little
information relating to accommodation requests for adjudicators, with limited time, to rely
upon at the hearing. Some tenants request accommodations on review, which they assert
were necessary at the hearing on the merits, after that hearing has been concluded. 643 In
addition, the Tenant Duty Counsel Review states that many tenants, sometimes up to fifty
percent, do not appear on the scheduled hearing date at all.644 Tenants may be intimidated by
LTB forms they receive, pressured by their landlords into leaving within days, or wary of a legal
system that was built on and reinforces colonial structures.645 If they have had previous
involvement with child welfare agencies or the criminal justice system, tenants may also be
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mistrustful of the LTB, as part of the larger legal system. 646 Tenants with language barriers or
limited literacy may be coerced into signing documents they do not understand.647 Women
facing violence or sexual exploitation from a landlord may not want to confront him at the
LTB.648 Tenants may also be precariously employed and may not be comfortable with, or may
not know, that they need to book a full or half day off work.649 This barrier may become even
more significant if a tenant’s case is adjourned because too many matters were scheduled in
one hearing block.650 Even if they attend the LTB, tenants with disabilities may not express their
accommodation needs unless specifically asked: “[t]he irony is, the province has a duty to
accommodate, but if people cannot even identify that need, then how do they access that
right?”651
The questions that these cases raise about imbalances of power between parties and between
a party and the tribunal decision-maker relate to systemic inequities that may not be remedied
by adopting theoretical approaches of engagement and dialogue. Sossin states that
“[d]iscretion reflects and reproduces assumptions about power”652 and, in some circumstances,
dialogue may expose power imbalances that would otherwise be masked by legal fictions. 653 He
presents engagement as an alternative to more traditional approaches to discretion that are
detached, technical, and do not reflect the issues most important to parties. 654
That said, he acknowledges that the capability of engagement and dialogue to make a
difference may be limited. Consequently, his model of intimacy may be more difficult to
achieve “where vulnerable groups are affected and where individuals may be dependent on a
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favourable administrative decision for their welfare (as in public housing or refugee setting).”655
In other words, “[w]hen a family’s shelter or individual’s health is at stake and there is nowhere
to turn, […] good intentions of an open and honest official may not be enough.” 656 According to
Sossin, this problem may be addressed by providing “an advocate, guardian or intermediary”
such as a social worker, doctor, state-funded lawyer, or other person who has a fiduciary
obligation to protect the vulnerable person’s interests.657 He asserts that an administrative
decision-maker could owe a similar type of obligation, reflecting the public trust with which
they have been bestowed.658 In this way, the vulnerability of a party could, in some cases,
restrict the scope of that decision-maker’s discretion.659
Cartier analyzes the problem of power imbalances and vulnerable parties to a lesser extent, but
she does address it. She recognizes that vulnerable parties may not be able to deliberate
mutually with a decision-maker in the way the law student did in the example she analyzed. 660
She also affirms that “the administrative state has a responsibility to resist both imposing
norms on vulnerable people and having norms imposed upon it by a powerful stakeholder.” 661
That said, she questions whether this imperative can be meaningfully achieved when tribunals
have a high volume of cases, impose guidelines and directives upon adjudicators, and require
adjudicators to provide justifications that reflect formal requirements of procedural fairness
that may not be genuinely responsive to a vulnerable party’s needs.662
Furthermore, there are factors that may enhance dialogue and engagement when imbalances
of power exist that go beyond accommodations. For example, Sossin refers to more diverse
appointments of decision-makers,663 a practice that Welsh endorses in the context of
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mediation. She states that increasing the number of mediators from “underrepresented
demographics” may act to “signal greater inclusivity and safety for all.”664 Welsh also refers to
institutional efforts to address unconscious bias and to encourage mediators to practice
reflective listening to promote trust and communication. 665 While these factors are not
addressed by my research, they are nonetheless relevant to the theories of discretion advanced
by Sossin, Cartier and Raso.
That said, to the extent that accommodations implemented through procedural decisionmaking are implicated, I will address these questions regarding systemic inequities below.
These inequities undermine the capacity of engaged decision-making to lead to meaningful
procedural accommodations. I will explore restrictions imposed by tribunal statutory mandates,
institutional decisions, and individual decisions in the next section of this chapter.

Barriers to Access to Justice: The Gap between Ideal Theory and Reality
The ideal theories presented by Sossin and Cartier present limitations, as applied in the real
world, when dialogic process may obscure and even reinforce existing structures and power
imbalances, at the expense of the interests of marginalized groups.666 Under these
circumstances, a tribunal’s own statutory mandate, institutional processes, overly technical
approach, or resource limitations undermine engagement between parties and tribunal
decision-makers. This dialogue may not be transparent or meaningful, especially to vulnerable
or marginalized parties. I will address these factors as they relate to the SBT, HRTO and LTB,
how they limit the achievement of these ideal theories, and how they demonstrate systemic
obstacles to procedural decision-making that undermine access to justice.
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A decision-maker’s statutory mandate to resolve a specific question and dispose of matters
efficiently may limit its ability to consider a party as a whole person and the barriers that party
faces. First, all three tribunals have narrow tasks to accomplish and issues to resolve that may
only engage with part of a litigant’s circumstances. Michael Gottheil, formerly the chair of
Social Justice Tribunals Ontario, stated that “the administrative justice landscape, built without
any official plan, coherent jurisdictional zoning, or common design elements, has led to an
uncomfortable community of structures, of varying shapes and sizes, which are difficult to
service, and even more difficult for citizens to navigate.”667
Consequently, upon experiencing discrimination on the basis of disability in the workplace, a
person might lose their job, apply unsuccessfully to ODSP, and be unable to pay rent, engaging
the mandates of all three tribunals. Based on the tribunal file, and the information that a selfrepresented party may disclose to any one of these tribunals without prompting, it could be
difficult for adjudicators to meaningfully respond to potential barriers this person may face.
This fragmented structure imposes additional burdens on parties. They may be required to
explain and prove details relating to their circumstances on multiple occasions, before different
decision-makers, who may not have the time to hear this information and may prematurely
decide it is not relevant. Lorne Sossin and Jamie Baxter observed that a person with concurrent
social benefits and rental housing proceedings “is forced to navigate a set of institutional silos
which impose high financial and informational costs and likely impede the overall quality of
justice services that the tribunals can offer.”668
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While this issue is recognized in administrative law literature and may be particularly apparent
in the context of legal proceedings affecting low-income people,669 the main focus of existing
scholarship is the evaluation of specific reforms that have been or could be implemented. One
of these reforms is tribunal clustering, which can permit tribunals to cross-appoint and crosstrain adjudicators, to co-locate tribunals, and to develop harmonized processes that apply to
multiple tribunals addressing similar situations.670 For example, as part of Social Justice Division
of Tribunals Ontario, the SBT, LTB, and HRTO have a set of common rules. 671 However, litigants
must read these rules together with tribunal-specific rules and policies created by each of these
tribunals separately. In this way, although tribunals in Ontario may share some resources and
standardize some processes, they continue to operate in many ways as separate rather than
integrated entities. Therefore, further reforms may be required to truly address the
fragmentation of tribunal structures.672
Second, all three tribunals are delegated the responsibility to balance efficiency with fairness. 673
The HRTO has an expansive grant of procedural discretion, which may have played a role in the
development of some positive practices detailed above. However, the SBT and the LTB do not
have as explicitly broad powers to create processes and adapt them to the circumstances of
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parties. This issue is compounded by a large volume of cases and limited resources that
decision-makers must consider in striking the difficult balance delegated to them.
Both of these factors may lead to institutional processes and decisions by individual decisionmakers that limit the engagement or dialogue that can occur between one or more parties and
a decision-maker about a procedural issue. Tribunals may adopt procedures that appear to
promote engagement but fail to meaningfully foster transparent decision-making that takes
into account the party as a whole person. Failures to promote access to justice may be masked
by constraining individual decision-makers within restrictive institutional processes, or by a
technical, legalistic view of what procedural fairness or accommodation may require. I will
address each of these two concerns in turn.
The LTB and the Tension Between Institutional and Individual Decisions
The case study of the LTB most starkly demonstrates the tension between institutional
processes meant to promote efficiency and individual decision-makers whose discretion is
significantly limited as a result. In this difficult position, an individual decision-maker’s ability to
ensure fairness and access to justice may be limited in a way that is troubling. Sossin and Raso
have commented on challenges facing individual decision-makers with a dual mandate to
balance fairness with efficiency, who work within a system that is designed to constrain them.
Their analyses demonstrate why, in certain cases, the LTB may be able to provide
accommodations that are responsive to the needs of tenants, while at other times, procedural
decision-making is much less meaningful.
As described in chapter 2, the LTB schedules large dockets in the ordinary course, a problem
that is exacerbated on “superblock” days, when many landlord applications for unpaid rent are
scheduled.674 The Tenant Duty Counsel Review criticized this practice for two reasons. First, it
builds the assumption that many tenants will not appear on their scheduled hearing dates into
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the LTB’s scheduling practices. 675 Second, adjudicators are overwhelmed by the number of
matters they are required to hear, even though many tenants do not attend. 676
Scheduling of hearings at the LTB serves efficiency at the expense of access to justice and
fairness. In contrast to the SBT, where at least some adjudicators consider whether appellants
have not appeared because of their disability,677 the LTB appears to have simply written off
many tenants who do not show up. 678 Instead of taking the time to determine why some
tenants do not appear for their hearings and to address these barriers, LTB policymakers have
built these failures into the system itself. Furthermore, even if a tenant does appear, the LTB
member may not have enough time to properly discuss and adjudicate accommodations to the
hearing process with such a large docket. The dual nature of the LTB’s statutory mandate may
pull decision-makers in opposing directions -- while fairness might require taking more time to
raise and to adjudicate issues of accommodation, efficiency might require placing a greater
onus on a tenant to minimize the time and effort required from the decision-maker.
Sossin addresses this tension inherent in the role of many administrative decision-makers.
Tribunals may assign some decision-makers to determine overall program and policy questions
and other decision-makers to interact with individual litigants.679 This separation means that
policy decisions are made by people who have little or no contact with parties before the
tribunal.680 Conversely individual administrative decision-makers are confronted with both
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institutional pressures and vulnerable people who require their time and attention, and have
difficulty reconciling these competing goals.681
Sossin described this duality, stating that individual decision-makers must, “at the same
moment act as individuals confronting a person in need and as agents of the state dealing with
a file.”682 He illustrates this dilemma through the example of a shelter worker:
For example, I spoke with one welfare official who regularly gave spare change to a
homeless man on his way home from the subway. One afternoon, the homeless man
was not at his regular street corner. The official asked around, concerned for the man's
well-being. He confessed that he almost never displayed this sort of personal attention
for a recipient at the office who failed to show up for an appointment. Bureaucratic
settings, he added, are not conducive to relationships of care.683
Sossin asserts that, as they find themselves in a position where they are able to help some
people but not everyone, decision-makers may begin to feel compassion fatigue and may begin
to blame parties before them for their circumstances.684 Sossin refers to the work of Michael
Lipsky,685 who asserts that street-level bureaucrats, such as police officers, welfare workers, or
court administrators, are faced with the dissonance created by “ideal service models” that do
not account for real world circumstances. 686 Lipsky argues that, confronted with these
pressures, officials may "reject personal responsibility for agency performance.”687 Demanding
ideals may, paradoxically, lead to markedly less than ideal conduct.
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This behaviour may be explained by institutional compromises that have already been made
and how decision-makers may deny responsibility for the system of which they are only a small
part. Robert Cover theorizes that the separation of policy and individual decisions acts to dilute
responsibility between these different levels of decision-makers. He explains that this happens
when “the act of interpretation—of understanding what ought to be done— [is separated]
from the carrying out of this ‘ought to be done’ through violence.” 688 Under these
circumstances, decision-makers who would not ordinarily exercise their discretion to dominate
and control a more vulnerable party, acting alone, may participate in a system that does so.
This situation may be analogous to the introduction of a new computer system, SAMS, that
automated and narrowed the discretion of Ontario Works caseworkers.689 Jennifer Raso’s
interviews with caseworkers demonstrated that it was difficult for these decision-makers to
adapt the decisions that this computer system generated to the circumstances of individuals.
Caseworkers were assigned a high volume of cases, had limited information available to them
about how SAMS processed information, and needed to check the system frequently or enlist
more senior decision-makers to circumvent or override it.690 Raso observed that, at least some
of the caseworkers learned to work around SAMS in limited ways to respond to the needs of at
least some income support recipients. 691 That said, even if a caseworker wanted to make these
changes to each income support recipient for which they were responsible, it was not possible.
In other words, “[g]iven their large caseloads, caseworkers cannot tweak the system for every
client and must selectively ration their efforts.”692
Whether a decision-maker took the time to adjust SAMS in any particular case related to that
caseworker’s view of their mandate and the time available:
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The lengths to which caseworkers will go in their creative responses to SAMS seem to
depend on their commitment to social work norms (such as preventing hardship, or
reaching client-centred decisions), but an equally important determinant is the limited
time that workers have available for each client, especially as any deviation from a
SAMS-imposed decision requires that caseworkers undertake more onerous data entry
tasks, diverting their attention away from their other clients.693
Furthermore, even if some caseworkers continued to be motivated to respond to client needs
pursuant to social work norms, they were required to focus on the computer system and its
language.694 This took time away from the interactions of caseworkers with income support
recipients themselves.695 Therefore, Raso concluded that the freedom of these caseworkers to
make decisions was significantly restricted and “SAMS continues to function as a uniquely
powerful institutional force governing their everyday decisions.”696
This tension is also reflected in the procedural decision-making of the LTB. While in some cases,
LTB members provided a range of accommodations, in other cases, they did not engage
meaningfully with tenants. In deciding whether to engage meaningfully with a party, LTB
decision-makers may be considering their dual statutory mandate and, perhaps more often, the
limited time they have available. LTB members may be more likely to allow accommodation
requests that can be adjudicated quickly, where there is sufficient medical evidence already
available.697 Meanwhile, they will deny other requests outright where there is little or no
evidence, rather than determining whether more evidence may be available. 698 In contrast to
the HRTO and SBT, where decision-makers do occasionally inquire with parties about
accommodations the parties themselves did not raise,699 LTB decision-makers do not.
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Similarly, LTB decision-makers may quickly evaluate barriers to access to justice on their own
rather than engaging with tenants about how that situation affects them. When a tenant
appeared to be participating in the process, an LTB member did not inquire about the reasons
why he wanted an adjournment. 700 Similarly, a member denied an adjournment request
because the tenant, mentioning her fever and back pain, “appeared capable of participating in
the hearing.”701 In a third case, when a tenant’s support worker was not available on the
scheduled date and the tenant made a request in advance that was completely ignored by the
LTB, the adjudicator gave him one hour to call a support person.702 It is possible that these LTB
members decided that, in the name of efficiency, they were required to proceed with the
hearing and could not engage with the tenant further regarding an adjournment or other
accommodations.
The LTB also exhibits similarly flawed practices with respect to interpretation provided at the
hearing. Although the HRTO and the SBT provide and pay for interpreters to address both
language and disability-related barriers,703 the LTB might only do this in certain limited
circumstances, such as sign language or real-time captioning 704 or when a party’s own
interpreter cannot interpret to the required standard.705 However, based on the body of case
law I have reviewed, the LTB does not always intervene to provide an interpreter when one is
needed. In one case, when a tenant’s own interpreter failed to appear on two occasions, the
LTB simply went ahead with the hearing, questioning the tenant’s need for an interpreter in the
first place.706 LTB members have also asked the tenant to identify anything he did not
understand707 or used computer translation to facilitate communication 708 rather than
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adjourning the hearing to arrange interpretation. These solutions are insufficient to address the
meaningful and fair participation of parties at the hearing and undermine the ability of these
tenants to testify credibly and participate fully.
In summary, LTB procedural decisions demonstrate patterns of decision-making that reflect the
tensions described by Sossin and Raso. LTB members find themselves working in a system
which already inherently strikes a particular balance between efficiency and fairness that they
have little power to change. In that system, many tenants to do not appear at hearings at all
and decision-makers do not have the opportunity to meaningfully interact with all tenants who
do attend. Furthermore, while some LTB members may attempt to engage with some tenants
about barriers in the hearing process this inevitably takes time away from other cases. This may
motivate them to focus on easier accommodations to grant, or ones that are obviously
supported by evidence they already have. In contrast, where there is little evidence supporting
an accommodation request, decision-makers may shift responsibility onto tenants. In doing so,
the decision-makers reason that these tenants did not meet their onus, while failing to
investigate the situation themselves. In this way, through the combination of institutional and
individual decisions, some tenants may not be able to participate meaningfully in eviction
hearings.
Statutory Mandate, Expertise of Adjudicators, and Positions Taken by Opposing Parties: A
Comparison of Decision-making at the SBT and HRTO
While the SBT and the HRTO may not be quite as limited as LTB decision-makers with respect to
time pressures, differences in their statutory mandates, the expertise of adjudicators, and the
positions taken by respondents may explain why they strike a balance between fairness and
efficiency in different ways. Access to justice concerns may relate to a wide variety of barriers
to the hearing process. However, my review of tribunal procedural case law in chapter 2
demonstrates that decision-makers at the SBT have interpreted their mandate as incorporating
a greater scope of these concerns, especially as they relate to poverty, as compared to the
HRTO. This may be attributable to the differences in the statutory mandates and expertise of
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decision-makers at these two tribunals, and what those differences mean for the balance these
tribunals must strike between efficiency and fairness at both institutional and individual levels.
The SBT is governed by remedial legislation that decision-makers should interpret “broadly and
liberally and in accordance with its purpose of providing support to persons with disabilities”,
since many income support recipients have a disability.709 Consequently, as the Ontario Court
of Appeal has clearly stated, decision-makers should resolve any ambiguities in favour of the
income support recipient.710 In addition, the SBT may order interim assistance for appellants
who meet all other criteria for ODSP or OW, aside from those at issue on appeal, who would
otherwise “suffer financial hardship during the period needed for the Tribunal to complete its
review and give notice of its decision.”711 Furthermore, the SBT is empowered by statute to pay
for travelling and living expenses to allow parties and witnesses to attend a hearing. 712
The SBT’s mandate of serving the needs of low-income people and persons with disabilities
informs how it balances competing concerns of fairness and efficiency. In particular, this
mandate may require the tribunal to take special care to understand the entirety of an
appellant’s circumstances to ensure fairness in some situations. This is apparent both in the
way accommodations are built into appeal forms, and also the way that some SBT adjudicators
approach procedural accommodations.
The SBT inquires about procedural accommodations on its appeal form, in a way that allows
appellants to raise the issue of language interpretation and disability accommodations while
filling out documents they must complete in any event.713 By filling out one or two boxes, an
appellant is able to start a process that becomes the SBT’s responsibility to continue. This may
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reflect considerations of universal design, informed by the SBT’s mandate to serve persons with
disabilities.714 In other words, the application form meets the needs of the greatest number of
people, including those with disabilities or language barriers, who may find it more difficult to
make a separate, formal request. Rather than requiring them to initiate an additional process,
the SBT accessibly builds procedural accommodation requests into a process that already exists,
consistent with Raso’s theory of human rights values.715
Similarly, at least some SBT members consider whether an appellant may not be able to
participate in or to attend a hearing based on that appellant’s situation as a whole, including
factors that may not be directly related to a disability. For example, in one case, an adjudicator
considered an appellant’s mental health condition in the context of her circumstances,
including the death of her mother and her recent move.716 Meanwhile, in another case, the
adjudicator took notice of an appellant’s documented homelessness and a tendency to lose
touch with caseworkers and healthcare workers.717 In addition, some SBT adjudicators account
for the intersection of multiple disabilities,718 as well as disabilities and language barriers.719
In this context, appellants often propose accommodations without opposition, and sometimes
with consent, from the Director. Consequently, the scope of SBT adjudicators to grant these
accommodations may be greater, as compared to the HRTO, where the respondent is a private
party who is more likely to object.
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This approach may reflect Sossin’s concept of special care taken by decision-makers with a
statutory mandate to serve vulnerable people that reflects public trust.720 As Sossin suggests,
income support recipients are vulnerable and the social welfare legislation that creates the SBT
should be interpreted in their favour, such that, in Sossin’s words, they receive “the fullest
possible benefit.”721 Adjudicators may be open to ameliorating a wide range of barriers that
many income support recipients face, as well as denouncing disrespectful conduct and failures
to accommodate by regional offices.722
Nonetheless, the approach of SBT adjudicators in every case may not always reflect this level of
heightened care. For example, one appellant’s request for an in-person hearing was denied
because she required a hearing on the ground level, based on a combination of physical and
mental health disabilities.723 The SBT member determined that no accessible location existed in
the municipality where the appellant lived, concluded that the accommodation was not
reasonable, and scheduled the matter to be heard by telephone.724 It may not be reasonable
for all SBT offices to have ground level hearing rooms. However, the SBT might have the
resources to arrange to use another location without undue hardship. 725 The reasoning
employed by the member resembles rationales that are more often adopted by HRTO
adjudicators, reflecting their legal training and human rights expertise. Justifications of
procedural discretion using this kind of legal language may mask compromises favouring
efficiency, the conservation of limited resources, and the procedural fairness entitlements of
opposing parties.
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The Code has quasi-constitutional status and, similar to income support legislation, must be
given “a broad and liberal interpretation” because “the protections afforded by human rights
legislation are fundamental to our society.” 726 That said, in contrast to the SBT’s enabling
legislation, the Code creates a hybrid system that provides scope for non-adversarial,
inquisitorial procedures, while also balancing the opposing interests of private parties. Although
the Code does not empower the HRTO to award costs against applicants,727 applicants also
cannot receive costs if they are successful.728 The Code does not specifically direct the HRTO to
take any positive actions to address barriers of financial hardship. However, the Code does
require adjudicators, with legal training and training “in alternative adjudicative practices”,729 to
balance departures from traditional procedure with the interests of and prejudice to
respondents.
As noted in chapter 2, the HRTO uses active adjudication to raise and explain accommodation
needs, to assist parties in obtaining relevant medical evidence to support accommodation
requests, to case manage applications, to depart from typical processes for hearing preliminary
issues, and to adapt the way they receive the applicant’s evidence during a hearing. As well, the
HRTO is willing to grant accommodation requests, even for multiple adjournments, despite the
objections of respondents. 730 In this regard, Flaherty explains that, “active adjudicators take on
some additional measure of responsibility for the outcome of the proceeding.” 731 Therefore,
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730 Tahir, supra note 420 (second adjournment); Pollock, supra note 427 at para 23 (third adjournment)
731 Flaherty, supra note 395 at 287
727

132

HRTO adjudicators may, in some situations, exercise their discretion consistent with Sossin’s
concept of special care, similar to the SBT.
However, in a few cases, HRTO adjudicators denied accommodation requests because there
was no Code ground. These cases required the HRTO to address requests to change the hearing
location732 or to have a hearing in person.733 In one case, this strict human rights framework
allowed an adjudicator to deny a request to move a hearing location when an applicant
asserted that he could not afford to travel to the hearing location. 734
This limited interpretation of access to justice as requiring only the rights guaranteed Human
Rights Code may undermine the ability of the HRTO to address financial barriers to
participation. “[R]eceipt of public assistance” is a Code ground with respect to discrimination in
housing,735 and poverty may sometimes be captured through the intersection of other Code
grounds.736 However, poverty is not a stand-alone Code ground that applies to the tribunal
context. This technical approach may therefore disregard barriers to accessing the hearing
process in a way that may undermine access to justice.
Sossin describes decision-making characterized by legal formalism, and this approach is part of
his motivation for reframing discretion in a more personal, informal and humane way. In his
analysis, Sossin addresses two types of morality. He argues that one view of morality might
provide a technical answer based on legal rules while another may attempt to apply the rules
more purposively to fit the circumstances of a particular person.737 In this example, HRTO
adjudicators must decide whether to strictly apply Code requirements to determine the content
of procedural fairness, or whether to view fairness in a more flexible way.
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The strict application of human rights law in the cases cited above may reflect the need to
balance fairness to opposing private parties, the legal training of adjudicators, the limited
resources of the tribunal, and a statutory scheme that does not specifically address financial
hardship. Legally trained adjudicators faced with limited resources, a mandate to balance
fairness to both parties and, more generally, fairness with efficiency of tribunal processes, may
be motivated to provide a technical, legal justification for their decisions that will withstand
court scrutiny. Nonetheless, these legal fictions might undermine meaningful dialogue about
accommodations, obscuring rather than illuminating how the interests of opposing parties and
issues of resources are considered.
For example, the HRTO is more likely to grant a request to change the hearing venue when
respondents consent and the request is made well in advance of the hearing. In three of the
five cases I identified where the HRTO changed the hearing location, the respondent consented,
and in the other two cases, no position from the respondent is described.738 In contrast, only
one of the requests that was denied was on consent from both parties. 739 This request was
initiated by the respondent, although the applicant raised physical and financial accessibility
issues upon agreeing to it. It is possible that the HRTO did not view this request as sufficiently
important to the applicant. Furthermore, the HRTO denied two requests to change the venue
that were advanced shortly before the hearing date, even though one of these requests was
based on disability, a Code ground.740 While the adjudicator was open to other
accommodations to address the applicant’s disability, she decided it was unreasonable to move
the hearing at such short notice. Therefore, while the explicit reasoning animating some of
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Ruffolo, supra note 427 at para 14; Schiller, supra note 427 at para 4; UM, supra note 427 at para 2. In Gonder,
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these decisions may relate to Code grounds, it is possible that the outcomes also account for
the positions taken by respondents and prejudice to them.
In addition, holding in-person hearings and changing their locations can implicate significant
resource considerations. In denying one request to change the location of the hearing, the
adjudicator stated that “the Tribunal has to consider not only the interests of the parties in a
particular case, but also the institutional and public interest in having the Tribunal make the
best possible use of its limited resources.”741 While these are valid concerns, it is possible that,
upon receiving such a general statement, the parties in this case may not have felt that their
needs were specifically addressed.
In summary, the statutory mandates and expertise of adjudicators at the HRTO and SBT may
explain some of the similarities and differences in their procedural discretionary decisionmaking. Social assistance legislation specifically addresses financial hardship of income support
recipients, is often meant to benefit persons with disabilities, and should be interpreted in
favour of the recipient where ambiguity exists. Consequently, institutional and individual
decision-makers may take notice of these statutory signals that suggest that special care must
be taken to ensure fairness.
Meanwhile, the HRTO has greater procedural discretion that may allow adjudicators an even
broader scope to address the needs and circumstances of applicants in ways that are also
consistent with special care. However, respondents to human rights applications are more likely
to object to accommodation requests than the Director in the context of SBT proceedings. In
some cases, prejudice to the respondent may motivate HRTO adjudicators to provide more
careful, technical justifications for their decisions to grant or to reject accommodation requests.
While these decisions may be individually justified in their particular context, the reasons
provided by adjudicators may mask inclusive dialogue that is meant to expose systemic
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inequities and resource allocations – an ironic result given the overall human rights purpose of
the Code and its consistent interpretation with substantive equality.
Limited Resources, Understaffing of Tribunals, and Undue Hardship
While decision-makers may not always address undue hardship, in the context of the Code,
trends in procedural discretionary decisions and information about tribunal resources shed
some light on potential limitations facing the SBT, HRTO, and LTB. Most tribunal decisions that
explicitly reference undue hardship are actually about frustration of the hearing process from
the perspective of the institution and not about undue hardship to a party in that process.
Moreover, situations when tribunals place the onus on potentially vulnerable parties may
demonstrate even further the limits of tribunal resource allocations.
It may be difficult to reach the undue hardship standard under the Code in respect of any
individual case before the SBT, LTB or HRTO. All three tribunals belong to the Social Justice
Division of Tribunals Ontario.742 This smaller cluster, which includes five other tribunals, was
projected to receive a budget of 48 million dollars in the 2019-2020 fiscal year.743 The LTB also
collects money from filing fees of about 11.6 million dollars a year.744 In addition, Tribunals
Ontario and the Ontario government as a whole have significant resources that must be taken
into account, since undue hardship is measured against the resources of the provincial
government as a whole.745 This may explain why individual procedural decisions by adjudicators
from all three tribunals do not refer explicitly to matters of resources in evaluating undue
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hardship. The threshold of undue hardship is high, and costs would have to be particularly
prohibitive to reach it.
Nevertheless, resource issues may implicitly drive institutional decisions made by all three
tribunals and approaches they take on a much larger scale which places the burden on parties
requesting accommodations. For example, while the SBT and HRTO clearly communicate that
they will arrange and pay for interpreters for languages that are not French or English, 746 the
LTB’s website states that it “does not usually” do this.747 The website explains that parties “are
expected to arrange for someone to interpret” for them, either by bringing someone they know
to the hearing or by hiring a professional interpreter.748 This policy may be influenced by a lack
of resources, since the LTB hears many more cases than the SBT and the HRTO.749 Although the
LTB may arrange for interpretation in rare circumstances, on a case-by-case basis, it does not
explain any criteria or provide any further guidance on its website. 750
This lack of transparency reinforces power imbalances, since parties are less likely to request an
interpreter without any reason to believe that request will be successful. Tenants may not be
able to pay a professional interpreter. Even if they can bring a friend or relative, a nonprofessional interpreter is not likely to be as impartial or competent as a professional, or to be
viewed that way by an adjudicator. As well, a language barrier could also dissuade tenants from
appearing for their hearings altogether, reinforcing their systemic exclusion from the
adjudication process.
Notably, the LTB’s practice of scheduling a large number of matters, on the assumption that
many tenants will not appear, may create delays and consume more resources than it initially
appears. If tenants did not attend a hearing date or did not feel that they were properly
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748 Ibid
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accommodated, they may bring a request for review. Even though these requests, as they
relate to access to justice concerns, are rarely granted,751 they still must be addressed using the
time and resources of adjudicators and other tribunal staff.752 Rather than holding two
proceedings for some cases, it may be more efficient and more legitimate to address barriers to
tenant attendance before the LTB on a systemic basis.
At all three tribunals, when it becomes apparent that an accommodation may be necessary in
the midst of a hearing, a frequent response is to grant an adjournment to reschedule to
another day or to give a party time to make an accommodation request or support it with
evidence.753 While an adjournment may be responsive to the needs and circumstances of a
party under some circumstances, it becomes less meaningful if a proceeding continues to be
adjourned because the appropriate accommodation is difficult to pinpoint or arrange, or
because an adjudicator does not have time to engage with a party about the issue.
Repeated adjournments create more process, which in itself may create barriers for certain
parties. At some point, parties may find that it is not worth negotiating about accommodations
further.754 As well, many decisions that do engage the concept of undue hardship do so after
significant delay has occurred.755 Where tribunals add to this delay, they may be adding to the
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potential prejudice to the other party or to the frustration of the tribunal process which may
ultimately lead to denial of the accommodation request.
In addition, accommodation needs are more likely to be addressed where the tribunal already
has some relevant evidence -- in an appeal of ODSP benefits, a human rights application
premised at least in part on disability, or a tenant application before the LTB. However, where a
human rights application is made on other grounds, or where a proceeding is initiated by the
opposing party, as in the majority of cases before the LTB, this information may not be
available.
Under these circumstances, all three tribunals have decided, at least in some situations, to
restrict their role to assist applicants in gathering additional evidence that may be needed.
While SBT adjudicators may explain the accommodation process and let parties know what
information they need, 756 and while the HRTO may even draft questions for a doctor, 757 it is
then left to the party to ensure that this information is submitted to the tribunal promptly.
Meanwhile, parties may not have a family doctor or specialist to prepare the report, it may be
difficult for a party to schedule an appointment with that doctor, or the doctor may charge fees
for preparing reports. By placing the onus only on parties to obtain this information themselves,
at their own expense, tribunals may be implicitly creating new barriers to accessing the hearing
process. They may also build these barriers into the process by subsequently dismissing
accommodation requests for failing to follow procedural orders, such as payment of rent into
the LTB, which may be a condition of receiving an adjournment. 758 These practices reflect the
tension, discussed earlier, between promoting efficiency and agency performance and engaging
with a party in need.

SG, supra note 471 at para 22; ATA, supra note 458 at paras 56-60; File No TSL-67570-15-RV2, supra note 561 at
paras 8-17; File No CEL-62600-16-RV, supra note 561 at paras 22-27; File No HOL-00395-16, supra note 561 at
paras 12-19
756 1412-13963 (Re), supra note 364 at paras 4-6; 1611-08690 (Re), supra note 318 at paras 2-5; 1704-02853 (Re),
supra note 289 at para 10
757 Noor, supra note 454 at para 7; Wolfe, supra note 454 at para 9; Garisto, supra note 454 at paras 21-22
758 File No TSL-67570-15-RV2, supra note 561 at paras 8-17; File No CEL-62600-16-RV, supra note 561 at paras 2227; File No HOL-00395-16, supra note 561 at paras 7-23
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Furthermore, practices of addressing accessibility problems with adjournments and placing a
significant onus on parties may be further exacerbated by a shortage of adjudicators. As of May
2020, Tribunal Watch Ontario reports that the SBT, LTB and HRTO have significantly fewer
adjudicators as compared to only two years prior.759 Esi Codjoe, a former Vice-Chair at the
HRTO, reports that the tribunal complement of Vice-Chairs has recently decreased by nine and
its complement of Members has recently decreased by fourteen.760 The ratio of Vice-Chairs to
Members has also decreased, despite the more limited responsibilities of Members. 761 Tribunal
Watch Ontario infers that the Ontario government rejected appointment and re-appointment
recommendations from Chairs and observes that reappointment terms are shorter, sometimes
as brief as 6 months.762
If pressures on adjudicators increase significantly, this may create a situation which, at some
point, becomes untenable. In early January, the Ontario Ombudsman began investigating
delays at the LTB, attributed, at least in part, to shortages of adjudicators.763 In addition, parties
at the HRTO have experienced delays in scheduling hearings and mediations. 764 Understaffing
may mean that there is less time for adjudicators to engage with litigants and that some
positive practices may be less effective, such as case management of each HRTO application by
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a dedicated adjudicator. As well, adjournments to arrange accommodations may create more
prejudice to the opposing party, and may be less likely to be granted, where significant delay
has already occurred.
In summary, although issues of resources are rarely addressed directly in tribunal procedural
decisions, they may operate in the background to animate how adjudicators exercise their
discretion and to limit their ability to act in individual cases. All three tribunals may not have
the resources to take on a more proactive role to investigate and arrange for accommodations.
However, the unintended consequence is that parties are more likely to receive
accommodations when requests are more closely related to evidence and documents
previously filed with the tribunal. In addition, the large number of cases the LTB hears each year
may explain why it does not consistently arrange for and fund interpretation and why they
schedule high volumes of cases to be heard, especially on certain days. Finally, the recent trend
of understaffing tribunals in Ontario, including the SBT, LTB and HRTO, has the potential to
significantly undermine the ability of adjudicators to take additional time to address and to
arrange accommodations as needed.

Accountability and Judicial Review
Having identified some negative practices, it is important to consider when and how tribunals
may be held accountable if they undermine full and fair participation in the hearing process.
Cartier and Sossin take somewhat opposing views with respect to the efficacy of judicial review
in promoting engagement and dialogue. 765 Cartier states that there may be a role for judicial
review in supervising dialogue between decision-makers and parties. In contrast, Sossin asserts
that judicial review, at least in the way it is currently undertaken, may undermine authentic and
transparent communication and engagement.
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In my view, principles articulated in Divisional Court case law, binding on all three tribunals,
have promoted or have the potential to promote positive decision-making practices.
Nonetheless, there are limitations to what a court can do without observing the interaction
between the decision-maker and the party, and especially if reviewing courts invariably take a
legalistic view of the bases on which it can intervene. This demonstrates that there may be a
role for other, more informal accountability mechanisms, which are beyond the scope of this
paper.
Cartier suggests that courts are in a position to evaluate administrative decisions with reference
to dialogue, while also taking on a role consistent with the autonomy of administrative
bodies.766 This responsibility, according to Cartier, would be two-fold. First, courts must
determine whether dialogue took place between the administrative decision-maker and the
party.767 If not, a court may impose a procedural fairness requirement to address this deficiency
-- for example, by stating that the administrative decision-maker should hold a hearing or give
reasons.768 Second, if dialogue did take place, a court must decide whether the decision is
“authentic and responsive to that dialogue.”769 While there may be a range of possible
outcomes that a decision-maker can reach, only some, or even one, of these outcomes may be
responsive to the dialogue that actually took place. 770 In Cartier’s words, “dialogue does not so
much restrict the margin of manoeuvre of the decision maker but positively indicates the way
in which the appropriate decision can be reached.” 771
Consistent with Cartier’s approach, the Divisional Court has outlined some broad principles that
tribunals could use, or have used, to facilitate engagement regarding accommodation
processes. For example, in several cases, SBT adjudicators cited a Divisional Court holding that
they must consider whether an appellant did not appear at a scheduling hearing date because
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of a disability.772 In these cases, based on the medical evidence already available to them, these
adjudicators decided to adjourn to provide appellants with opportunity to explain why they
were not able to attend. There is also a Divisional Court decision, described above, which
instructs HRTO adjudicators to raise and to consider procedural alterations to the hearing
process even if self-represented parties do not raise them.773 Based on this case, HRTO
adjudicators may be required to inquire, respectfully and without reference to stereotypes, into
accommodation needs and other procedural changes that self-represented parties may not
raise on their own.
Finally, the Divisional Court has also outlined in the LTB context what the duty to accommodate
requires and that it is the responsibility of the Board.774 In two cases I identified, adjudicators
who were concerned about prejudice to the landlord stated in error that the duty to
accommodate rests in whole or in part on the landlord.775 In Beaux Properties, the Divisional
Court laid out the relevant distinction succinctly and clearly:
The tenant suffers from mental illness. As a matter of common sense, this disability
affects her conduct as a tenant and as a litigant […] [T]he landlord does have a duty to
accommodate the tenant to the point of undue hardship.
So too does the Landlord and Tenant Board in ensuring that the tenant's interests are
properly put before the Board so a just determination of the underlying issues may be
rendered on the merits. This the Landlord and Tenant Board did not do. It should have
granted the second adjournment. What other steps may be required to accommodate
the tenant in the Landlord Tenant Board process is for the Landlord and Tenant Board to
decide, but the accommodation must accord the tenant full and fair participation in the
process to the point of undue hardship. 776
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In addition, the LTB member in one of these cases ignored the “undue” element of undue
hardship, asserting that any financial hardship was sufficient.777 Judicial review may be an
appropriate forum to correct obvious errors of law of this type and to outline general principles
tribunals must follow to grant procedural accommodations.
However, Cartier acknowledges that her analysis, based on a few Supreme Court of Canada
cases, may not account for the way adjudicators decide run-of-the-mill cases in a much
different context.778 She questions that judicial review could motivate decision-makers to
provide transparent reasons, or, conversely “to take formal but hollow steps--that is, to hide
their real motivations and write down reasons that appear to comply with the substantive
requirements of fairness.”779 This more skeptical view is adopted by Sossin, who illustrates
some of the limitations and incentives that may be created by judicial review.
Sossin criticizes the characterization of procedural fairness and, specifically, the duty to give
reasons, in the law governing judicial review. In Sossin’s words, “[i]ntimacy begins with honesty,
law, by contrast, begins with fiction.” 780 He conceives of procedural fairness more broadly as
what is required for a transparent, mutual exchange of “inward knowledge” between a party
and a decision-maker.781 According to Sossin, courts could require more than just a “boilerplate” justification, and could interrogate decisions to understand “the individual values or
systemic assumptions” the decision-maker considered.782 However, current principles of judicial
review are premised on a more adversarial relationship, where an administrative decisionmaker must provide the minimum process required to fairly deny the positions, claims, and
rights of parties.783
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The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed this traditional approach in Vavilov. The Court referred
to leading cases on procedural fairness to explain why the reasonableness of a decision must be
evaluated against a standard of “responsive justification” and how reasons are essential to this
analysis.784 The Court later explained that:
Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the
reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes. The principle of responsive
justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the
affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the
legislature’s intention. This includes decisions with consequences that threaten an
individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood.785
This characterization of reasons, as justifying the act of taking rights away, may motivate
decision-makers to be less authentic and to shore up decisions as much as they can.
A recent Ontario Divisional Court decision, referencing Vavilov, demonstrates one facet of this
problem.786 This case was brought by a foreign-trained dentist, Dr. Irinie Mattar, who failed an
examination to become accredited in Canada by the National Dental Examining Board. 787 The
court required the Board to address an argument advanced by Dr. Mattar about her mental
state during her examination.788 Dr. Mattar asserted that, when she was treated unfairly by an
invigilator, she had “a nervous breakdown”, “couldn’t stop crying”, and “was panicking until the
end of the exam”.789 After receiving the Board’s negative decision, she also explained she had
chronic migraines and wanted to provide further medical evidence. 790 The Board refused to
receive this additional information.791
However, in its decision on judicial review, the court did not confront the obvious possibility
that the Board did not want to explicitly state whether it believed Dr. Mattar. The court listed a
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number of possible rationales the administrative body could have offered, 792 appearing to have
no interest in scrutinizing the Board’s chain of reasoning and whether it reflected the dialogue
that occurred. In other words, the court did not require transparent or authentic reasons – any
rationale that could be supported by the evidence was good enough.
In contrast, Sossin recommends that courts could ask whether a decision meets a “standard of
meaningfulness, truth and honesty.” 793 On judicial review, judges could determine the values
the decision-maker considered based on the reasons provided, and whether these norms were
explained accessibly in the decision.794 According to Sossin, judges could prefer “fuller, clearer,
more comprehensive, genuine reasons” that flow from the dialogue between the decisionmaker and the parties.795 This would require more than simply any justification that is logical
and flows from some evidence within the record. 796
Returning to Mattar, applying such a standard could require the Board to make an explicit
finding of credibility. This finding would be based on the evidence provided by Dr. Mattar and
the invigilators of the examination, rather than stereotypes about immigrants to Canada or
persons with disabilities. To make this finding, the Board could have received the medical
evidence that Dr. Mattar wished to provide, engaged with her more meaningfully, and made a
more transparent decision that responded to her arguments. This process would have the
potential to uncover, rather than veil, the power imbalances that the Divisional Court
referenced but never explicitly addressed.797
In practical terms, however, Sossin’s standard for administrative reasons may be difficult for
courts to apply without observing and understanding the interactions between the decision-
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maker and the parties. It may not be workable for decision-makers responsible for the volume
of cases at the LTB, SBT and HRTO to outline, in detail, every interaction, argument, or piece of
evidence in each case. Even if they could, Sossin questions whether such a decision would
reflect the entirely uncensored views of a decision-maker when an adversarial judicial review
process exists.798 That said, he does concede that more detailed reasons “would begin to
illuminate the gap between the stated and unstated justifications for decision-making” that
courts could then analyze.799 Finally, the ultimate decision will not always accurately describe a
party’s own experience of the administrative process, even if it describes the essential
interactions that took place.
For example, in Zhou, the Divisional Court refused to find a breach of procedural fairness when
tenants did not understand the oral submissions provided by the landlord’s lawyer at the
hearing, despite having access to an interpreter.800 The LTB Member adjourned the oral hearing
and gave the tenants over two months to have the landlord’s written submissions translated
into Mandarin, presumably at their own expense. 801 However, when the Divisional Court
decided that the hearing was fair, after the tenants raised the written hearing as an issue, it did
not address whether this solution enabled the tenants to meaningfully understand and reply to
the landlord’s submissions. 802 It was sufficient that this was an attempt at accommodation, for
the tenants benefit, whether or not it was actually responsive to the tenants’ needs and
circumstances.
Since doctrines of procedural fairness and the duty to give reasons may not be responsive to a
party’s actual experience of the administrative process and the actual barriers a vulnerable
party may experience, other accountability mechanisms may be necessary. Recommendations
regarding specific solutions fall outside the manageable scope of research for this thesis, as
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they should be informed by the experiences and views of marginalized communities. This
would require particularly time-consuming additional research. However, I do recognize that
there are other options that are less formal and potentially more accessible than judicial
review.
For example, the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) has an independent Fair
Practices Commission. This Commission communicates informally with parties and with WSIB
upper level management to investigate and resolve issues relating to unreasonable delays,
inappropriate or biased behaviour and decision-making, decisions communicated without clear
reasons, and decision-making that ignores the evidence of a party or Board policies and
guidelines.803 In addition, upon receiving complaints from many parties regarding the same
issue, it may also observe and address systemic issues. A more informal process like this one
could have the potential to mediate power imbalances, improve communication, and provide a
measure of accountability that may be inaccessible to vulnerable parties.
The Commission’s mandate includes building relationships between WSIB staff and the
employers and workers who they serve, by facilitating communication and offering creative
solutions.804 For example, in 2019, the Commission received a complaint from an injured
worker who was hospitalized during her return to work.805 The worker believed that her
worsening condition was directly related to her accepted PTSD claim, but the WSIB initially
disagreed.806 The Commission made inquiries with a manager and then a director. 807 These
inquiries eventually led to a WSIB-sponsored psychological assessment and a new course of
action with respect to return to work.808 This solution was reached informally without the
injured worker having to launch a formal appeal while participating in a process that was
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negatively affecting her health. Meanwhile, in another case, a worker and the WSIB had a
miscommunication about the termination of his employment, and the WSIB cut his benefits
abruptly.809 The worker needed this decision reversed quickly so that he could pay his rent and
avoid eviction.810 The Fair Practices Commission raised the issue with a manager who corrected
the WSIB’s decision much more quickly than a formal appeal ever could. 811 In both of these
examples, promoting meaningful communication led to an efficient solution that was
responsive to the worker’s circumstances.
While judicial review provides some level of accountability and allows courts to outline broad
principles regarding the minimum requirements of procedural fairness, it may not be an
appropriate forum to consider whether dialogue or engagement took place and to measure the
quality of that communication. As already noted, accountability structures are beyond the
scope of this paper. However, other more informal models may exist or may be developed that
can address power imbalances and structural inequities in a more accessible and meaningful
way.

Conclusion
The comparison of ideal theories of engagement and dialogue with actual decision-making
practices of tribunals in exercising their procedural discretion demonstrates some troubling
trends. A few positive tribunal practices may foster engagement and dialogue by providing
transparent information or proactively addressing accommodations and promoting
engagement. However, other practices may undermine meaningful interactions or mask a
tribunal’s abdication of responsibility for certain matters. Some of these problems may be
amplified by the division of responsibility between institutional and individual decision-makers,
and the justification of decisions using technical rationales informed by legal training of the
adjudicator and the prospect of judicial review. These circumstances might place a difficult or
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impossible onus on vulnerable parties to successfully request the accommodations that they
need to meaningfully participate in the hearing process.
Although all three tribunals have limited resources and a difficult mandate to balance efficiency
with fairness, excluding parties from the hearing process cannot be consistent with that
mandate. In the words of Patricia Williams, “[s]ome structures are the direct products of people
and social forces who wanted them that way.” 812 These tribunal systems are inevitably
informed by legal traditions which have historically ignored and alienated many of the
vulnerable populations who are meant to access them.813 Future research may build on my
findings by analyzing potential reforms that are supported by the lived experiences of members
of marginalized groups who interact with these tribunal systems.
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Some Final Observations
After analyzing the theoretical basis of discretionary decision-making and comparing it to
tribunal case law, a logical next step would be to recommend specific reforms to both
institutional and individual decision-making practices. I will address how future work may build
on my findings and how external factors, such as the current pandemic, also have the potential
to motivate change.
My research findings may be extended through conducting interviews with tribunal
adjudicators and front-line staff, participants in the hearing process who support litigants, such
as lawyers, social workers, doctors and advocacy organizations, and, most importantly, a
diverse group of vulnerable parties, who face a variety of barriers to accessing the hearing
process. These interviews may also address factors identified in the procedural justice literature
relating to what extent parties feel that they have a meaningful voice in the proceeding, such as
whether they have received trustworthy consideration, and how they perceived any imbalances
of power. Interviews with tribunal staff could also address factors analyzed by procedural
justice scholars, such as the recruitment and training of adjudicators.
This work might also be informed by changes made by other tribunals serving low-income
parties and opinions of litigants regarding whether these reforms have been successful. 814 For
example, the Social Security Tribunal (SST), which adjudicates disputes relating to federal social
assistance programs such as Employment Insurance and Canada Pension Plan-Disability
benefits, recently implemented reforms to improve accessibility and address long delays.815 It
removed the requirement for a lawyer and engaged an expert in plain language to improve
written decisions.816 It interpreted its regulations to allow it to obtain documents directly from
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Employment and Social Development Canada, rather than requiring litigants to submit them.817
It also recently assigned tribunal staff to call litigants in advance of their hearings to explain the
tribunal’s process.818 Some of these changes have the potential to bring the SST closer to
adopting a process where fewer accommodations are required in the first place, where
opportunities to request accommodations are built into that process, and where the tribunal
could support litigants in making these requests. The experiences of litigants who have engaged
with these new processes may demonstrate positive practices and further improvements that
could be implemented in other tribunal settings.
While changes at the SST were motivated by delays and flawed processes, sometimes change is
triggered by events and pressures external to tribunal performance. As COVID-19 swept across
the world and businesses and government offices began to close, new solutions were needed
to accommodate the new reality of social distancing. The Ontario government quickly halted
evictions to ensure that tenants who found their incomes reduced would not lose their
housing.819 Meanwhile, the HRTO and the SBT continued to hear at least some matters in
writing and by teleconference.820 The HRTO has stated that litigants who cannot participate in a
hearing remotely may contact the Registrar to have the date rescheduled. 821 In contrast, the
SBT presumes that hearings will proceed remotely, though they are willing to grant
adjournments on a case-by-case basis.822
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For litigants who would find a remote hearing to be more accessible, the normalization of these
practices may demonstrate to tribunals that this request is not as onerous as it may have
seemed. Justice Myers of the Ontario Superior Court recently issued a ruling addressing video
hearings, opining that:
In my view, in 2020, use of readily available technology is part of the basic skillset
required of civil litigators and courts. This is not new and, unlike the pandemic, did not
arise on the sudden. However, the need for the court to operate during the pandemic
has brought to the fore the availability of alternative processes and the imperative of
technological competency. Efforts can and should be made to help people who remain
uncomfortable to obtain any necessary training and education. 823
Adapting to the use of these technologies to address the COVID-19 pandemic could mean that
accommodation requests that require them may be more likely to be accepted even after inperson hearings resume. However, it is difficult to predict for certain what will happen once the
pandemic is over, and when these adapted processes are not needed for everyone.
As time passes, many systemic problems that have been highlighted in the last few months may
be addressed, or the status quo may continue to reinforce existing inequities. For example, in
response to the pandemic, ODSP recipients received only a small increase to their benefits,
which each person or family had to individually request.824 Meanwhile, even with this top up,
their total monthly benefits continued to be much less than the Canada Emergency Response
Benefit.825 Disability advocates raised concerns about the Ontario government’s medical triage
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protocol and whether it protects the interests of persons with disabilities. 826 The institution of
enforcement measures to promote social distancing raised criticisms and concerns about racial
profiling.827 Furthermore, Toronto communities with higher proportions of low income and
racialized people have experienced comparatively higher rates of COVID-19 infection, a trend
that has also been observed in Montreal, and in other parts of the world. 828
Who receives support, who is targeted by enforcement efforts, and who suffers the most
during a crisis can reflect fundamental inequities built into governmental systems and
programs. The response to these failings, including the recent protests and demands for action
regarding racism against Black people, highlight the need for systemic change in many areas,
including tribunals that adjudicate matters of discrimination. 829
These overarching inequities may also demonstrate the importance of focusing on both
processes and outcome in the context of future research and in recommending reforms. While
a fair outcome may not be possible without a fair procedure, seemingly “fair” and “accessible”
procedures may be relied upon to justify flawed outcomes. The best appellate procedures
cannot increase ODSP benefits. The most effective protections at the LTB cannot create
affordable housing. And the most accessible and efficient HRTO processes would not be
required as frequently with more effective systemic efforts to combat discrimination.
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Justice Rosalie Abella recently gave a lecture about the meaning of access to justice and the
importance of just outcomes, stating that:
We can't talk seriously about access to justice without getting serious about how
inaccessible the result, not the system, is for most people. Process is the map, lawyers
are the drivers, law is the highway and justice is the destination […] If, much of the time,
the public can't get there because the maps are too complicated, then, as Gertrude
Stein said, ‘There's no there there.’ And if there's no ‘there there,’ what's the point of
having a whole system to get to where almost no one can afford to go? 830
Future research must reflect the lived experience of marginalized communities and their
opinions about tribunal processes and outcomes to recommend reforms. Some of these
reforms may improve existing processes and structures. However, others may require much
more fundamental changes to amend legislation, redistribute resources, and alter institutional
processes. Even though tribunal procedures should promote full, fair and meaningful
participation, the path forward must also lead to a just destination.
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